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With the advent of digital convergence, incumbent telephone and cable companies 
have begun to offer their services, such as voice telephony, Internet and TV in so-called 
triple play packages. While carefully recognizing the technological, legal and economic 
framework of the fixed-line telecommunications industry, this book investigates whether 
bundling is indeed a profitable pricing strategy for the firms and if it can possibly facili-
tate the leverage of market power into neighboring markets. In contrast to previous work 
on bundling, a symmetric duopoly market structure is considered, with two firms having 
market power in their respective home markets, but without any clear ex-ante advantage 
for either firm on the converged market.
This book also serves as a basic introduction into the technological, economic and re-
gulatory concepts of communications as well as into the theory of bundling.
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Introduction
The communications industry is one of the key drivers of economic growth (Ro¨ller and Wa-
verman 2001) and has recently, following the liberalization of the sector in the late twentieth
century, undergone a tremendous transformation. In particular, digital convergence is at present
a key factor in the developments underlying electronic communications (OECD 2006). The
notion of digital convergence has its origins in the early 1980s when Pool (1983) predicted a
“convergence of modes” which would eventually integrate every communications service into
one grand system. In fact, Latzer (1997) divides the convergence phenomenon into two distinct
phases. In the first phase, beginning in the 1960s, telecommunications and data communica-
tions started to converge. This phase of convergence has subsequently been labeled as telematics
(Nora and Minc 1980). The second phase, which Latzer calls mediamatics, was characterized
by convergence of telematics with mass media and begun in the early 1990s. Today, the term
digital convergence is widely used and therefore eludes precise definition. The authors of the
most comprehensive overviews on the topic, such as Baldwin, McVoy, and Steinfield (1996) and
Yoffie (1997), follow the original notion expressed by Pool, however, and envision the emer-
gence of an integrated broadband network. For the course of this thesis, I will also follow this
notion and adopt a definition put forward by the European Commission (COM 1997).
Definition (Digital Convergence). Digital Convergence refers to the the ability of different
network platforms to carry essentially similar kinds of services.
Digital Convergence can take place at different levels. Damjanovic (2002), for example,
differentiates between technological, regulatory and economic convergence. While there is a
significant body of literature concerned with technological and regulatory convergence, Bauer
(2007) points out that economic “literature fails to embed convergence in a broader economic
theory of networks and service provision”. Furthermore, he concludes that “convergence un-
folds in ways that are more complicated and with effects that are more multilayered than com-
monly recognized”.
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It is the aim of this thesis to fill into this hiatus of economic literature. More precisely,
I consider the competition between integrated network operators, such as telephone and ca-
ble network incumbents. Digital convergence has led to a platform competition between these
two network operators, i.e. between the services provided by them. In most leading OECD
countries today, former telecommunication monopolists offer not only Internet and telephony
services over their network, but also digital TV (Ortiz Jr. 2006). On the contrary, regional cable
network monopolists, have also invested in network digitization in order to augment their tradi-
tional TV broadcasting service by a telephony and Internet service themselves. Maldoom et al.
(2005, p.80) affirm that consumers view the services delivered over different platforms as close
substitutes. While each network provider has a strategic advantage on his home market, both
firms compete head-to-head on the converged markets for market share and profits.1 I argue
that digital convergence has created a prisoners’ dilemma which forced the network operators
into entering each others markets: Each firm found it profitable to capture a share of the com-
petitor’s market and hence no one could commit not to do so. Consequently, both firms entered
each other’s markets and ceteris paribus end up with lower overall profits. I refer to this market
structure as a reciprocal duopoly because monopolies have transformed into duopolies through
reciprocal entry. The peculiar feature of the reciprocal duopoly is that each firm originates from
a home market where it is considered to have some strategic advantage over its competitor.
As the convergence of communications markets is inevitable today, Bauer (2007) notes that
the literature on the topic “emphasizes the centripetal forces leading towards a more integrated
communications sector, but tends to ignore the forces that contribute to divergence and dif-
ferentiation within the sector”. Indeed, the economic literature recognizes that the increase of
competition has led to a decay of profit margins in the sector. However, only very few authors,
like Bauer, conclude that “combinations of high sunk costs and low profit opportunities are not
stable and will necessitate adjustments by the service providers.” Also Maldoom et al. (2005,
1In this respect Germany currently constitutes and exception among the leading OECD countries (cf. OECD
2007b and Section 1.3). Due to historic legacies, the incumbent telephone network operator, Deutsche Telekom
AG, has had a significant head start in the provision of its broadband delivery technology (DSL). However, the
German cable network operators are currently investing over one billion Euros in the upgrade of their infrastructure
and gain market share at an ever growing pace (Kabelverband 2006). In their newest press release, the cable
companies affirm that within the last year the number of cable broadband subscriptions tripled, while the number
of voice telephony subscriptions (over the cable infrastructure) even quintupled (Kabelverband 2007). By these
figures, together with historical evidence from other comparable countries, we can conclude that also in Germany
cable and telephony incumbents will eventually become symmetric competitors.
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p.51) write that in the light of digital convergence “non-price product differentiation is likely to
become increasingly important”. While these authors provide a rather qualitative analysis, I ap-
proach the topic with a formal game-theoretic model in this thesis. In particular, the interplay of
two possible sources of differentiation is considered: service bundling and quality competition.
Communications firms often sell their services in a bundle only, although it would be tech-
nically possible to offer each service separately. For example, if a customer wants to use the
cable company’s telephony service, he will also have to sign up for a TV contract - the firm’s
home product. Likewise, telephony incumbents make the provision of their digital TV service
conditional upon the purchase of their telephony service. This business strategy, by which com-
munications firms are supposed to achieve some differentiation of their service portfolio over
competitors has become known under the buzz word Multiple Play.2 Especially Triple Play
receives increased attention in the literature, from an economic (e.g. Picot, Bereczky, and Frey-
berg 2007) as well as from a regulatory perspective (e.g. Bundesnetzagentur 2006). Therein,
bundling is attributed with a central accomplishment (or concern): Its ability to differentiate
facilities-based competitors, which are able to provide the whole range of communications ser-
vices because they have their own infrastructure, from access-based competitors, which rely on
foreign infrastructure and can therefore only provide one or two services at most. However,
while bundling may help the integrated multi-service providers to differentiate themselves from
the single-service providers, it does not differentiate them among each other. By offering Triple
Play packages in order to evade the ruinous competition in the voice telephony segment, ca-
ble and telephone network incumbents create a joint duopoly market in which they compete
for bundles. Current empirical evidence confirms that the firms’ bundles are very similar to
each other and therefore regarded as close substitutes by consumers. Consequently, given firms
compete in prices, the classical Bertrand argument predicts a price war with near competitive
outcomes even for this (reciprocal) duopoly setting.
Hence, the integrated network operators must find another means of service differentiation.
I suggest that such differentiation will take place along the quality dimension. Communica-
tions services are not a homogeneous good and can e.g. differ in terms of reliability, customer
2The term Multiple Play subsumes a variety of different service bundles, which may range from Double Play,
e.g. the bundle of voice and data services to Triple Play, which includes voice, data and video services. Today, one
can also observe an increasing trend to Quadruple Play which amends the Triple Play package by mobile services.
The latter term, however – albeit used by firms’ marketing departments worldwide – is not completely coherent,
because it does not add another service variety but merely locational flexibility to the package.
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service, transfer speeds, video quality or content. In such vertically differentiated markets, a
standard result in the theoretical Industrial Organization literature states that the firm providing
the service of higher quality will also earn the greater profits. Therefore, in the absence of cross-
market effects, each of the facilities-based competitors will exploit its home market advantage
by establishing itself as the high-quality provider in its home market. Thus, when firms offer
their services separately, each firm will be the high-quality provider in its home market and the
low-quality provider in its secondary market.
Moreover, I will show that in mature vertically differentiated markets, service bundling can
have an additional powerful effect, quite distinct from those previously known. In particular,
my main result is that Triple Play, i.e. tie of a firm’s home service with some (or all) of its
secondary services, creates a cross-market interdependency which serves as a market leverage
device through which one firm may carry its home market advantage over to the secondary
market. This is achieved through a quality-differentiation effect which emerges as firms seek to
soften price competition by specializing on providing either the high- or low quality service in
both markets, thereby leaving the high-end provider better and the low-end competitor worse
off than under separate pricing. I will show that such quality leverage is feasible for a very
generic type of cost function, assuming that the costs of service quality stem from fixed costs
mainly.3
The remainder of this thesis follows the Market Engineering process methodology as de-
scribed in Section 2.3 and is structured as follows.
In Chapter 1 the technological and legal foundations underlying the digital convergence
phenomenon are laid out. More specifically, Section 1.1 provides the reader with background
information on communications protocols and current network architectures enabling the con-
vergence process. In Section 1.2, I survey the regulatory developments in the European Union
empowering integrated network operators to engage in reciprocal market entry. Finally, Section
1.3 analyses the current state of competition in the European, and especially German, broadband
market.
Next, Chapter 2 discusses the economic peculiarities of communications markets and relates
the present framework with previous ones in which the digital convergence phenomenon has
been explicitly addressed.
3This seems to be a natural assumption in the context of network industries, where scale economics are rather
prominent since each additional customer induces near zero marginal costs, whereas (fixed) costs of e.g. network
maintenance are very high (cf. Section 2.1).
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Chapter 3 constitutes the heart of this thesis and presents the base framework. My model is
distinct to others in the sense that it provides an integrated analysis of bundling and vertically
differentiated markets in a reciprocal duopoly market. I employ a three-stage game, where
firms decide whether to price their services separately or in a bundle first, then determine their
optimal service qualities and finally compete in prices. I can show that bundle pricing is an an
equilibrium strategy for both firms, even without prior commitments, and that it can facilitate
quality leverage.
In Chapter 4, I extend the base model in several ways, for example, by considering (unilat-
eral) mixed bundling, economies of scope or correlated consumer preferences. I can show that
the main implications of my model are robust.
Chapter 5 considers the welfare effects imposed by quality leverage through bundle pric-
ing. In oligopoly settings, bundling has traditionally been attributed to have highly ambiguous
welfare consequences, where consumers’ and even producers’ surplus may rise or fall. In my
model, for symmetric firms the net effect on both producers’ and consumers’ surplus is nonneg-
ative, such that bundle pricing leads to an increase (or constancy) of overall welfare.
Finally, Chapter 6 presents policy implications with respect to price regulation, discusses my
findings in the light of current empirical evidence from the European communications markets
and comments on possible future developments of competition in this industry.
5

Chapter 1
The Anatomy of Digital Convergence:
Technological and Legal Background
1.1 Technological Background
In order to understand the economic consequences of digital convergence, it is indispensable
to have at least a basic understanding of its technological underpinning. To make this work
self-contained within the Market Engineering framework, I will therefore introduce some of the
most fundamental technological concepts and definitions regarding the provision of telecom-
munications and media services. Readers already familiar with the matter may therefore skip
this section and return only if necessary. If not otherwise noted, the following content is adapted
from the books of Stallings (2007), Maldoom et al. (2005) and Baldwin, McVoy, and Steinfield
(1996).
1.1.1 Foundations of Communication
Information, Data, Signal, Communication
The most basic communications scenario is constituted by the exchange of information from
a sender to a receiver. Information is encoded into data, i.e. logical entities which are able
to convey meaning. Signals are electric or electromagnetic representations of data which may
be propagated from the receiver to the sender along a suitable medium (signaling). Finally,
7
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communication is the process of transmitting data (or information) between sender and receiver
by the propagation and processing of signals.
Sender
Modulator
Receiver
Demodulator
Physical Medium
Information
Data Data
Signal Signal
Communications Channel
Figure 1.1: Basic Communications Scenario
Modulation and Transmission
Data transmission requires a physical medium, such as the air or a wire, which propagates
the signals. However, first data has to be transformed into a signal through a modulator. A
microphone, for example, converts audio data into a small electrical signal which is in direct
proportion to the strength of the sound wave hitting it. Conversely, on the receiver side, signals
have to be demodulated back into data (cf. Figure 1.1). In the example this can be achieved by
a loudspeaker, which transforms the electrical signal back into a sound wave.
More technically, modulation refers to the modification of a carrier signal, which is a pure
wave of electromagnetic radiation send over the medium, in any way suitable to represent data.
There are many forms of modulation, such as amplitude modulation (AM), frequency modu-
lation (FM) or phase modulation (PM).1 The simplest form of modulation, however, is just to
switch the carrier signal on and off, as used by early telegraph systems utilizing the Morse code
to encode and decode the data.
1For more detailed information the reader is referred to Stallings (2007).
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Digital and Analog
Generally, the terms analog and digital are used to distinguish between continuous and discrete
values of parameters, respectively. For example, all forms of modulation described above are
analog because the carrier signal being modified is time-continuous. Analog modulation is
fairly easy if the input data is also analog (as the sound wave in the example above), because
then the carrier has just to be modulated in proportion to the strength of the input data. However,
analog modulation can also be used to represent digital data like text, for example. The most
prominent example here is the modem (modulator, demodulator) which sends digital data over
the public voice telephony network by converting it to analog signals. More recently, also
digital modulation systems have evolved which are in a sense a regression to the early analog
modulation forms where the carrier is simply turned on and off. A digital signal is a sequence
of discrete, discontinuous voltage pulses; each pulse being a signal element. In the simplest
case, there is a one-to-one correspondence between bits and signal elements. In this case the
data rate (measured in bits per second, bps) corresponds to the modulation rate (expressed
in baud), which is the rate at which the signal level is changed. In practice, however, other
encoding schemes are used in order to make the transmission more reliable, such that data rate
and modulation rate must not coincide.
Data Rate, Bandwidth and Channel Capacity
The maximum rate at which data can be transmitted over a given communications channel
under certain conditions is referred to as the channel capacity. If the communications path was
perfect, one could achieve an unlimited data rate. However, real communications channels are
constraint by bandwidth and noise. The bandwidth of a channel is defined as the maximum
modulation rate achievable if the channel was noise free.2
According to Nyquist, the data rate which can be supported by a medium with B Hz band-
width is 2B bps. The voice channel of the public telephone system, for example, has roughly a
bandwidth of 3100 Hz. Then, the capacity of the channel is C = 2B = 6200 bps. This formula
holds only if each signal element represents only one bit. In real modems, for example, more
than two signal levels are used such that each signal element can represent more than one bit.
2Another definition of bandwidth is the difference between the highest and the lowest frequency which can
be send over the medium. Although this definition relates more to analog modulation, bandwidth is therefore
measured in Hertz (Hz).
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When M is the number of discrete signal or voltage levels, the Nyquist formula becomes
C = 2B log2 M.
Thus, data rate can be increased by increasing the number of signal elements, M . In practice,
however noise and other impairments of the communications channel will constitute an upper
limit to M .
Moreover, the Shannon-Hartly Capacity Formula gives further insights into the relationship
between channel capacity and noise. In particular, the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is usually
taken as the ratio of the power in a signal to the power contained in the noise at the receiver
(measures in decibels). Thus, a higher SNR means a higher signal quality and therefore fewer
transmission errors. The Shannon-Hartly Capacity Formula then states that the maximum chan-
nel capacity depends on bandwidth and SNR:
C = B log2(1 + SNR).
In summary, what is important to understand is that both formulas express a basic linear rela-
tionship between bandwidth (being a physical characteristic of the transmission medium) and
data rate. Consequently, the only practically viable way to boost the performance of a commu-
nications channel (in terms of data rate) is to increase bandwidth.
Transmission over Wires
As I have noted earlier, in principle signals can use a wired or unwired (i.e. air) transmission
medium. I will focus on the presentation of wired transmission media here, because they have
generally higher bandwidths and are thus capable of conveying the extremely high data rates
necessary in the future. Although the data rates achieved over the wireless medium have con-
stantly increased in the past, they will never be able to replace or outperform wired technologies.
Today, three wired technologies are most commonly used for data transmission: twisted pair,
coaxial cable, and optical fiber.
Twisted Pair consists of two insulated copper wires arranged in a regular spiral pattern to
cancel out electromagnetic interference from external sources and crosstalk from neighboring
wires. One wire pair acts as a single communications link. Usually, a number of these pairs are
bundled together into one cable. Twisted pair installations were originally designed to support
10
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voice traffic using analog modulation. However, today twisted-pair is used for both, digital and
analog transmission. Using analog modulation an amplifier is required every 5-6 km to refresh
the signal and improve the SNR. For digital modulation repeaters are required every 2-3 km. On
long distances, twisted pair can achieve a bandwidth of about 1 MHz under analog modulation
and data rates of a few Mbps under digital modulation. For very short distances, data rates of up
to 1 Gbps are possible. Compared to other wired technologies (i.e. coaxial cable or optical fiber)
twisted pair is the least expensive, but also limited in bandwidth, distance and data rate. Most
critically, twisted pair cables are very susceptible to interference and noise, especially at higher
frequencies. However, because of its early application in the telephone system (cf. Section
1.1.2), twisted pair is still by far the most common transmission medium for both analog and
digital signaling.
Coaxial Cable also consists of two conductors like twisted pair. Thereby a hollow outer cylin-
drical conductor surrounds a single inner wire conductor. This concentric, shielded architecture
makes coaxial cable much less susceptible to interference than twisted pair and can therefore
be used over longer distances and at wider frequency bands. For long distance transmission of
analog (digital) signals, amplifiers (repeaters) are needed every 1-9 km depending on the fre-
quency (data rate) used. The bandwidth is at about 500 Mhz and thus about 500 times higher
than that of twisted pair. Coaxial cable has traditionally been an important part of the long
distance telephone network, but is today most common as a means of distributing TV signals to
individual homes (cf. Section 1.1.2).
Optical Fiber is a thin, flexible medium capable of carrying an optical ray. Optical fiber
also has cylindrical shape and consists of three concentric sections. The innermost section
is called the core and consists of very thin strands (fibers) made of glass or plastic. Each
fiber is surrounded by the cladding, a glass or plastic coating with different optical properties
acting as a reflector. The outermost layer is the jacket, whose sole purpose is to protect its
content from environmental influences. Optical fibers have been a breakthrough in transmission
media and are mainly used for digital modulation. They transmit a signal encoded beam of
light by means of total internal reflection. Optical fiber outperforms twisted pair and coaxial
cable by far in all relevant characteristics: Its bandwidth is immense, amounting to hundreds
of Gbps over long distances. Moreover, optical fiber is considerably smaller and lighter, has
much lower attenuation and is not affected by external electromagnetic fields. Thus, repeaters
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must only be spaced at about 40km intervals. Optical fiber is becoming increasingly important
for long-distance communications links and is due to its high data rate capabilities recently also
being deployed in local networks (see next Sections). Optical fiber certainly is the transmission
medium of the future as digital convergence drives up the (bandwidth) demand for all types of
information (i.e. data, voice and video).
1.1.2 Communications Network Architectures
In order to be able to understand the economics of communications networks later, it is neces-
sary to introduce their basic architecture. In this section, I will focus on the stylized presentation
of the two most important and independent communications systems connecting to many house-
holds in industrialized countries today: The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and
the Cable-TV Network also known as Community Antenna Television (CATV).
The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN)
Until today most telephone networks use a star architecture (Figure 1.2) with twisted pair cables
running from each terminal node (end user) to the local exchange (also called local switch or
central office). One cable pair, called the local line, is required for each phone line and the
connection between the local exchange and the terminal node consisting of the local line and a
line card (located at the local exchange) is referred to as the local loop. Furthermore, the local
exchange contains the switching equipment to route calls to and from the end-users served by
it and stores all data associated with the local loop, such as billing data and the type of service.
The network spanned by a single local exchange to all end-users connected to it is called the
customer access network. On the contrary, the long distance network connects the different
local exchanges (possibly in other countries) through a number of other exchanges called trunk
exchanges. Lines within the long distance network are therefore also called trunk lines. Today,
most trunk lines are made of optical fiber. Exchanges are hierarchically organized, which is due
to historical legacies. In the late 19th century, when telephones were first introduced, people
would buy a pair of phones and run a wire between them. Soon, cities were enmeshed in
telephone cables running in all directions. Hence, early phone companies built local exchanges
such that customers could run their wires to a single location and let operators connect them
with other phones via a manually operated switching system. At first, customers could only
connect with other customers at the switch, but soon, trunk lines were established between
12
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Figure 1.2: Stylized Architecture of the Public Switched Telephone Network
phone companies and everybody could call everybody else in the same local area. This grew
into the hierarchy of switches that eventually extended to outlying areas and other cities. The
telephone system now uses digital signaling except in the local loop. The local loop still uses
analog transmission methods for voice calls. In the local switch the analog signals are then
digitized and conveyed over the trunk lines to other (local or trunk) exchanges.
The Cable TV Network (CATV)
Whereas the telephone network was build for one-to-one (bidirectional) communication, the
architecture of the cable-network was designed as a one-to-many (unidirectional) communica-
tions system. This was reasonable because at the time of deployment, in the 1980s, its sole
purpose was to broadcast analog TV signals to the homes. Therefore, the cable network is or-
ganized in a tree and branch structure where a single thick coaxial cable, the trunk, originates
from the headend (similar to the local exchange of the PSTN) and is routed through each neigh-
borhood (Figure 1.3). At each neighborhood a tree structure unfolds which is subdivided into
A- and B-lines responsible for transporting the signal within the neighborhood, C-lines serving
13
CHAPTER 1: THE ANATOMY OF DIGITAL CONVERGENCE
Headend trunk line
tap
trunk amplifier
C-line
A/B-line
D-line
(drop
 cable)
house
(premisis)
terminal
node
line amplifier
C-line
C-line
A/B-line
Figure 1.3: Stylized Architecture of the CATV Network
individual streets and D-lines connecting individual premises (terminal nodes). Thus, D-lines,
also called the drop cable, may be considered as the local line. No end-user is served directly
from the trunk. Each node of the resulting tree is called a tap. As signals travel down the coaxial
cable tree structure, they lose strength and must be amplified (especially at the taps). In analogy
to the PSTN, the whole network cascading from the headend to the individual homes shall be
called the customer access network.3
Since the 1990s (in Europe mainly since 2000) the CATV customer access network has
been largely upgraded to allow for bidirectional traffic (i.e. downstream from the headend and
upstream to the headend), which is necessary to offer such services as the Internet or voice tele-
phony. Upstream and downstream signals can be distinguished by using a different frequency
spectrum for each direction. The coaxial cable per se is bidirectional already, but amplifiers
had to be renewed, such that they would route upstream and downstream signals in opposite
directions. Pure coaxial-cable bidirectional systems are very difficult to maintain because over-
the-air signals use similar frequencies than the upstream signals and can thus easily leak into
3In Germany, this part of the network is referred to as network level 3. In fact, there also exists a network level
4 which denotes the wiring on the individual premises behind the terminal node.
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the cable network and cause interference. Reliability has thus always been an issue of the early
bidirectional cable networks. Reliability was dramatically increased, however, when fiber optic
cables were used to replace the old coaxial trunk lines (and even some of the A- and B-lines). At
the point where the optical fiber terminates, the so called fiber node, photodetectors are installed
to convert the light energy back into electrical energy used for the coaxial lines. Each fiber node
usually serves 1500 - 6000 households. Because the signals send through optical fiber cannot
interfere with the electromagnetic over-the-air signals and because the remaining amplifier cas-
cade within the tree structure is much shorter, both reliability and bandwidth are increased in
this hybrid fiber coaxial cable network (HFC). Moreover, each fiber node can be programmed
with different content, thus allowing for video on demand. However, in the CATV network no
user has a dedicated local loop because many users share the cascading coaxial lines (which
are constraint in bandwidth) on the way eventually up to the fiber node. Thus, also in the HFC
network performance still depends crucially on how many users are concurrently connected.
1.1.3 Network Transparency and the IP Protocol
Both, the PSTN and the CATV network have traditionally been line switched networks, mean-
ing that signals use a dedicated communications channel for the transmission. Until today most
voice calls over the PSTN are still line switched with the switching systems being installed
at the different exchanges. Line switching has been intended for voice telephony and is very
reliable with respect to this task. However, it has many disadvantages if used for data commu-
nications. First, line switching is very inefficient and inflexible in terms of network utilization,
because it reserves an exclusive end-to-end communications channel for each transmission. Of-
ten users request short high-volume data bursts and remain idle for a while thereafter. With line
switching, extended demand for bandwidth can only be accommodated by reserving multiple
lines. During the idle time, however, the excess bandwidth cannot be utilized by other users.
Second, line switching is not very robust to line or switch failures along the dedicated commu-
nications path. If failures occur, the connection will inevitably be lost. Packet switching is an
alternative switching technology that has been invented in the 1960s alongside with computer
communications networks. Under packet switching, data is split up into small packets contain-
ing a header and the digital data to be send.4 The header contains information about the source
and the destination of the data packet, as well as error correction information. Each packet is
4Thus, packet switching requires the use of digital data. Analog data, such as voice, must be digitized first
before it can be send packet switched (as in Voice over IP).
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then autonomously routed through the network where switches are now called routers. Each
router keeps a list of its neighboring routers and the shortest paths connecting to them. When
a data packet arrives, the router reads its destination address and decides to which neighbor-
ing router it will be passed on. Network reliability is increased, because there is no dedicated
route through the network which all packets have to take. If failures occur, packets are simply
rerouted. Also network utilization is increased because the small packets can be well distributed
over the network, such that network resources may be allocated more evenly. On the contrary,
packet switching cannot guarantee bandwidth to any one user (as in line switching), because
there is no real control of the data flow in the network. This shortcoming concerning the provi-
sion of quality of service (QoS) has been improved by current research, but remains an issue,
however (OECD 2007a).
The just described process of packet routing is handled by the IP protocol which constitutes
a logical overlay network, independent of the physical network, and is responsible for signal
transmission. In very general terms, one can distinguish three different hierarchical layers or
tasks involved in any communications process, which are depicted by Figure 1.4.5
Sender/Receiver Sender/Receiver
Application
Network access
Transport
Application
Network access
Transport
Application protocol
Transport protocol
Communications
network
Network access
protocol
Network access
protocol
Figure 1.4: Simplified Communications Protocol Architecture (Stallings 2007)
The network access layer, which is the lowest layer, is concerned with the exchange of data
between a sender and receiver in the sense specified earlier (cf. Figure 1.1). For example, the
network access layer is in charge of the modulation and demodulation of data or recognition
of transmission errors and therefore specific to the network architecture and physical medium
used. Consequently, the layers above the network access layer must not be concerned with the
specifics of the physical network and can provide network transparent higher level functional-
ity. The IP protocol is located within the transport layer which is responsible for data routing
5Usually the protocol stack involves five (Internet Protocol Stack) or seven layers (ISO/OSI Protocol Stack).
However, in the present context three layers are sufficient for an understanding.
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through possibly heterogeneous network architectures and reliable data exchange. The transport
layer ensures that the data finds its way from the sender to the receiver, but is not concerned as
to what type of data (e.g. voice, video or text) it is carrying. This is the functionality provided
by the highest layer, the application layer. What makes the IP protocol so unique, however, is
that it is a universal protocol which is used for all packet switched communication scenarios.
Whereas other protocols above and below the IP protocol may vary with the specific commu-
nications task, the IP protocol is always employed because, essentially, it provides physical
network transparency. In the light of digital convergence, this functionality has become crucial
because it allows to carry all sorts of data simultaneously and to physically different network
architectures. Next to the Internet, recent prominent applications running over IP are Voice over
IP (VoIP), a voice telephony service, and IP Television (IPTV), an interactive TV broadcasting
service (cf. Ortiz Jr. 2006).
1.1.4 Broadband Delivery Technologies
Today the term broadband is simply used as an abbreviation for high-speed always-on data con-
nections (Maldoom et al. 2005). Broadband is generally associated with the packet-switched
digital data, as opposed to (dial-up) narrowband connections which are analog and line-switched
and therefore tie up an end-users phone line during connection. Although today the two dom-
inating network architectures, PSTN and CATV, employ both analog and digital services (in
different segments of their frequency spectrum), only digital (broadband) services will prevail
in the future (COM 2005). The definition of broadband itself is deliberately kept network neu-
tral because it can be offered over a variety of network architectures. The different network
architectures employ different technologies, however, in order to deliver broadband access to
the homes and businesses. In particular, the two technologies employed over the PSTN and the
CATV network shall be discussed in more detail. These are also the most prevalent technologies
because they make use of already existing infrastructure.
DSL
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) is the predominant broadband technology in most European
countries because it uses the PSTN as the underlying network platform. The broadband connec-
tion is established between a modem at the user end and a DSL access multiplexer (DSLAM)
at the local exchange over the existing twisted pair local line. The broadband traffic is send
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at considerably higher frequencies than those used by the regular narrowband voice traffic.
Both signals are separated by a line splitter, which allows for the simultaneous use of the line-
switched phone line and the packet-switched broadband connection. However, since the twisted
pair cables are very susceptible to inference at higher frequencies, DSL can generally only be
offered for those homes with relatively short local lines. The local loop of homes in rural areas
are usually too long in order to provide reliable broadband access over DSL. Different versions
of DSL are currently deployed:
Asymmetric DSL (ADSL) is the most common version. It provides much higher downstream
(up to 8 Mbps) than upstream (up to 1 Mbps) data rates which resembles the requirements of
standard Internet users.
Very high-speed DSL (VDSL) achieves much higher bandwidths than standard ADSL (up
to 52 Mbps downstream and 16 Mbps upstream) due to the use of fiber optics. Optical fiber
is run close to the neighborhoods in order to shorten the remaining distance over the copper
twisted pair lines. Because VDSL requires deployment of new (optical fiber) infrastructure, it
is relatively costly and most suited for densely populated areas.
In summary, the biggest advantage of DSL is its reuse of the ubiquitously existing twisted
pair wiring. It is a very mature technology and equipment is available at relatively low cost. On
the contrary, the inferior physical properties of the twisted pair lines also considerably limit the
bandwidth achievable over DSL. Actual data rates are extremely contingent upon the length of
the local line: While the maximum acceptable line length is at about 5,5 km for ADSL it is at
about 1,2 km for VDSL.
Cable Broadband
Cable broadband uses the HFC infrastructure whose deployment varies widely across Europe.
However, since the coaxial local lines are superior to the twisted pair cables used in the PSTN,
cable broadband is generally able to offer higher bandwidths than DSL. Again, line splitters
are used to distinguish between analog (i.e. television broadcasting) and digital services and to
allow for the simultaneous use of data, television and voice traffic. Contrary to DSL, in cable
networks voice traffic is usually packet-switched (Voice over IP) and not line-switched. As
discussed earlier, the main drawback of cable broadband is that the users connected to the same
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fiber node share bandwidth. At peak times bandwidth may be reduced for some users. Because
of this and other technical difficulties related to the tree and branch architecture of the initially
unidirectional cable network, cable broadband service providers are still struggling with the
reliability and quality of their service, especially their voice telephony service.
Other Broadband Technologies
For completeness, some of the less common broadband technologies should be mentioned as
well.
Power Line Communications (PLC) uses the existing electricity distribution system to
transmit data. Although the ubiquity of power lines seems to offer an interesting alternative
to DSL, PLC remains to have some significant technical and regulatory obstacles questioning
its commercial success. First, bandwidth is rather limited (up to 200 Mbps) taking into account
that it must be shared by many users. Moreover, power lines were not designed to carry data
and thus high frequencies. The amount of energy radiated by power lines is significant and
interferes with radio signals.
Satellite Broadband The main advantage of satellite broadband is its availability even for
remote areas. However, currently downstream bandwidth is very limited (up to 2 Mbps) and
the upstream connection has to be established via a dial-up connection over the phone line.6
Therefore satellite broadband is and will remain a niche service.
Other Wireless Technologies The remaining wireless technologies like UMTS or WiMax
also have one common drawback: their limitation in bandwidth. Wired technologies generally
allow for higher bandwidth and as the demand for bandwidth is steadily increasing with its
availability, wireless technologies will always lag behind and remain either complementary (as
in the case of UMTS) or niche services, as for example WiMax.
Fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) ,finally, is a very promising alternative to the dominating broad-
band delivery technologies DSL and cable. In principle, it is similar to the cable network
6Although most recently two-way satellite broadband services are offered. These require expensive equipment
on the side of the end-user, however.
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architecture but consists of optical fiber links only. It is thus capable of much higher band-
widths. Its main obstacle, however, is the requirement for large new deployments of fiber, even
up to the individual premises, which is therefore currently only reasonable where cable ducts
are available. Nevertheless, FTTH seems to be the broadband technology of the future.
1.1.5 Organization of the Communications Industry
Having introduced the technological fundamentals of communications networks, it remains to
identify some rather organizational characteristics of the communication industry. The business
model of firms active in this industry can be roughly differentiated into (de Bijl and Peitz 2002):
Network Operators: Firms building, maintaining and operating their own communications
infrastructure
Service Providers: Firms offering communications services, such as voice telephony, Internet
or TV, over existing communications infrastructure
Resellers: Firms engaging merely in resale (including marketing and billing) of foreign com-
munications services.
However, often firms are integrated, i.e. both network operators and service providers of a com-
munications service. This gives them the opportunity to control every step in the value chain of
the final retail communications service and thus allows for maximal control of the service char-
acteristics. This is particularly important because different services have different requirements
of the physical characteristics of the network. VoIP, for example, requires relatively low latency
(the time a data packet needs from the sender to the receiver), but can run at modest bandwidth.
TV broadcasting, on the contrary, requires high bandwidth but is not as demanding in terms of
latency. Other services again, such as video telephony, necessitate both, high bandwidth and
low latency.
Consequently, pure service providers are technologically bound to the capabilities of the
foreign infrastructure. This limits the scope of (quality) characteristics under their control. Yet
service providers can decide which services and service variants they want to offer in principle.
Finally, resellers have virtually no control over the type and quality of services they are selling,
but may only control price and billing options.
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Today, regulatory intervention (see Section 1.2) has blurred these organizational bound-
aries, however. In short, in order to achieve competition in the local access network, which
constitutes a natural monopoly due to the high sunk costs involved in deploying new wiring to
individual homes, the regulator forced the incumbent PSTN operators to allow new entrants in
the telecommunications market access to the local loop. In particular, three forms of access to
the local loop are feasible:
Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) refers to the case where an alternative network provider
takes over technical control at both ends of the local loop. This includes also the installation
and provision of own equipment, such as the DSLAM and the DSL modem. If the alternative
network provider also owns a trunk network, providing connectivity form the local exchange
onwards, LLU provides him with the same amount of control over the physical network as the
incumbent PSTN operator.7
Line Sharing of unbundled local loops is often employed if the alternative provider wants
to offer a broadband service only. The line is then shared in the narrowband voice telephony
frequency spectrum, remaining at the incumbent PSTN operator, and the broadband frequency
spectrum leased to the alternative provider. Although with this form of access the alternative
provider does not have control over the whole frequency spectrum of the local line, it has full
control over the broadband service, including the provision of own equipment.8
Bitstream Access is a less common form of access to the local loop. Here the alternative
provider may only access the IP layer of the broadband service and thus has no control over the
technical infrastructure.9
In the remainder of this text, I will focus on platform or facilities-based competition, i.e.
competition of vertically integrated service providers owning their own infrastructure, because
only this type of competition allows for unconstrained choices of all relevant service character-
7From July 1, 2007 the Bundesnetzagentur approved access prices of 36.19e and up to 20.93e (set up and
cessation fee, respectively) and 10.65e (monthly fee) for the access of a single twisted pair local loop. In Germany,
LLU access is offered since 1998.
8As of July 1, 2007, fees for line sharing in Germany are at 60.82e (set up fee) and 1.91e per month. Line
sharing must be offered in every Member State of the EU since January 1, 2001 by regulatory order No. 2887/2000.
9Bitstream access will soon be offered in Germany. It was imposed by regulatory order in September 2006.
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istics. More precisely, I will consider the inter-modal competition between PSTN and CATV
network operators offering substitutive broadband services over different platforms.
1.2 European Regulation and Legal Background
The communications sector has been regulated ever since its existence. At first, regulation has
been justified by arguing that the provision of communications services was as an official duty
which should not be left to private firms. Part of this reasoning has been that the telecommu-
nications sector was viewed as a natural monopoly due to the large economies of scale and
high amounts of sunk costs needed to install the necessary infrastructure. The cost function of
communications firms is usually U-shaped with respect to the number of subscribers: First scale
economies drive down unit costs while it becomes increasingly expensive to connect subscribers
in remote areas to the communications network. In order to guarantee nationwide access to
communications at affordable and identical prices, i.e. to prevent firms’ cream skimming the
market, legislators worldwide thought that only a State owned monopolist could provide such
service. Due to technological developments (cf. Section 1.1) and subsequent changes in the
cost and demand structure of the telecommunications sector, today almost all telecommunica-
tions markets are privatized (the monopolistic firm has been transferred from State to private
ownership) and liberalized (opened for competition). However, the legal history of countries
worldwide differs greatly. Since many English publications have already presented a thorough
picture of the developments in the precursing North American and British communications mar-
kets, I will focus on the presentation of the developments in the remaining European countries,
following the regulatory regime issued by the European Commission (EC).10 The present sec-
tion has been largely adapted from Larouche (2000), Koenig, Loetz, and Neumann (2004) and
Sa¨cker (2006), if not noted differently.
1.2.1 Liberalization of Communications Services
With the Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications
Services and Equipment (COM 1987) the European Union (EU) started to think about a change
in regulation of the telecommunications sector for the first time. Back then, almost all Member
States employed a State owned monopoly to control infrastructure and services of their network
10See Thatcher (2001) for a discussion on the closeness of interaction between the EC and national governments.
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industries, including telecommunications, mail and public transport.11 The main reasons why
the EC put the telecommunications sector on topic just now are spelled out in the introduction of
the Green Paper and to a large extend even remain valid today. In particular, the afore mentioned
technological developments (including convergence) and increasing demand for telecommuni-
cations services boosted the economic and social importance of the communications sector.
Moreover, other countries, foremost the USA, have shown that at least partial liberalization of
the telecommunications market could well work and thereby increased the political pressure
on the EU in changing the regulatory framework to support the development of state-of-the-art
communications infrastructure. Among others, the main aims of the 1987 Green Paper thus in-
cluded the gradual liberalization and harmonization of the telecommunications markets within
the EU. More precisely, the Green Paper identifies the following goals:12
a) Member States must preserve network integrity in any event, and may therefore leave
telecommunications infrastructure under monopoly
b) Amongst services, only public voice telephony may be left under monopoly
c) All other services must be liberalized
d) An Open Network Provision (ONP) framework must be put in place to regulate the rela-
tionship between monopoly infrastructure providers and competitive service providers
e) Community-wide interoperability must be achieved through harmonized standards
f) Terminal equipment must be liberalized
g) Regulatory and operational functions of the Public Telephone Operators (PTOs) must be
separated
h) Competition law must be applied to PTOs and new service providers
The 1987 Green Paper has been a milestone in European telecommunications legislature and
each of its goals has subsequently been transformed into Community Law. In particular four key
conceptual distinctions have been made: i) regulatory and operational functions, ii) reserved and
11The only exception was constituted by the United Kingdom. See Laffont and Tirole (2000, Section 1.3.2.1)
for a comprehensive overview.
12Listing taken from Larouche (2000).
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non-reserved services, iii) access and interconnection and iv) services and infrastructure. For
the purpose of this paper, only the latter distinction deserves special attention.
The Green Paper has made a distinction between the telecommunications network infras-
tructure and the telecommunications services running on that infrastructure.13 Thus, the Green
Paper calls only for a liberalization of the service sector, an does not yet induce platform com-
petition in the sense defined before. Consequently, in 1990, Directive 90/388 ruled that the
network infrastructure could remain in the hands of the State own monopolist, while services–
with the exception of voice telephony (for the public)–were opened to competition (goals a-c).
This exception has been issued on the legal basis of Article 86(2) because at the time it was
believed that the sufficient provision of voice telephony could be at risk if left to the market.
Moreover, voice telephony was by far the largest and most profitable service and has been used
by the publicly run PTOs to cross-subsidize other possibly loss-making services. Opening the
market to hastily might have endangered the provision of other services, such as the postal ser-
vice for example. However, realizing that the competition in the service sector relies upon the
access to monopolized infrastructure, a regulatory framework (ONP) is needed to ensure that
the monopoly cannot negatively affect the competitive part (goal d). To this extend, Directive
90/387 was enacted in 1990 on the basis of Article 95.
Harmonization of telecommunication standards and equipment (goals e and f) was tackled
by EU Directive 88/301 of 1988, which completely opened the terminal equipment market for
competition on the basis of Article 86(3), and EU Directive 91/263 of 1991, which provided a
framework for the mutual recognition of terminal equipment throughout the Community. Fi-
nally, the separation of regulatory and operational functions of the PTOs (goal g) has been
undertaken in Directive 88/301 and Article 7 of Directive 90/388, while goal h was addressed
in the 1991 Guidelines.
In 1992, the Commission issued a review (COM 1992) and started a consultation process
in order to determine further steps in the liberalization of the telecommunications sector. Sub-
sequent to that consultation the Commission presented an ambitious timetable (COM 1993),
including the liberalization of the cable TV network for the provision of liberalized services
13Although the distinction between the terms ’infrastructure’ and ’service’ is intuitively clear, a precise defini-
tion, as e.g. implemented by EU Directives 90/387 (Article 2) and 90/388 (Article 1) remains very difficult. As I
have argued before, due to LLU, line sharing or bitstream access, the boundary between facilities-based competi-
tion and access-based competition has become very fuzzy. However, later I consider facilities-based competition
only, such that there is no need to further elaborate on the issue.
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until 1996 and the full liberalization of telecommunications services (i.e. the liberalization of
public voice telephony) until January 1, 1998. The Council, however only agreed to the latter
and laid off any decisions concerning the competition of network infrastructures to the upcom-
ing 1994 Green Paper (COM 1994) on the liberalization of telecommunications infrastructure
and cable television networks.
1.2.2 Liberalization of Communications Infrastructure
While the 1987 Green Paper has been the starting point for the liberalization of communications
services, the 1994 Green Paper marks the beginning of the liberalization of communications in-
frastructure. More precisely, in the 1994 Green Paper the new regulatory concept of alternative
infrastructure was introduced which referred to the provision of infrastructure for liberalized
communications services. The provision of liberalized infrastructure is so important because of
the bottleneck constituted by the local loop. Suppliers of telecommunications services have to
lease lines from the infrastructure monopolist, which in turn also competes in the service sector.
This remedy could especially be overcome by the cable TV network, which provides another
means of wired access to individual homes. Recall, however, that at the time the liberalized ser-
vices did not include public voice telephony, thus the aim of the 1994 Green Paper has merely
been to allow for platform competition with alternative services. Nevertheless, following the
consultation process of the 1994 Green Paper (COM 1995), the Council agreed to align the full
liberalization of the alternative infrastructures with the timeline of the liberalization of public
voice telephony as scheduled for January 1, 1998. For the transitional period from 1996 to 1998
two Directives addressed the alternative infrastructure constituted by the mobile and the cable
TV networks:
Directive 95/51 explicitly recognizes the CATV networks as communications networks and
obliges the Member States to “abolish all restrictions on the supply of transmission capacity
by cable TV networks and allow the use of cable networks for the provision of telecommu-
nications services, other than voice telephony.” Moreover, Member States were obliged to
allow for interconnection of the cable and other communications networks and mandated to
non-discriminatory behavior and transparent accounting. In particular, in Member States where
both the PSTN and the CATV network were operated by the same firm (e.g. in Germany), ”the
separation of financial accounts as concerns the provision of each network and its activity as
provider of telecommunications services” had to be ensured.
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Similarly, by Directive 96/2 the terrestrial mobile telephony infrastructure market has been fully
liberalized. Interestingly, by this directive voice telephony was liberalized on the mobile market
as early as 1996, because the definition of public voice telephony in Directive 90/388 did not
include telephony services over the mobile communications infrastructure.
Eventually, Directive 96/19 marked the final step to full liberalization of the communica-
tions market.14 In Article 2(1) the Member States were bound to revoke all exclusive rights
for the operation and provision of communications infrastructure and services. However, as the
build of telecommunications infrastructure involves large investments and high risks,15 the mar-
ket dominance of the former monopolistic PTOs remained a regulatory challenge in the years
after 1998. Most PTOs have been privatized and released as a vertically integrated firm (i.e.
owning infrastructure and providing services) into competition. While long distance (trunk)
networks were build up relatively fast by new entrants, especially the local loop remained a
central point of concern. To this extend, Regulation No. 2887/2000 was issued in December
2000 to grant access to the local loop e.g. by local loop unbundling (LLU), line sharing or at
least bitstream access.16 Although these measures improved the competition in voice telephony
services, broadband competition would still not really pick up. The key driver of broadband
competition was seen in promoting inter-modal competition between the PSTN and the CATV
network.17 The, in principle, higher bandwidths achievable over the CATV network were also
thought to animate quality competition and not just price competition. Only such vertically
integrated firms can control the whole spectrum of technologies necessary to deliver proper ser-
vices to the customer, including investments into the infrastructure necessary to improve quality
of service. Unfortunately, in the Member States both fixed-wired infrastructures (i.e cable and
telecommunications networks) were mostly owned by the same operator, which, of course, had
no interest in cannibalizing itself through self-inflicted platform competition. Recognizing this
short-coming, the EC issued a second cable Directive in 1999 (Directive 99/64). This directive
was especially addressed to those network operators which were “dominant in the provision
of public telecommunications networks and public voice telephony services and which have
established their cable TV networks under special or exclusive rights”. These operators were
14Although some special rights and obligations remained for the operators of public networks and providers of
public voice telephony services to ensure minimum quality and service standards.
15Compare Section 2.1.1.
16Recall these concepts form the previous section.
17Indeed, in an empirical study Distaso, Lupi, and Manenti (2006) confirm that only platform competition can
assure effective competition and broadband uptake.
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henceforth not only obliged to keep separate financial accounts for each network platform (as
demanded by Directive 95/51), but to operate their cable TV network in a separate legal entity.
1.2.3 Regulatory Convergence
With the fall of legal barriers and separation of legal entities, competition–and especially inter-
modal platform competition–within the communications and particularly broadband market of
the Member States really started to pick up momentum. Integrated cable network operators were
struggling for market share and quickly sought to upgrade the old coaxial-only cable networks
to bidirectional HFC networks in order to offer new digital broadband services. CATV network
operators really lived up to the capabilities put forward by digital convergence in offering a
Triple Play service, including voice telephony, TV broadcasting and data communications. Of
course, the incumbent telecommunications network operators did not stand behind for long and
also quickly implemented digital services such as IPTV into their service portfolio. Hence,
platform competition brought a rich bouquet of digital services to the market.
Realizing the possibility of such development, the Green Paper on the Convergence of the
Telecommunications, Media and Information Technology Sectors (COM 1997) addressed some
of the legal problems implied by this process. Most prominently, much of the regulatory frame-
work had thus far differentiated between one-to-one (unicast) communication (as historically
present in the PSTN) and one-to-many (multicast) communication (as originally intended by
the CATV network). Through digital convergence, however, the distinction between both com-
munications forms and thus network infrastructures steadily vanished (Schultheiß 2004; Dam-
janovic 2002). Today one-to-one and one-to-many communication may be offered on the basis
of IP and thus on both network architectures. Moreover, also new forms of communications
such as many-to-many18 or many-to-one-to-many19 communication emerged. A contempo-
rary definition of communication must thus be able to comprise all of these different means
of communications and cannot be bound to a specific network architecture. The results of the
consultation on the 1997 Green Paper (COM 1999) also pointed into this direction and favored
an horizontal approach which refers to the “homogeneous treatment of all transport network
infrastructure and associated services, irrespective of the types of services carried”.
This view of regulatory convergence is expressed in the new regulatory framework, which
18Call-in-conferences, for instance.
19E.g. chat rooms or Internet forums.
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encompasses the Framework Directive 2002/21 and four further directives concerned with is-
sues of access (Directive 2002/19), authorization (Directive 2002/20), universal service (Direc-
tive 2002/22) and privacy (Directive 2002/58).20 The regulatory framework became effective
on April 24, 2002 and had to be incorporated into national law by all Member States within
one year time. The framework was complemented by Directive 2002/77, which addresses the
competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and service and thereby
replaces the previously mentioned directives 90/388, 94/46, 95/51, 96/2, 96/19 and 99/64. In
Germany, the directives have been implemented into the new German Telecommunications Law
(TKG), which was enacted on June 26, 2004.21
The new regulatory framework promotes not only competition and consumer surplus, but
also emphasizes technological neutrality. Stimulated by the convergence phenomenon, this lat-
ter concept has been pursued with great intensity by the European Commission (Sa¨cker 2006,
p.45). To this extend, the terms electronic communications network and electronic communica-
tions service are newly defined in Article 2(a) and replace the previously used terms ’telecom-
munications service’ and ’telecommunications network’. In this way, an unbiased view of
all systems which are “concerned with the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or
other electromagnetic means (i.e. fixed, wireless, cable television, satellite networks)” has been
achieved (Directive 2002/77). Consequently, all imaginable current and future communications
networks as well as the services supplied thereon fall under the present regulatory framework
and must thus be treated equally.
1.3 The German Fixed-Line Communications Market
Before discussing the economic dimension of digital convergence on the fixed-line communi-
cations market in the subsequent chapters, it is helpful to survey the current state of competition
and the developments that have led to it. I chose Germany as a proxy for the European Commu-
nications Market because the incumbent PSTN operator, Deutsche Telekom (DT), is the largest
facilities-based provider of communications services and infrastructure in Europe, and much of
the European legislature seems to have been tailored for the German market. Today, the German
20The former four directives were adopted on March 7, 2002, while Directive 2002/58/EC was adopted later on
July 7, 2002.
21Previously, the European Commission had filed a suit against Germany and some other Member States on the
basis of Art. 226 EC Treaty, because the directives had not been implemented within respite.
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communications market alone is attributed to have a total market volume of 76 billion Euros
(Freyberg 2007). Moreover, the potential for platform competition is very large in Germany,
because about 86% of the households have the choice between cable broadband and DSL.
The era until 2002: In the late 1980s the communications monopoly of DT was manifested in
the German Constitution, giving it only little incentive to invest more into its network than was
demanded to provide sufficient and reliable service. As a consequence, DT’s service quality was
very low at the time: Following Waverman and Sirel (1997), the exchanges’ digital switching
level was the lowest in the west, while calling prices where among the highest. In fact, DT was
misused as a cash cow paying 10 per cent of its revenue as a government tax as well as a 4 per
cent special reunification tax and a 6 per cent tax to cross subsidize the losses of the Post Office,
which was also under State control.
In the 1980s the German government also approved the deployment of the CATV network.22
Cable TV revolutionized the quality and reliability of TV broadcasting, which had been terres-
trial and restricted to three channels before. Thus, until the mid 1990s roll-out was rapid, and
until the end of 2002 about 22.3 million German households had cable TV subscriptions, while
the CATV network passes about 86 per cent of all homes (Maldoom et al. 2005). By these
figures, the German CATV market is the second largest behind the USA (Digitalfernsehen.de
2007). However, during the first roll-out phase only few cable licenses were granted to providers
other than DT.23 Thus, until DT was forced to sell its CATV network, it operated about 90 per
cent of the existing cable infrastructure (Cawley 1997).
Consequently, when DT started to offer its DSL broadband service in April of 1999, it
had little incentive to upgrade its CATV infrastructure to HFC in order to be able to offer
broadband over cable as well. In fact, DT aggressively pushed DSL take up through very
low initial subscription charges, which had to be raised later, because they were deemed by
the regulator to foreclose the market.24 Furthermore DT’s DSL roll-out also benefited from
technical and regulatory circumstances, such as on average relatively short local lines (1.5 km - 2
km) allowing DSL at rather modest investments and the absence of bitstream access obligations,
which would have allowed entrants to free-ride on DT’s infrastructure roll-out. Hence, by the
end of 2002, 98 per cent of broadband subscribers in Germany had DSL over DT infrastructure.
22Initial deployments started in 1984, following a proposition by the “Kommission fu¨r den Ausbau des technis-
chen Kommunikationssystems”.
23VEBA, for example, applied successfully for a cable license in Berlin.
24This and the following data of this paragraph are taken from (Maldoom et al. 2005).
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However, the overall broadband penetration rate was at 4.1 per cent rather low in Germany,
giving it a middle rank in the EU (OECD 2007b).
Platform competition from 2003: The reason for relatively low broadband penetration can
be mainly explained by the absence of platform competition through cable broadband. DSL
had a considerable head start, because it would take another four years after DSL had first been
offered, before cable broadband would become available all over the country by 2003:
In the advent of second EU cable directive, DT divested its cable infrastructure into the
newly found Kabel Deutschland GmbH (KDG) during the late 1990s. The KDG was subdi-
vided into nine regional organizations which were supposed to be sold individually to investors.
First, the cable infrastructure in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) was sold in February 2000 to
the American investor Callahan, who subsequently also bought the regional network of Baden-
Wuerttemberg (BW). The respective cable operator were named ish (NRW) and Kabel BW.
Hesse’s CATV network was sold to a group of investors under the leadership of A. Gary Klesch
and operated by a company called iesy.25 The remaining six regional organizations were sold to
a group of investors comprising Apax Partners, Providence Equity Partners and Goldman Sachs
Capital Partners in 2003 to form the new Kabel Deutschland Group. The sale of this largest
part of the fomer DT cable infrastructure has been considerably delayed by an objection of
the German Federal Cartel Office (Bundeskartellamt) to a previous offer of the Liberty Media
Group. Investors had been so reluctant in purchasing German CATV infrastructure because of
its peculiar ownership structure. More specifically, DT had only sold its network level 3 in-
frastructure, i.e. the customer access network from the headend to the terminal node located at
each premises. Network level 4 infrastructure (i.e. the wiring on the premises to the individual
households) was in largely distributed private ownership, making it very difficult to coordinate
the necessary infrastructure upgrades (Marcus and Stamm 2006). Although all regional op-
erators quickly began upgrading their infrastructure to two-way HFC networks, DT has had
enough time to build a large installed based of DSL broadband subscriptions. Cable broad-
band subscriptions just recently seem to gain momentum. Figure 1.5 (OECD 2007b) shows
that Cable and DSL broadband compete head-to-head especially in those countries where ef-
fective platform competition has been in place for some time (e.g. Denmark, Netherlands,
Korea, Switzerland, Canada or United States). In Germany, however, the aforementioned reg-
ulatory barriers, the reluctance in cable broadband provision and DSL’s head-start have led to
25Iesy and ish were combined under the brand of Unitymedia in May 2007.
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Figure 1.5: OECD Broadband Subscribers per 100 Inhabitants, by Technology, Dec. 2006
an overwhelming DSL predominance. Furthermore, the figure shows that although broadband
penetration has significantly increased in Germany within the past four years (from 4.1 per
cent in 2002 to 17.1 per cent in 2006), Germany is still at a medium rank EU or OECD wide.
However, Table 1.1 shows that the potential for platform competition (without virgin build) is
among the highest in Europe, as over 80 per cent of the homes having access to broadband have
the choice of technology.26 As the market matures, we can therefore expect a similar pattern as
in other leading OECD countries where the market is split up more or less evenly among DSL-
and cable-broadband subscribers.
While the convergence of voice, video and data, on the one hand, may signal more competi-
tion in individual markets for each of these services, there are, on the other hand, only very few
firms which can provide all of these services bundled together. In particular incumbent PSTN
and CATV operators seek to differentiate themselves from other access-based firms by offering
a Triple Play bundle comprising these three essential services. CATV operators can most natu-
rally offer a bundle of a TV-subscription, Internet and voice telephony service: TV-broadcasting
has been the CATV firms’ home product. Not only the physical network is perfectly suited for
this task, but also existing contracts with content providers give the cable companies a head start
with respect to this service. In addition, the new HFC infrastructure allows for the provision
of broadband services such as Internet and VoIP.27 Therefore, today all of the aforementioned
regional cable companies in Germany offer various Triple Play service bundles. On the other
26As Maldoom et al. point out, actual company data is very limited for this domain: Nevertheless, British
Telecom suspects that 50.9 % of its DSL lines are in areas also covered by cable, whereas Comcast, the leading
cable network operator in the US, estimates that DSL services are availabe to 77% of the households it passes.
27Reliability, especially of the voice telephony service remains an issue in the CATV network, however, as they
depend on the packet switched IP protocol which cannot give performance guarantees like line-switched networks
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DSL Cable Fiber Upper
coverage homes passed homes passed bound
(% of lines) (% households) (%households) on overlap
Austria 77% 53% - 53%
Belgium 95% 100% - 95%
Denmark 95% 77% - 77%
France 86% 51% - 51%
Germany 90% 86% - 86%
Ireland 50% 88% - 50%
Italy 68% 11% 6% 17%
Luxembourg 89% 100% - 89%
Netherlands 85% 94% - 85%
Portugal 61% 93% - 61%
Spain 89% 38% - 38%
Sweden 75% 65% 7% 72%
UK 63% 62% - 62%
US 62% 97% - 62%
Table 1.1: Potential Platform Competition in Selected EU States and the US by end 2002 (Maldoom et
al. 2005)
hand, Deutsche Telekom also offers a Triple Play bundle under the brand name of “T-Home”.28
As a classical PSTN operator, DT has a strategic advantage in the voice telephony and Internet
service markets, but struggles in providing competitive content for its TV broadcasting ser-
vice.29 Moreover, due to the more limited bandwidth of the PSTN, DT is also experiencing
technical problems with its IPTV service. Thus, either one of the vertically integrated platform
operators seems to have some strategic advantage in providing its home service.
Offering Triple Play bundles as a differentiation strategy may lead to a reduction of com-
petition in the communications sector as a whole. However, when firms compete in prices,
the classical Bertrand argument yields that two firms may be enough to achieve near competi-
tive outcomes. Thus, although Triple Play may be sufficient to differentiate the facilities-based
28At the time of writing, the Triple Pay packages are called “Entertain”. See http://www.t-home.de
29Whereas customers may access over 200 channels over the CATV network (depending on their regional
provider), DT currently provides their customers with just over 100 channels.
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from the access-based operators, it will not protect the facilities-based operators from (poten-
tially harsh) competition in the market for bundles. The point I would like to make in this paper
is that firms may find a way out of this dilemma by adding another dimension to competition,
namely quality.30 I will show that incumbent firms seek to offer bundles of different quali-
ties in equilibrium in order to mitigate competition. Before I proceed to the discussion of the
formal game theoretic model, I will point out the economically most important facets of the
communications industry in the next chapter.
30I use the term quality very generically and will refine its notion in Section 2.1.9.
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Chapter 2
The Economics of Digital Convergence
Having established a sufficient legal and technological understanding of digital convergence,
this chapter seeks to provide the reader with some rather general insights into the economics of
the communications industry, and converging communications markets in particular. However,
in several points I break with conventional wisdom, e.g. by proposing that communications
services are not a homogeneous good. This chapter is also meant as a tie between the phys-
ical world of communications, comprising many small and individual facets which make up
the complex whole, and the abstract world of economics, where the most prominent features of
these complex markets are extracted in an effort to explain large parts of the economic activity
observed. In the second part of the chapter the related literature concerned with multi-market,
multi-product competition in general and digital convergence in particular is surveyed and con-
trasted with my framework. The chapter concludes with a detailed exposition of the structure
of this thesis within the Market Engineering methodology.
2.1 Communications Markets Characteristics
The communications markets exhibit some very peculiar economic features deserving special
attention. In following, I present a list of those which seem to be most outstanding in the present
context and will discuss the rationale, applicability and relevance of each in turn.
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2.1.1 Sunk Costs
Communications network operators distinguish between Capital Expenditures (CapEx) and Op-
erational Expenditures (OpEx). Generally, CapEx are the costs associated with setting up a
communications system, while OpEx are the costs of running the system (Verbrugge et al.
2005). Thus, CapEx are constituted by the purchase of fixed network infrastructure (e.g. optical
fiber, IP routers), land and buildings, software (e.g. network management systems) or license
fees (e.g. frequency spectrum licenses). In network industries, CapEx have traditionally been
associated with large sunk costs, due to the tremendous initial investment necessary to build up
sufficient infrastructure. These investments are typically sunk because they cannot be recovered
should the firm leave the market and are dedicated to the particular use. Take the German 3G
spectrum auction for example. The licenses acquired by MobilCom and Quam were never used
and there has been an ongoing legal struggle on whether these firms are allowed to sell or give
back their licenses (Bundesnetzagentur 2007). In any case, it is inevitable that neither firm is
able to recoup its initial expenses. More traditionally, also the deployment of new cable requires
large amounts of manual labor for digging and trenching that cannot be recovered later on.
The existence of high sunk costs, which are often coupled with economies of scale (cf. Sec-
tion 2.1.2), give rise to a natural monopoly, because it would be (socially) inefficient to make
two such sunk investments concurrently. The rationale that network industries constitute a nat-
ural monopoly has persisted in the minds of regulators (and economists) for many decades.
Consequently, the communications sector has almost exclusively been operated and owned by
the State until the late twentieth century (cf. Section 1.2). However, since then, rapid tech-
nological advancements have successively reduced the importance of sunk costs: Today it is
more economical to deploy long distance networks (e.g. due to the rise of fiber optics1) and
infrastructure becomes obsolete at a much higher rate, requiring constant reinvestment. While
this argumentation is largely true for the trunk networks, it is not valid for the customer access
networks (Vogelsang 2003). Here the natural monopoly prevails, because it is prohibitively
expensive to deploy new infrastructure to each individual premises. Therefore, both DSL and
cable broadband technologies reuse the local loop, although its wiring is inferior with respect
to fiber. Likewise operators have been very reluctant with the roll-out of FTTH, especially in
sparsely populated areas.2
1Recall that fiber optics are able to carry oder of magnitudes more data while necessitating significantly less
repeaters.
2In Korea or Japan, for example, where FTTH is already available at large (see Figure 1.5), cities are densely
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Finally, Sutton (1991) has shown that market structure relies upon whether sunk costs are
endogenous or exogenous. Exogenous sunk costs are those which cannot be influenced by com-
petitors and are outside a business’s control. They usually comprise the purchase of production
factors and production facilities. On the contrary, endogenous sunk costs of entry may be influ-
enced by the firm or its competitors. Sutton himself refers to advertisement as a key endogenous
sunk cost of market entry, because the amount a firm needs to spend on effective advertisement
depends on the competitors’ advertisements efforts. The distinction between endogenous and
exogenous sunk costs may also be artificially created by regulatory circumstances. For instance,
consider the case where licenses are an essential production factor (e.g. spectrum or broadcast-
ing licenses). If these licenses are sold in an auction, they constitute an example of endogenous
sunk costs since the final price to be paid is determined by the other firms’ bids. However, if
the licenses were to be given away at a predetermined price, the acquisition of the same pro-
duction factor constitutes exogenous sunk costs. Moreover, sometimes the transition between
exogenous and endogenous sunk costs can be blurred, as in the UK 3G spectrum auction, for
example, where some licenses were reserved for newcomers, such that only some of the firms
had influence on their final price.
2.1.2 Fixed Costs and Economies of Scale and Scope
The OpEx of communications network operators are mainly constituted by fixed costs. Accord-
ing to Verbrugge et al. (2005) these costs comprise:3
• Continuous Infrastructure Costs include rental payments for equipment space, leasing
of equipment, energy costs for cooling and power, but also right-of-ways, e.g. to run
cables or fiber over someone else’s property. These costs occur, even if the network was
error-free.
• Maintenance Costs are those costs associated with maintaining and operating a network
under potential failures. In particular, they include costs of monitoring the network and
its services in order to enable stock management, software management, security man-
populated and people frequently live in apartment buildings, such that a single premises connected with fiber can
provide access for hundreds of customers.
3I mention only those OpEx costs specific to communications network operators. Of course there are other
OpEx which accrue in every firm and may thus be summarized as (administrative) overhead costs.
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agement, change management and preventive replacement of possibly faulty components.
Changes in equipment may also fall under this category.
• Reparation Costs occur if a failure has occurred and contain all costs associated with the
actions taken to repair the failure, such as technicians traveling to the place of failure,
diagnosis and analysis of the failure, the actual fixing of the failure and verification that
the problem has been corrected.
• Operational Network Planning Costs include costs of the ongoing network planning ac-
tivity like day-to-day planning, re-optimization and upgrade planning.
• Marketing Costs are those costs associated with the ongoing marketing and promotion
activities of the communications firm, especially those with promoting its service and
providing price information.4
• Service Provisioning Costs arise with providing a predefined service to the end customer.
These costs are mainly constituted by providing appropriate content (according to the
service), but also comprise costs associated with the order entrance and switching the
customer onto the network as well as costs of service cessation.
• Billing and Accounting Costs accrue by sending bills to the customers and making sure
they pay, but also include costs of collecting user information, such as service usage and
costs per customer.
With the exception of billing and accounting costs, OpEx are not directly related to an individual
customer. Furthermore, billing and accounting costs comprise only a negligible fraction of
the total OpEx, especially when bills are send out electronically. Also the digital switching
technology has decreased the marginal costs per call to zero. Thus, one can justify to make
the simplification that the marginal cost of serving an additional customer are negligible, while
almost all remaining costs fall on fixed costs.5 Certainly, the existence of high fixed costs
(while variable costs tend to zero) implies strong economies of scale. For network industries
in particular, economies of scale may stem from economies of density and economies of size
4These costs are distinguished from the sunk costs of marketing associated with market entry. As I have argued
above, the latter fall under CapEx because they accrue only once when the new firm enters a market or sets up a
new service or infrastructure.
5This assumption is common for the present industry. See de Bijl and Peitz (2002), Laffont and Tirole (2000),
or Economides and Lehr (1995) among others.
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(Keeler 1974).6 Economies of density refer to those economies of scale which result from
increased traffic volume along existing network paths. In the PSTN, for example, advances in
technology have made it possible to increase the bandwidth of the local line and thereby enabled
the provision of additional services. Similarly, new digital compressing techniques allow for
more effective utilization of existing bandwidth. These examples exhibit economies of density,
because one can increase the traffic (and thus revenue) of the existing network with only little
modification. On the other hand, economies of size refer to a broader notion of scale economies,
because they also incorporate adjustments of the physical network. Deploying optical fiber, for
example, multiplies the traffic capabilities of the network by magnitudes, but does not incur a
proportional increase in costs.7 This means that a larger network is likely to have lower unit
costs than a smaller one, which in turn hampers entry by new competitors, since they would
need to capture a large share of the market in order to be competitive (cf. Section 2.1.3).
Moreover, in the above listing of cost types one can distinguish between network related
costs, and service related costs (Machuca et al. 2007). A communications firm can run several
services on its network without necessarily implying an increase of the network related costs.
Thus, the communications industry exhibits large economies of scope, because only few of the
OpEx cost types will experience a significant increase with the introduction of a new service.
2.1.3 Barriers to Entry
The presence of large scale and scope economies along with significant sunk costs of market
entry promotes the existence of high entry barriers to (facilities-based) competition in the com-
munications market. Any competitor willing to compete in the market faces the risk of enor-
mous irreversible investments, while superadditivity of costs require for a large market share.
In order to acquire sufficient demand, the entrant is likely to price below the incumbent, which
diminishes profits and therefore makes it difficult to recover the sunk costs.
In particular the local loop remains to constitute an essential facility (Haucap, Heimeshoff,
and Uhde 2006). Essential facilities are parts of resistant natural monopolies, access to which
is necessary to compete in the specific market. Of course, the owner of an essential facility or
bottleneck would like to prevent or at least hinder access by potential competitors, which in turn
6Actually Keeler determined these cost types by looking at the railroad industry.
7Although fiber optic cables are costlier than coaxial or twisted pair cables, they are also very robust and
therefore cheaper in maintenance.
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warrants regulation (Areeda 1990). In the case of the communications industry, the regulator
has therefore demanded the incumbent PSTN operator to grant access to its local loop in the
form of LLU, line-sharing or bitstream-access.8 In this paper I focus on facilities-based com-
petition by incumbent PSTN and CATV operators, each of which control their own customer
access network. Hence the problem of access to essential facilities does not arise. In fact, in the
light of digital convergence the same arguments of irreversibility and superadditivity which con-
stitute insurmountable entry barriers should have prevented the simultaneous existence of two
independent communications networks in the first place. However, at the time of construction,
the analog nature of signal transmission justified the coexistence of these networks because the
present technology allowed only one service at a time. Each network served a distinct market.
Through digital convergence these formerly disjoint markets have converged, bringing about
the possibility of inter-modal platform-competition. Following this argumentation of the local
loop as a resistant natural monopoly, it seems reasonable to acknowledge the existence of a
reciprocal duopoly market in the facilities-based fixed-wire communications industry.
2.1.4 Flatrate Pricing
For a long time we could observe non-linear pricing on the fixed-line communications market.
Non-linear pricing refers to those pricing schemes where the unit price depends on the total
quantity demanded. Typically non-linear pricing is achieved through two-part tariffs, where
customers pay a fixed (subscription) fee and a variable fee depending on the marginal costs
and demand elasticity of the good requested. In his seminal paper, Oi (1971) showed that a
monopolistic firm can fully capture consumers’ surplus by employing a two part tariff. Thereby,
the fixed subscription fee covers the firm’s fixed costs, while the variable fee is set at marginal
costs. Without the fixed fee, the monopoly would price above marginal costs, resulting in a dead
weight loss. Oligopolistic firms, on the other hand, generally cannot extract the full consumer
surplus and should set the variable fee at the “perceived” marginal costs, as Laffont, Rey, and
Tirole (1997, 1998a) point out.
Today, ongoing digitization and resulting cost efficiencies have lead to another form of
non-linear pricing, the so-called flatrate pricing (OECD 2007c, Chapter 7). Flatrate pricing
8For CATV network operators such regulation does not exist at present, but is vividly discussed. Brunell (2005)
provides a comprehensive list of the various arguments in this discussion. See also Hausman, Sidak, and Singer
(2001) on the topic.
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is a degenerate two-part tariff, where the variable fee is set to zero. This type of pricing has
become reasonable for communications services because metering a consumer’s usage is rel-
atively costly compared to the marginal costs created by this usage. This form of pricing is
particularly common if there exist excess capacities in the network. The roll-out of fiber along
with the rise of digital compression and transmission techniques, for example, has created ex-
cess capacities especially in the long-distance networks. Of course, if capacity is not scarce,
marginal costs and thus prices will eventually drop to zero. Thus the best a firm can do is to
recover its fixed costs by setting its flatrate tariff accordingly.9
2.1.5 Network Effects and Compatibility
One speaks of network effects whenever the value of a product depends on how many other
people are using the same or compatible products (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Farrell and Saloner
1985). Let us briefly consider the implications for the fixed-line communications markets.
As a point of departure, suppose communications networks, i.e. the services provided over
them, were incompatible, such that users connected to the PSTN (or CATV network) could only
communicate with other users connected to the PSTN (CATV network). In this case, consumers
would most probably prefer the larger network because it would allow them to communicate
with more people, which in turn raises their benefit from subscribing to this particular network.
In this vein, networks experience increasing returns to scale and much of the early literature
on network effects has therefore been concerned with early adoption and lock-in (e.g. Arthur
1989).
This simple view is flawed in two respects, however. First, people generally value more
how many people they regularly communicate with are connected to the network, rather than
how many subscribers the network has in total. The emergence of a global network effect then
depends crucially on the microstructure and embedding of the local networks into the larger
network (see e.g. Durlauf 1993) Second, today all communications networks are interconnected
and compatible:
Compatibility has been achieved through digital convergence (or more precisely the Internet
9In the mobile telephony market, non-degenerate two-part tariffs are still very common, because capacity is
more limited and marginal costs (due to mobile termination prices) are higher. Very recently, however, many
operators have begun to offer flatrate tariffs for on-net and landline calls. Therefore, as the capacities of the mobile
network increase, we can also expect a general tendency towards flatrate pricing in this market.
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Protocol) which unified heterogeneous network architectures by allowing for network transpar-
ent service provision. In particular, this means that voice, data and video services are therefore
not exclusive to any network. Furthermore, compatibility between services provided over dif-
ferent architectures does not seem to be a relevant problem today. Subscribers of the CATV
network can most naturally call people which are connected to the PSTN and vice versa. Also,
given the same technical quality of the connection, consumers should not care about whether
they are connected to the Internet via DSL or cable broadband; or if they receive their TV sig-
nal via a coaxial or twisted pair cable. Consumers may therefore Mix and Match (Matutes and
Regibeau 1988; Economides 1989; Einhorn 1992) services from different providers.10
Interconnectedness of networks belonging to different firms immediately raises the question
of cost sharing. On the one hand, firms wish to connect their network in order to increase the
network effect and thereby consumers’ willingness-to-pay. On the contrary, firms must agree to
connect through or terminate calls on their network which were originated on the competitors
network. If capacity is limited, and especially if networks are very asymmetric in size, this can
lead to increased costs on the terminating network while the benefit (in form of subscription
or connection fees) is received by the originating network provider. Therefore, firms usually
charge a termination price for each call that terminates on their network, but was originated
from a different network (off-net call ). For on-net calls, costs and benefits fall upon the same
provider, of course, such that no such extra charge is necessary. If both networks are fairly equal
in size, or if capacity is not limited, one could argue that the additional costs accruing by foreign
traffic balance each other out, or are even negligible. While this argumentation seems to hold
for the fixed-line telecommunications market, it is rather not valid for mobile communications.
This is also why we can frequently observe flatrate offers for on-net or mobile-to-fixed-line
calls, but generally not for off-net mobile calls.11 Theoretical considerations have shown that
both firms can individually gain from charging different on- and off-net prices, because they
evoke tariff-mediated network externalities (Laffont, Rey, and Tirole 1998b): While network
interconnection eliminates network effects, discriminatory pricing of on- and off-net calls is able
to artificially restore these network externalities.12 Still, the existence of tariff-mediated network
10I will elaborate more on the findings of the Mix-and-Match literature in Section 4.2.
11At the time of writing, among the four big mobile network operators (T-Mobile, Vodafone, E-Plus and O2)
only O2 has just begun to offer a genuine off-net mobile-to-mobile flatrate for the consumer segment.
12Other important papers in this strand of the literature, such as Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1997, 1998a) or
Economides, Lopomo, and Woroch (1996), are more concerned with the effects of termination based pricing on
collusive agreements and welfare.
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externalities hinges upon the fact that customers pay per call (or minute). Consequently, under
a flatrate pricing scheme, network effects vanish.
2.1.6 Switching Costs
Consumer switching costs arise because consumers make investments specific to the service or
product they have bought. Klemperer (1995) notes that such costs may stem from a physical
investment, either for equipment or due to transaction costs of switching suppliers. A consumer
wishing to switch from DSL to cable broadband, for example, will need to replace his DSL
router by a cable modem. Also, very likely there might be a charge from the providers in either
canceling the old or setting up the new service.
Furthermore, switching costs may also be constituted through informational investment
costs in finding out how to use and configure a product/service or due to quality uncertain-
ties of competing services. Again, consider a consumer wishing to switch from DSL to cable.
Once his new service is up and running he has to re-configure his router and other equipment
from the factory defaults to the settings which fit his needs best. This might involve reading of
manuals as well as tedious trial-and-error processes. Switching the voice telephony service may
also result in a different telephone number. The efforts necessary to inform friends and relatives
of the new number also cause switching costs related to informational investment.
Next, switching costs can also be artificially created by firms, especially by means of con-
tracts. Communications firms typically try to lock-in their customers for a period of time by
offering them one- or two-year subscriptions. In this way, a consumer wishing to change his
service just now will need to pay both services for some time and might therefore be reluctant
to switching in the first place.
Finally, also psychological attachment to the current service might lead to perceived switch-
ing costs. Klemperer argues that the mere fact of using a service or product can change a
consumer’s relative utility for it and thereby create a preference for the current service. For ex-
ample, a consumer might want to stick with a certain provider only because he has subscribed
with this provider before and made good experience, although other providers have objectively
better offers.
In recent years considerable efforts have been undertaken to lessen switching costs in the
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communications industry:13 These efforts include free set-up charges and equipment for new
customers, plug-and-play equipment configuration or telephone number portability between
providers. Moreover, it is important to understand, that switching costs arise only after a con-
sumer has subscribed to some service. Thus, consumer switching costs give firms only market
power over those customers who want to repeatedly purchase a service. If consumers have not
subscribed to any service yet, switching costs cannot account for competitive advantages.14 On
the contrary, shopping costs denote those costs related to buying services from different sup-
pliers (Klemperer 1992). In traditional markets, shopping costs are relevant because products
of different suppliers might not be compatible or simply because of the transaction costs in-
volved in visiting many stores. In the communications industry, shopping costs seem to be less
pronounced. As I have mentioned before, services are generally compatible and set-up fees
often exempted. Also, due to the digital nature of the product, transaction costs of purchasing
from different providers are rather low. It is often argued that consumers prefer to receive one
bill for all their communications services. While this argument is questionable in itself (Pernet
2007, p.25), taken alone it is certainly not decisive in the presence of heterogeneous service
offerings.15 Besides, price discounts for bundles seem to be a much better explanation of why
consumers prefer to buy all of their services from one provider.16 All in all, it is therefore
doubtful whether shopping costs are of relevance in the present context.
2.1.7 Home Markets
The PSTN was designed to provide voice telephony; likewise cable networks were originally
deployed to provide video programming. At the time of erection, each of these networks pro-
vided a distinct service - and only this service. Thus, each network was fine-tuned for its home
service, and the providers gained technical and market expertise in running and marketing it. In
short, there is reason to believe that prior incumbency in a service market gives firms a strategic
advantage over its competitors, should they seek to enter its home market. The precise nature
of this advantage can be manifold:
13Compare Neumann (1999).
14In what follows, I will consider a one-shot game of platform competition and therefore neglect any switching
costs.
15Compare Subsection 2.1.9 for more on product differentiation.
16See Subsection 2.1.8 for more on bundling & tying.
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• Installed Base: Incumbents may have an installed base of customers, which would expe-
rience switching costs if choosing a different provider.
• Market Expertise: Incumbents have greater market expertise and can therefore “read”
their home market better. This may include marketing efforts, customer appeal or recog-
nition of future trends.
• Technological Know How: Incumbents have better technological know how. Their tech-
nology is generally more mature and tailored to the provision of their home service.
Technicians have experience with various sorts of failures and thus malfunctions can be
repaired more quickly and cheaper (cf. Subsection 2.1.2).
• Existing Market Relationships: In their home market, incumbents are likely to have
existing and better relationships with other vertically distinct firms (such as equipment
manufactures or content providers) or horizontally related competitors (e.g. operating
in geographically distinct markets). A telephony service provider wishing to enter the
video service market, for example, needs to make new contract arrangements with con-
tent providers first. Conversely, the telephony service provider may be able to negotiate
better off-net termination prices with foreign telcos.
• Psychological Adherence: Finally, existence of (possibly sunk) investments in physical
assets together with the mere fact that a firm used to be the incumbent in a particular mar-
ket may lead to psychological adherence to the home market: As a consequence, the firm
(or better its employees and management) is not willing to give up market share and/or
reputation in its home market (see e.g. O’Reilly and Chatman 1986). This incitement
may renew the firms’ spirit and can well lead to a superiority above competitors.
2.1.8 Bundling & Tying
After communications services and infrastructure have been liberalized, there has been a general
tendency to package services into a bundle (Bauer 2007; Welfens 2006). Each of the vertically
integrated PSTN and CATV network operators, for example, have recently started to offer so
called Triple Play packages, comprising a video, data and voice telephony service (cf. Section
1.3). Of course, naively one can suspect that these bundle pricing strategies are cost side driven
since there exist high economies of scale and scope in the production of network products
(cf. e.g. Chae 1992; Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). However, there is also a large strand
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of literature which studies the more interesting strategic and demand-side effects of bundling.
In particular, bundling might serve as a price discrimination or product differentiation device,
mitigate competition, deter entry or even leverage market power from one market to another. I
will survey this literature in great detail in Chapter 3. At this point, I will therefore only clarify
the definition of different forms of bundling.17
Pure Bundling refers to a pricing strategy where two services, say A and B, are only sold
together (at some fixed proportion). Neither A nor B is available for individual purchase.
Mixed Bundling denotes a pricing strategy where A and B are sold individually and in a
bundle. TheA-B package is generally offered at a discount over the sum of the individual
prices of A and B. Of course, mixed bundling is a generalized form of pure bundling,
because firms can always choose to set the individual prices arbitrarily high and thereby
establish a de-facto pure bundle pricing regime.
Tying is used ambiguously in literature, but generally refers to a firm’s practice of making
the purchase of good B conditional upon the purchase of good A. In a static tie, or
unilateral mixed bundle (Bundesnetzagentur 2005), a consumer may buy A alone, or the
combination of A and B, but not B alone. In a dynamic tie, consumers must buy one
unit of B together with at least one unit of A. Thus, consumers may purchase bundles of
A−B, 2A−B, 3A−B,... and so on.
One can generally assume that consumers desire only one communications service of each
type. There would be no added value in having two voice telephony or data services, for exam-
ple. Thus, in what follows, I will assume that no consumer ever purchases more than one unit
of any service type. Therefore, in the present context dynamic tying is not relevant and pure
bundling always refers to the A−B package.
Integrated network operators frequently employ unilateral mixed bundling. Consumers have
the choice of a basic subscription to the firms’ home service, or a Multiple Play package, in-
cluding the home service and additional services. An IPTV subscription of DT, for example,
requires a basic telephony subscription with DT. Likewise the voice telephony and data service
of all German cable operators require at least a basic TV broadcasting subscription. The point
is that firms do not offer their additional services individually. In the subsequent chapters I will
17The definitions follow Nalebuff (2003) if not noted otherwise.
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explore why and how such bundle pricing strategies might be profitable under facilities-based
competition.
2.1.9 Product Differentiation
Communications services are not a homogeneous good18 and may be either horizontally or
vertically differentiated, or both.
Under horizontal service differentiation consumers have different biases towards particular
services. These biases can be constituted through various means, such as switching costs or mar-
keting efforts. Consider switching costs, for example. If a consumer has already subscribed to
DT’s voice telephony service, he might likely also subscribe to its DSL broadband subscription,
because this involves the least amount of time and costs. However, another consumer which has
previously assigned to the cable companies TV service may apply the same type of rationale
and choose cable broadband instead. Hence, given identical service offerings, switching costs
induce some degree of ex-post heterogeneity upon firms’ services, once consumers have pre-
viously purchased from that particular firm. Therefore market power through switching costs
translates directly into (previous) market share. Also marketing efforts may have evoked a dif-
ferent service awareness and reception in different consumers, although these services are in
principle identical. Or a consumer may subscribe to a service because his neighbor or friend
has recommended this service to him. The crucial feature about horizontal service differentia-
tion is that consumers do not agree upon a ranking of services in terms of better or worse: Each
consumer has his own (unique) perception of the ideal service characteristics. While horizon-
tal service differentiation is well suited to study markets with asymmetries, it adds little to the
analysis of symmetric markets.19 Moreover, horizontal differences often stem from exogenous
influences, such as historic events or physical location, and may only be indirectly influenced
by firms’ efforts, such as marketing. Communications services have little prestigious (or im-
age) value, however, and thus horizontal service differentiation can only insufficiently explain
why and how symmetric markets compete. Here, each firm’s efforts to change the horizontal
characteristic to its favor is prone to canceling each other out.
Vertical service differentiation, on the contrary, assumes that consumers share a common
18Although some authors claim the difference. See e.g. Lommerud and Sorgard (2003).
19Usually these asymmetries are deduced from the incumbent vs. entrant relationship under intra-modal (or
access-based) competition. See. e.g. de Bijl and Peitz (2002) or Wang and Wen (1998).
47
CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL CONVERGENCE
understanding of the desirable service characteristics. These characteristics are usually com-
prised into one single parameter, called service quality. The difference to horizontal service
differentiation is that at equal prices all consumers prefer services with higher quality over ser-
vices with lower quality. Service quality is a very generic term in this context and stands as a
proxy for various service characteristics. Moreover, these characteristics may also vary across
services.
For example, §32 of the German Telecommunications Customer Protection Ordinance
(Telekommunikations-Kundenschutzverordnung: TKV) prescribes the following quality mea-
sures which must be collected by all network operators and dominant providers:
• Time until first provision of network access
• Failures per customer access line per year
• Failure repair response time
• Frequency of failed connections
• Time for connection
• Switched services response time
• Information services response time
• Share of functioning public phones
• Precision of billing
While these quality measures are published annually by the German Federal Network
Agency (Bundesnetzagentur), they are by far not the only one relevant quality characteristics.
Further possible measures of voice telephony services could be, but are not limited to:
• Speech quality
• Number of calling countries included in flatrate subscription
• Support availability
• Value added services availability
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In addition, data communications services could differentiate in:
• Bandwidth
• Quality of hardware provided
• Quality of software provided
Finally, video broadcasting services can be distinguished by:
• Video/sound quality
• Content quantity/availability
• Content diversity20
• Content quality21
The richness of quality measure shows that communications services are indeed far from
being a homogeneous good. In fact, the aim of this paper is to show that quality competition,
i.e. competition in the quality dimension, is a key mode of competition in convergent commu-
nications markets.22
2.2 Digital Convergence and Competition
2.2.1 Reciprocal Duopoly and the Prisoners’ Dilemma
Established Entry vs. De-Novo Entry
Among the many characteristics of the communications industry, regulators are most concerned
with the existence of resistant natural monopolies in essential facilities, such as the customer
20Under analog broadcasting, providers (especially CATV operators) were forced to distribute an assortment
of prescribed (public) channels bouquets (Must-Carry-Rule); in some States so much that there was little room
for individual packaging of content. With the latest amendment of §52 of the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement
(Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) enacted on March 1, 2007, only one third of the digital broadcasts fall under the Must-
Carry-Rule, allowing for sufficient differentiation.
21§11(4) of the Interstate Broadcasting Agreement even demands the German Public Content Providers (ARD,
ZDF and Deutschlandradio) to biannually publish a report about the quality and quantity of their content.
22It shall be annotated that in context of another network industry (namely the railroad industry) Braeutigam,
Daughety, and Turnquist (1984) even find that the extend of scale economies and service quality are highly related.
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access network, which prevents entry and thereby effective competition. In the course of this
text some of the regulatory measures (e.g. LLU, line-sharing or bitstream access) seeking to
dismantle entry barriers have already been discussed. However, all of these measures, like most
of the economic literature on entry, implicitly assume de-novo entry, i.e. entry by firms without
any history in this (geographically distinct) or a related market.23 The traditional rationale
then implies that the new entrant first needs to make high (possibly sunk) initial investments in
order to acquire the necessary assets to compete in this new market. If these initial investments
seem unrecoverable to the new firm, for example due to scale economies, we speak of a natural
monopoly.
However, often potential entrants are not start-ups, but established firms having a related
home market (Andrews 1949; Brunner 1961). In fact, for established entry Bain (1956)’s clas-
sical arguments certifying high entry barriers, may be reversed for established firms. Yip (1982),
for example, argues that economies of scale may even facilitate entry by established firms who
probably have realized sufficient size already in their home market. Likewise, established firms
may already have relations with vertically related firms, or have an established brand and can
exploit their own customer base. Moreover, Cairns and Mahabir (1988) assure that firms in
related industries find it more attractive to enter due to their own sunk costs, forcing them to
utilize the excess capacity in their home market. This view, of course, implies that the oppor-
tunity costs of entry are zero, i.e. no profits are foregone in the home market by entering the
secondary market. This is particularly true whenever a firm may exploit its (intangible) assets
with public good character, such as know how, consumer goodwill and management skills in
the new market (Teece 1982). Generally, if physical and intangible capital is rather firm- than
product specific, such that it can be easily transfered from one product market to another, es-
tablished firms may be able to move fast and at large scale into markets with high entry barriers
(van Wegberg and van Witteloostuijn 1992; van Wegberg 1995). Therefore, it is not surprising
that the empirical evidence for entry by established firms is overwhelming.24
23Sutton (1991, 1998) calls this the “symmetry principle”, meaning that all firms are equally likely to enter a
market, irrespective of their background.
24See van Wegberg and van Witteloostuijn (1991, Section 3) and the references therein for a comprehensive
overview.
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Reciprocal Entry
In the communications industry we observe precisely the same situation: Facilities-based entry
into the PSTN’s local loop seems infeasible to a de-novo entrant, but CATV network operators
have their own customer access network with excess capacity, exhibiting large scale and scope
economies and a installed base of customers. Thus, with digital convergence and the fall of
legal barriers, the cable companies’ entry into the voice telephony and data service market–the
PSTN incumbent’s home market–was indispensable. However, ceteris paribus the incumbent’s
profits are reduced after entry. Therefore, even if the incumbent did not find it profitable to
enter the CATV firms’ home market before, entry might change the incumbents equilibrium
output such that a reciprocal entry becomes profitable (Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer
1985). More formally, see that entry reduces the incumbent’s sales and thereby leaves him with
unused capacity. As the opportunity cost of unused capacity is smaller than the opportunity cost
of used capacity, the incumbent will retaliate entry if the expected profits exceed the reduced
opportunity costs (van Wegberg and van Witteloostuijn 1991). Thus, initial entry provokes
reciprocal entry (Calem 1988) and this is exactly what DT does by offering an IPTV service.
Apart from retaliation, other reasons for reciprocal entry are also plausible. Watson (1982),
for example, argues that firms might enter a potential entrant’s home market (prior to actual
entry) in order to be able to better protect their own home market. Such counter-competitive
actions have especially been effective in the industries characterized by economies of scale.
By pro-actively extending competition into the rival’s home market, a firm is able to lower its
unit costs and thereby able to better fight the potential entrant in one’s own home market.25
Furthermore, Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) identify a mutual foothold equilibrium, where
each potential entrant establishes a foothold in the rival’s home market in order to signal the
possibility of direct retaliation.26
A Prisoners’ Dilemma
Since I consider facilities-based entry only, reciprocal entry is limited to the two network op-
erators and their respective home markets, yielding a reciprocal duopoly market structure. It is
25Watson especially considers geographically distinct markets and finds empirical evidence for this strategy in
the information technology industry.
26Here the difference to the prisoner’s dilemma situation (see below) is that firms do not actually engage in large
scale entry leading to a price war, but make a credible threat by small-scale market entry. Thus, the mutual foothold
equilibrium is the first step towards mutual forbearance, discussed in Section 6.3.
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easy to see that the reciprocal duopoly situation is pareto dominated by the situation where both
firms would have stayed in their isolated monopolies: Suppose, each firm makes a monopoly
revenue of Rm and a duopoly profit of Rd. Then it generally holds that Rm > 2Rd, because
some revenue is foregone in the friction created by competition. Also notice that this is a very
strong proposition, because it holds irrespective of scale or scope economies and costs of en-
try. Consequently, under digital convergence myopic firms face a prisoners’ dilemma: Each
firm is individually better off by entering the neighboring service market, but as entry provokes
re-entry, both firms will end up in the reciprocal duopoly, yielding lower overall profits than
before. However, as each firm maximizes its short-term profits myopically, neither firm can
commit not to enter each others territory and thus reciprocal entry is inevitable.27 In Kra¨mer,
Berninghaus, and Weinhardt (2006), I show that this prisoners’ dilemma situation is not prone
to the duopoly and prevails for an arbitrary number of firms with home markets.
2.2.2 Multi-Market and Multi-Product Competition
The story of reciprocal entry, and thus competition under digital convergence, is tied closely
to the literature on multi-market or multi-product competition. The terms multi-market and
multi-product competition are inherently ambiguous and their difference hinges upon the defi-
nition of the market. Generally, one can say that if each new product constitutes a new market
(with possibly other consumers or a different demand function), then multi-market and multi-
product competition coincide. If, however, each new product is a close substitute to the other,
then a multi-product firm must not necessarily be active in multiple product markets.28 While
it is impossible to give a comprehensive overview over this broad strand of literature, I will
nevertheless try to pin down some of the papers most influential to the present context.29
The early literature on the topic sought to explain why multi-product firms arise in the
first place. The traditional explanation has been motivated by cost-side effects, in particular
the presence of economies of scope (Panzar and Willig 1981). Teece (1980, 1982), however,
argues that the existence of economies of scope alone cannot explain why “joint production must
be organized within a single multi-product enterprise”, because the same could be achieved
by contracts. In his view multi-product firms are rather able to economize on transactions
27In Section 6.3 I will reconsider this argumentation.
28That is, if one accepts market boundaries to be defined through demand-substitutability.
29The multi-market or multi-product literature dealing with product differentiation or bundling will be discussed
in great detail in Chapter 3.
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costs–much in the sense of Williamson (1979)–e.g. through avoiding repeated negotiations and
hazards of opportunism. In this sense, the efficiency of multi-product organization comes from
economies of scope in factor allocation (i.e. contracting) and not necessarily from economies
of scope in production (Haber and Levy 1988).
In a different vein, Wolinsky (1986) gives a demand-side explanation for multi-product
firms. In his model, firms offer multiple products in equilibrium only if they face imperfect
competition. Wolinsky argues that “imperfect competition in a market for a single product
often leads to firms’ excess capacity”. Excess capacity, however, may in turn be interpreted as
a form of “quasi-public input”, which gives rise to economies of scope. In this way, Wolinksy
is able to relate the demand-side explanation with the cost-side explanation of multi-product
firms.
Among others, Schmalensee (1978), Scherer (1979) and Brander and Eaton (1984) have
shown that diversification cannot only be an optimal choice for a firm because it exploits
economies of scope, but also as a strategic preemptive weapon against potential rivals. Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) argue from a different perspective, that
multi-product firms may be able to deter entry in market A by developing a reputation for
being aggressive in market B. In a sense these papers present a formalization of the counter-
competitive actions described before. Furthermore Srinivasan (1991) shows that an incumbent
which operates in multiple markets is able to raise entry barriers by limit pricing across markets.
On the contrary, Judd (1985) remarks that entry deterrence through brand proliferation involves
a credibility-problem, because a firm producing a line of substitutable products might be highly
vulnerable to entry. In fact, whenever exit barriers are low, the incumbent might find it more
profitable to leave the market under attack and thereby raise prices in all markets.
Shaked and Sutton (1990), finally, abstract from any cost-side considerations and provide
a framework that explains multi-product firms in terms of an expansion and competition ef-
fect. Therein the expansion effect measures the monopolist’s relative gain from producing an
additional good, whereas the competition effect reflects the profit loss due to increased rivalry.
Equilibria of multi-product settings are then characterized by a balance of these two opposing
effects.30
Concerned with multi-market competition, Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) of-
30Myopic firms, however, first see the short-term expansion effect only. The above prisoners’ dilemma situation
then arises when the subsequent competition effect overcompensates the benefits received through expansion.
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fer a different parameterization of the nature of competition into strategic complements and
strategic substitutes. The authors investigate a game where one firm operates in a monopoly
and a duopoly market. Although demands are not interrelated across markets, they show that
a change in one market may nevertheless have ramifications on the other market if costs are
interdependent. The critical issue in determining the nature of the interaction is determined
by whether competitors regard products as strategic substitutes or complements. If products
are strategic complements, a more aggressive behavior of one firm in a market will elicit an
aggressive response from its competitors, whereas strategic substitutes refers to a more lenient
behavior in response to more aggressive play. The characterization of oligopolistic competition
in strategic substitutes and complements is a very substantial one and essentially relates to the
slope of the reaction function. For example, under Cournot competition firms reaction functions
are usually downward sloping, i.e. as one firm expands its quantity the other firm will lower its
output (strategic substitutes). On the contrary, under Bertrand competition reaction functions
are generally upward sloping such that an decrease in price by one firm will provoke a price
decrease by the other firm (strategic complements), resulting in the well-know Bertrand price
war.
Many other models of multi-market competition consider geographically distinct markets of
the same product (Anderson and Fischer 1989; Calem 1988; Pinto 1986; Krugman 1980; Ven-
ables 1990; Veugelers 1995; Lommerud and Sorgard 2003). It is also in these models where the
effects of reciprocal entry have first been studied. Brander and Krugman (1983), for example,
find a similar prisoners’ dilemma situation while concerned with reciprocal dumping.31 Other
authors focused on hit-and-run entry between contestable markets (Anderson and Fischer 1989;
Calem 1988; Venables 1990).
While all of these models capture some sort of multi-market (or multi-product) effect, ei-
ther on the demand or on the cost side, they are not able to reflect the digital convergence
phenomenon. What makes it different from the multi-product literature is that the firms’ ser-
vices (i.e. voice or video) are not demand-substitutes. In the multi-product literature consumers
choose exactly one product from a variety of substitutes comprising one market. On the other
hand, the multi-market literature is concerned with (geographically) distinct consumer markets
of the same product. In the present scenario, however, the same consumers are present on all
service markets, willing to purchase exactly one service from each.
31Dumping denotes the observation that international firms may charge a lower price for their products in foreign
markets (net transportation costs) than in their home market.
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2.2.3 Competition under Digital Convergence: A Survey
Only very few scholars have investigated the economic consequences of the digital convergence
phenomenon by means of a rigorous formal analysis.32 Firstly, Greenstein and Khanna (1997)
and Greenstein (1999) provide a starting point by distinguishing two kinds of convergence:
convergence in complements and convergence in substitutes.
Convergence in complements means that “products work better together than separately”
or “work better together now than they worked together formerly” (Greenstein and Khanna
1997). This definition suggests that consumers derive greater value from the package of the two
complementary products than from the sum of each product separately or, put differently, that
products become increasingly compatible. With convergence in complements, ceteris paribus
competition should detensify. It is doubtful, however, if the convergence of different services
into one service package (like Triple Play) really proves to be a case of convergence in com-
plements on the consumer side. In fact, there is no convincing argument why a TV service
subscription should substantially raise the value of one’s voice telephony service, although ser-
vice providers might want us to think so (cf. Kabel Deutschland GmbH 2006; Kabel Baden
Wuerttemberg AG 2006). The reduction of transaction costs at least, seems to be a rather weak
argument and it is the aim of this dissertation to show that service bundling can be motivated by
much stronger means.33
Furthermore, Greenstein and Khanna (1997) argue that digital convergence is an example
of convergence in complements at the distribution stage, because voice, video and data can be
send simultaneously over the same wire. Again, I cannot follow this argument and would rather
advocate this as economies of scope.
Convergence in substitutes, on the contrary, refers to the case where two previously distinct
products or technologies become increasingly interchangeable to consumers. A case in point
is the fixed-mobile convergence (FMC) : Whereas until recently the mobile voice telephony
service was viewed as a luxury complementary service to fixed-line telephony (Feijoo et al.
2006), today both services are rather viewed as substitutes (Welfens 2006, p. 77; OECD 2007c,
p.26 ff.). Moreover, digital convergence has lead to convergence in substitutes in the sense that
32There is an array of strategic management literature which partly or fully addresses digital convergence (e.g.
Fransman 2007; Pennings and Puranam 2001 or Warf 2003). These papers either provide general definitions and
empirical data of digital convergence and are cited elsewhere or lie outside the focus of the present analysis and
are therefore omitted.
33Compare Chapter 3.
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consumers view the same services provided over different platforms as close substitutes. For
example, according to Maldoom et al. (2005, Section 5.1.1) “subscribers saw little difference
between DSL and cable modem services.” The authors provide several examples that “most
consumers are platform agnostic”, including two econometric studies by Crandall, Sidak, and
Singer (2002) and Rappoport et al. (2002).
Of course, with convergence in substitutes, ceteris paribus competition between the two
convergent products intensifies, resulting in market consolidations in the form of merges and
acquisitions (Warf 2003), or artificial differentiation strategies, such as bundling. However,
bundling of different services can only relax competition if the competitor is not able to offer a
matching bundle himself. Thus, for the two network operators bundling alone cannot be a way
out of this dilemma. In Chapter 3, I will therefore show that differentiation along the quality
dimension can have the desired effects.
Shy (2000, 2001) is the first (to the best of my knowledge) to provide a game-theoretic
model of digital convergence. In a similar spirit to the model presented here, Shy studies
whether bundling of communications services may lead to market dominance or even fore-
closure. His model relies upon four central assumptions. First, firms’ (homogeneous) services
are horizontally (and not vertically) differentiated through switching costs. Second, markets
are asymmetric.Third, services are perfect complements and fourth service provision is cost-
less. In particular, there are three firms in the market 1, 2, 3 and two distinct consumer types
θ1, θ2. Firms 1 and 2 provide a different service (say voice telephony) than firm 3 (say video).
Moreover, the θi consumers are biased towards firm i, e.g. through switching costs, and would
therefore cope to pay a higher price if they could purchase the service from their desired firm.34
Consumers wish to purchase one unit of each service. Three different regulatory regimes are
investigated: (i) Regulation: Firms are not allowed to offer a service other than their home ser-
vice. (ii) Partial Deregulation: Only firm 1 is permitted to enter firm 3’s home market. (iii) Full
Deregulation: Firm 1 and firm 2 are allowed to enter firm 3’s market. However, Shy does not
allow for reciprocal entry.
Under the regulatory regime (i.e. firms sell their services separately), two equilibria are
feasible. Either the voice telephony providers charge high prices and the video service provider
a low price or voice telephony prices are low whereas the video service price is high. Shy argues
that the voice telephony providers have a first-mover advantage in the communications market
and therefore the former equilibrium seems more likely.
34Shy makes the implicit assumption that services are sufficiently differentiated.
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Under partial deregulation, firm 1 provides a bundle of voice telephony and video service
for the same price as the sum of the prices firm 2 and firm 3 charge for their services individu-
ally. Thus, since prices are equal, only the consumer’s bias determines who buys which offer.
Unfortunately, given a multiplicity of equilibria, Shy is not able to say whether this raises or
lowers firm 1’s profits as opposed to separate pricing. The merger of firm 1 and firm 3 in order
to foreclose firm 2, at least, is not profitable.
Under full deregulation, finally, Shy finds that in the unique equilibrium, both firm 1 and
firm 2 provide a service bundle and thereby drive firm 3 out of the market. Aggregate profits are
the same as under separate pricing, thus, if service provision was costly, firms’ bundle pricing
would not be a profitable strategy. Moreover, from the previous discussion, it seems more likely
that firm 3 would try to fight back by reciprocal entry, rather than being passive.
Reisinger (2006), although not building upon or referencing Shy’s model, partially ad-
dresses these shortcomings. In his model of digital convergence, there are two firms 1 and
2 each providing both of two differentiated services A and B (two duopolies).35 Consumers
are again horizontally differentiated with bias towards one firm for each service. They regard
the services as independent (not complementary) and have unit demand for each. Finally, the
provision of each service induces some marginal cost.
Reisinger considers different correlations of consumer biases by assigning a one-to-one
mapping between the consumers’ preferences for each service. In this way, he distinguishes
between homogeneous consumers (i.e. their preferences are positively correlated) and heteroge-
neous consumers (i.e. preferences are negatively correlated). Of course, a one-to-one mapping
is not able to capture uncorrelated tastes, however.
Reisinger finds that firms employ bundling as an equilibrium pricing strategy, except if con-
sumers tastes are perfectly positively correlated. In this case consumers have a unique bias
towards one of the two symmetric firms, and thus bundling is not necessary to “sort” the con-
sumers. However, while bundling is profitable for homogeneous consumers, firms increasingly
slip into a prisoners’ dilemma when consumers preferences become heterogeneous. For hetero-
geneous consumers, price competition is harsh and each firm wishes that both products were
sold separately, but none can commit to do so.
While more plausible than Shy’s model, Reisinger’s model also has some major drawbacks.
35I do not refer to this structure as a reciprocal duopoly, because neither firm has a home market with some
strategic advantage in this setting.
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Most importantly, the consumers’ bias towards different firms is exogenous and cannot be in-
fluenced by the firms. As I have argued before, there is no convincing argument why consumers
should have a bias towards one firm in market A and another bias towards another firm in mar-
ket B. It would be more appealing if decisions were driven by real preferences stemming from
product characteristics (as in vertical product differentiation). If biases are exogenous and pos-
itively correlated (i.e. consumers have a strong tendency towards one firm for all services), it
is not very surprising that firms can exploit this bias by offering bundles–especially since each
consumer must buy one unit of each service. Furthermore, Reisinger’s framework does not al-
low him to address the interesting case of uncorrelated preferences. Also does it neither account
for economies of scale (but rather suggests positive marginal costs) nor allows to investigate the
possibility of market leverage through bundling.
Finally, in independent work Diallo (2006) considers a model of digital convergence where
firms can choose the vertical characteristic of their service. Again there are two firms in the
industry, 1 and 2, each providing both services A and B. However, only the service in market A
is differentiated in either high or low quality. In market B both firms provide the same service
quality. Furthermore costs of service quality provision (both fixed and marginal) are zero. Firms
cannot endogenously choose their service quality level, but firm 1 is exogenously assigned
to be the high-quality provider and firm 2 the low-quality provider in market A. Consumers
may purchase either one or zero units of each service that they have independent demand for.
The author then considers a two-stage game, where firms first decide on whether to offer their
services separately or in a bundle and then compete in prices.
Diallo finds that both firms are better off by pursuing a bundle pricing strategy and therefore
emerges as a dominant strategy equilibrium. Unfortunately, this result is false because his
analysis is flawed. In fact, only the high-quality provider would be better off by bundling.
Although Diallo’s framework came to my attention only after the analysis to be presented in
Chapter 3 has been complete, I can show that bundling might nevertheless indeed emerge as
an equilibrium strategy for both firms. I extend Diallo’s framework in many respects. Most
notably, I allow for service differentiation in both markets and let firms endogenously choose
their quality levels. Furthermore, in my setting firms bear costs of quality improvement, such
that the optimal quality choice becomes non-trivial. It is also due to these missing “ingredients”
that Diallo fails to notice that bundling can have a tremendous effect on the firms’ quality choice.
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2.3 Digital Convergence and Market Engineering
Weinhardt, Holtmann, and Neumann (2003) define Market Engineering as the structured, sys-
tematic and theoretically founded procedure of analyzing, designing, introducing and also qual-
ity assuring of electronic markets as well as their legal framework regarding simultaneously the
market microstructure, infrastructure, and business strategy. The key elements of this definition
are summarized by Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The Market Engineering Framework
Indeed, the careful reader will already have recognized that Market Engineering and Digital
Network Convergence rest upon the same foundation: The Economic, Technological and Legal
Environment. In particular, Section 1.1 has provided a detailed discussion of the technological
developments that have stimulated and enabled digital convergence as well as a presentation of
the current state of the technology employed in the PSTN and CATV network. Moreover, Sec-
tion 1.2 surveyed the legal developments in the European Union which have shaped the structure
and behavior on the communications market. Finally, most of this Chapter (especially Section
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2.1) has been devoted to the presentation of the economic characteristics of communications
markets.
The interplay between these three components comprises a unique environment which forms
the foundation of electronic markets in general and the communications market in particular.
The communications services (transaction objects) which may be offered on the market are en-
abled through this environment: They must be technologically feasible, economically appealing
and legal in order to be marketable.
In turn, a market is constituted by the provision of different communications services by
different firms. The structure of this market is determined by several factors which can be re-
lated to the microstructural, infrastructural and business strategy related aspects. The market
microstructure is e.g. affected by the number of active firms, (historic) market shares or other
strategic advantages. Obviously, for the market outcome, it makes a fundamental difference
whether the market is monopolistic or oligopolistic or whether one firm has a strategic advan-
tage over the other. Likewise, the firms’ infrastructure affects their ability to compete on the
market. The specific architecture of the CATV network, for example, is tailored to the provision
of video and TV broadcasting, but has its disadvantages when employed for data or voice traf-
fic.36 Similarly, the PSTN relies upon the inferior twisted pair wiring which has been sufficient
to transport voice traffic, but is at its limits when required to transmit bandwidth demanding
services, such as video. Finally, in the next chapter I will show that also a firm’s business strat-
egy greatly influences the market. More specifically, I investigate the influence of firms’ pricing
strategies (separate or bundle pricing) on the market outcome.
The consumer (agent), finally, is the last element in the chain of market structure and market
environment whose decision eventually determines the market outcome. Whether a particular
market outcome is desirable or not may be viewed from different angles. On the one hand,
one might take the consumers’ point of view and regard market outcomes as favorable if they
result in an increase of consumers’ surplus. This might well be the case because prices are
low or because consumers can choose their optimal service portfolio out of a large variety of
offerings. For the firms, on the other hand, the consumers’ desires are often contradictory to
profit maximization. Generally, producers’ surplus is high if competition is low, i.e. there are
few competing services and high prices. In Chapter 5, I will provide the reader with a welfare
analysis (in terms of producers’ and consumers’ surplus) of the predicted market outcome.
36Recall the problem of shared bandwidth, for instance.
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Thus, the structure of analysis within this paper follows strictly the Market Engineering
methodology, starting from the technological, legal and economic environment, to the analysis
of market structure and finally market outcome. It shall, however, be noted that Market Engi-
neering is not a static framework, but requires a dynamic approach. For example, we have
already seen that technological convergence has also lead to regulatory convergence which
again enabled economic convergence in the form of reciprocal market entry. Hence, altering
any one of the key factors comprising the market structure or environment, even changes in
the consumers preferences, may lead to different market outcomes and thereby might require a
re-engineering of the market as a whole.
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Chapter 3
Quality Leverage through Bundling
The previous chapters have pointed out that the communications markets are highly complex in
technological, legal and economic terms. No formal mathematical model will be able to cap-
ture the full dynamics present in this industry and no model attempts to do so. The beauty of
microeconomic modeling rather lies within its power to enable an isolation of strategic effects
which might otherwise be overshadowed by other forces, and are thus not necessarily empir-
ically observable. The difficulty of this methodology is to discover and formalize only those
parts of the complex whole which are indispensable for the specific features of the model to
hold.
In this chapter, a game-theoretic model is presented which considers the effects of bundle
offers (such as Triple Play) and quality competition in a mature communications industry under
digital convergence. In the model, most of the aforementioned communications market char-
acteristics are comprised. In particular, I consider the inter-modal competition of integrated
PSTN and CATV network operators (cf. Section 1.1.5) in a reciprocal duopoly (cf. Section
2.2.1). This market structure has been constituted as a consequence of the digital convergence
phenomenon and is characterized by a strategic advantage which each firm enjoys in its re-
spective home market (cf. Section 2.1.7). Each firm has invested considerable sunk costs with
market entry and thus firms’ entry decision is taken as irrevocable (cf. Section 2.1.1). The
provision of each distinct communications service exhibits large economies of scale because
the production requires mainly fixed costs, whereas marginal costs of supplying an additional
consumer are zero (cf. Section 2.1.2).1 These characteristics constitute considerable barriers to
entry and exit and therefore justify to focus on the interaction of the two-firm and two-market
1In Chapter 4 also economies of scope are considered.
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economy proposed by the reciprocal duopoly framework (cf. Section 2.1.3). Each firm offers
exactly one distinct service in its home and its secondary market. Moreover firms can choose
different qualities of their services (cf. Section 2.1.9).2 At equal prices, higher service qualities
will c.p. induce more demand. However, the costs of service provision also rise (convexly) with
the quality level. Thus, firms must trade off between higher service quality and costs. Finally,
firms may offer their services separately in each market, or sell a pure bundle of both services
instead (cf. Section 2.1.8).
The main accomplishment of the present model is to show that the pricing decision (i.e.
separate selling or bundling) can have significant ramifications upon the firms quality choice.
More precisely a three-stage game is considered. In the first stage firms select a pricing strat-
egy,3 then, in a second stage, firms simultaneously choose the quality of their services. Finally,
in stage three, firms set flatrate prices for each of their services, or the bundle of them.
I can show that bundle pricing serves as a powerful leverage device. This is achieved through
a vertical differentiation effect, which accrues as the firms wish to shield themselves from in-
creased price competition in the market for bundles. Absent bundling, each firm can exploit its
limited home market power and obtain quality leadership (associated with higher profits) in its
home market. Under bundle pricing, however, one firm emerges as the high-quality, high-profit
provider in both markets, whereas the competing firm has to settle for low qualities and profits.
In Section 1.3 I have presented empirical data from OECD countries which shows that in
mature communications industries PSTN and CATV network operators are symmetric firms
which compete heavily for market share and profits.4 The aforementioned quality leverage
effect is remarkable, because it confirms that–everything else being symmetric–bundle pricing
affects the firms quality decision, such that for one of the firms it is an effective tool in leveraging
home market power over to its secondary market. What distinguishes the present model from
previous ones technically is that it provides an integrated analysis of bundle pricing and vertical
product differentiation in multiple markets. Moreover it considers a reciprocal duopoly market
structure where firms have home markets (cf. Section 2.2.3). Before proceeding to the formal
2As I have argued before, only facilities-based competition can accommodate for such vertical competition,
because only then firms have full control over all quality characteristics of their communications services.
3For now firms may only offer pure bundles. The model is later extended to incorporate unilateral mixed
bundling as well.
4For the course of this book, I will therefore not consider switching costs, because in my model firms neither
have asymmetric market-share nor do they compete for repeat purchasers.
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model description, I will therefore survey the most relevant and related findings in the literature
on vertical differentiation and product bundling first.
3.1 Quality Differentiation under Oligopoly
3.1.1 The Differentiation Principle
The basic structure of the game employed here, where firms in a duopoly decide simultaneously
first on quality levels and then on prices, owes much to Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1984).5
These early contributions derive the consumers’ quality choice from a direct utility function
relating different preferences to differences in income. Instead, Tirole (1988, Section 2.1.1)
considers an indirect utility function, which introduces a heterogeneous taste parameter that
can be interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution between income and quality. Thus, higher
income corresponds to higher taste for quality and in this vein Tirole was able to capture the
notion of the earlier papers by the same simple (indirect) utility function which I will employ
here.6 These classical contributions have all affirmed that in equilibrium firms will differentiate
their products.7 This quality differentiation principle stems from the fact that firms wish to
weaken price competition by refraining from offering close substitutes. If firms offered exactly
the same product qualities, their products would be perfect substitutes and in the subsequent
Bertrand stage prices were driven down to marginal costs. Thus firms will not offer the same
product qualities and one firm must emerge as the high- and the other firm as the low quality
provider.
However, my analysis departs from the traditional single market, single product setting of
the product differentiation literature since I consider firms which provide a distinct service for
each of two markets. Surprisingly, despite of its practical relevance, the product differentia-
tion literature concerned with multi-market competition is rather sparse in diversity. Broadly
speaking, previous research has either been concerned with (entry deterrence by) multi-product
firms (e.g. Eaton and Lipsey 1989; Donnenfeld and Weber 1995; Constantatos and Perrakis
5Previous work on vertical product differentiation has either assumed qualities as exogenous (Gabszewicz and
Thisse 1979) or focused on non strategic market structures (Mussa and Rosen 1978).
6See also Peitz (1995) for a more elaborate argument. Therein the corresponding direct counterpart of Tirole
(1988)’s indirect utility function is constructed and shown that the underlying preference relation satisfies reflex-
ivity, transitivity, completeness and local nonsatiation.
7See Choi and Shin (1992) for an explicit solution to the model in Tirole (1988).
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1997) or product line rivalry by duopolists (e.g. Brander and Eaton 1984; Champsaur and Ro-
chet 1989; Lal and Matutes 1989; de Fraja 1996; Klemperer 1992; Klemperer and Padilla 1997;
Johnson and Myatt 2003). Product line rivalry investigates firms’ endogenous choice of product
variants on one product market, i.e. where the firms’ products are close substitutes. Under dif-
fering assumptions, the authors then either find market segmentation (each firm offers a range of
close substitutes thus maximally differentiating their product lines), or head-to-head competi-
tion (each firm matches exactly a substitutive product of her competitor) resulting in minimally
differentiated product lines. Quite differently, I consider two product markets, whose products
are neither substitutes nor complements. Here the only link between the markets is constituted
by the firms and consumers being present in both. I will show that in my model firms seek
to segment the consumer rather than the product space via the vertical differentiation effect of
bundling (cf. Section 3.2.2).
3.1.2 The High-Quality Advantage Principle
Most of the classical contributions cited above assume zero or small and decreasing costs of
quality improvement. Obviously, consumers are willing to pay more for a product of higher
quality. Consequently, if costs of quality improvement are negligible, firms wish to provide a
product of the highest possible quality because this allows them to extract maximal consumer
rent.8 By the quality differentiation principle, only one firm can provide the highest feasible
quality, however, whereas the other firm must bear to offer some intermediate quality. Here two
forces are at work, the balance of which characterizes the equilibrium in such a vertical differen-
tiation framework: First, firms wish to mitigate price competition by maximally differentiating
their products. This tends to drive down the quality of the designated low-quality firm. Sec-
ond the low-quality firm also wishes to extract consumer rent which is higher at higher quality
levels, of course. This gives the low-quality firm incentive to increase quality. The equilibrium
then obtains when the marginal effects of both forces are equally strong. Moreover, it is easy
to understand that the high-quality firm will generally earn the higher profits: Under zero costs
of quality improvement, it is always best to provide the highest quality which in turn allows to
extract maximal consumer rent.
At a first glance the above high-quality advantage principle seems to hinge on the assump-
8In all models, including the present, consumers’ willingness-to-pay is uniformly distributed on some interval.
Therefore, results may differ if a skewed distribution is assumed.
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tion that costs of quality improvement are negligible. If costs of quality improvement are non-
neglegible the high-quality advantage is not as intuitive, but still valid. Some authors (Aoki and
Prusa 1996; Boom 1995; Motta 1993; Ronnen 1991) have confirmed the high-quality advantage
for specific cost functions. Lehmann-Grube (1997), finally, was able to generalize this result to
all cost functions which are increasing and convex in the quality chosen, but independent of the
output.9 Furthermore, Lehmann-Grube shows that if firms choose their quality sequentially in
Stackelberg fashion, then the Stackelberg leader will always select the product of higher qual-
ity. This result is important for the present context because it provides the central explanation to
how the incumbent can exploit its home market advantage. More specifically, I assume that the
home-market advantage grants first-mover privileges to the incumbent firm which– according
to the high-quality advantage principle– seeks to establish itself as the high-quality provider. By
the quality-differentiation principle, the entrant can do no better than offer a product of lower
quality, yielding lower profits.
3.2 Bundling and the Leverage Theory
3.2.1 Reasons for Bundling
Beginning with Stigler (1963), the literature on bundling has grown vast and encompasses a
magnitude of different themes today. The most comprehensive overview on the topic is provided
by Nalebuff (2003), which also claims to be complete. The subsequent survey will focus on the
most related literature only. Following Nalebuff there are two main motives which incentivize
firms to employ bundling: efficiency reasons and strategic reasons.
Efficiency Reasons
Economies of Scale and Scope: The naive explanation of bundling is that it reduces costs
through economies of scope or scale. Chae (1992), for example, considers the bundling of
TV channels to one subscription and notes that the producers’ desire to bundle stems from
9On the contrary, if quality improvement induces an increase of marginal costs, the low-quality provider may
earn greater profits. Moorthy (1988), for example, shows that this is the case when marginal costs rise at a higher
rate than consumers’ willingness-to-pay. Also Kuhn (2007) finds a low-quality advantage under positive marginal
costs, as long as consumers’ utility depends only very little on quality.
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the fact that the “distribution technology exhibits an extreme form of economies of scope”.
Salinger (1995) adds that bundling is especially profitable if economies of scope are coupled
with consumers’ positively correlated valuations for the goods. Similarily, Bakos and Bryn-
jolfsson (1999, 2000) consider bundling of (digital) information goods. Due to consumers’
heterogeneity in valuation for different kinds of information, firms usually find it difficult to
set an appropriate price for every individual information item. Therefore, the authors propose
large-scale bundling as a profitable strategy, as the law of large numbers levels the consumers’
preferences out, such that firms can better predict the demand and optimal price of the bundle.
However, large-scale bundling is only feasible because information goods are characterized by
zero marginal costs and therefore exhibit large scale economies.
Price Discrimination: The model of Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000) also touches upon
an earlier theme in the literature. Quite surprisingly, the early literature on bundling was not
concerned with the naive cost-side effects, but rather proposed bundling as a price discrim-
ination device. Adams and Yellen (1976) followed Stigler (1963)’s initial thought and were
the first to formally show that bundling is profitable to a multi-product monopolist when con-
sumers’ reservation prices are negatively correlated. This is best explained by a brief example.
Suppose a monopolist sells two goods, A and B to two potential customers 1 and 2. Further-
more, let 1 (2) have a reservation price of 10e (5e) for good A and 5e (10e) for good B. If
the monopolist was to sell the goods individually, the best he could to was to sell each at 10e
(or 5e) and make a revenue of 20e. If he offered a bundle containing good A and good B
at a price of 15e, however, both consumers would still buy and he would make a revenue of
30e. The example points out that bundling is advantageous because it reduces the consumers
heterogeneity. While Adams and Yellen (1976) have assumed that consumers’ valuations for
the goods are negatively correlated, McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) and Schmalensee
(1982, 1984) proved that this result also holds if consumers valuations are uncorrelated or even
positively (but not perfectly positively) correlated.
Double Marginalization: In the above setting, firms’ products are independent to the con-
sumers. If products are complements, bundling may have an additional effect, because its avoids
double marginalization. This results dates far back to Cournot (1838, Chapter ix), who consid-
ered two monopolists, each selling a good being a perfect complement to the other (i.e. the
goods were only of value if consumed together). Cournot found that if both firms price their
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products independently, they would set an inefficient high price, because neither firm consid-
ered the effect its price has on the demand for the complementary good. If instead, firms would
offer the package of both goods at a common bundle price, then (i) prices would fall because
firms circumvented double marginalization and (ii) firms’ profits would increase because the
rise in demand overcompensates the price reduction.10 Thus, in the end, both consumers’ and
producers’ surplus rises. Of course, this results rests upon some strong assumptions, among
which are the complementarity of the goods and the possibility that firms can coordinate (or
merge). Even if we agreed that communications services are complementary, the latter assump-
tion cannot be sustained in the present context: Recall that the EC has demanded the PSTN and
CATV network operators to be separated into two legal entities. Furthermore the rules of the
game are different because firms have already engaged in reciprocal market entry.11
Strategic Reasons
The literature concerned with efficiency reasons for bundling focuses on monopolized markets
with no strategic interaction. Under oligopoly, bundling can have quite different, strategic ef-
fects. For example, depending on consumers’ preferences, bundling might either increase or
decrease the level of competition (Stole 2003). Thus, in order to determine whether bundling
for strategic reasons is profitable, one must weigh such competitive effects with the above effi-
ciency gains.12
Entry Deterrence: Among the strategic motives why firms engage in bundling, entry deter-
rence has been studied first. As Nalebuff (2004) points out, “although price discrimination pro-
vides a reason to bundle, the gains are small compared with the gains from the entry-deterrent
effect”. Entry deterrence changes the level of competition because it alters the market structure.
However, the way in which this is achieved is manifold. All models consider a multi-product
firm, say 1 which offers two goods, A and B and a single-product firm, say 2, which seeks to
enter market B. Whinston (1990), for example, shows that bundling makes the multi-product
10In fact, Sonnenschein (1968) showed that Cournot’s theory of complementary monopolies and his duopoly
theory are technically identical. One follows from the other by a reinterpretation of the parameters.
11Nevertheless, the presence of this efficiency gain might be of relevance in the context of mutual forbearance,
which I will discuss in Section 6.3.
12Notice that both incentives to bundle may intersect. Efficiency reasons may also have strategic consequences,
for example.
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incumbent, 1, more aggressive and thereby discourages entry (or encourages exit even). Whin-
ston’s model, however, requires a commitment to bundling by the incumbent, because bundling
is not an ex post credible strategy once the market has been foreclosed. Considering the same
market structure, Choi and Stefanadis (2001) show that market foreclosure through bundling is
also likely if A and B are perfect complements. Since B has no value alone to customers, they
can either buy the bundle of firm 1 or must refrain from buying at all. Their model also requires
commitment. In a similar way, entry deterrence may also work if products and not perfect com-
plements. Carlton and Waldmann (2002) present a dynamic framework in which the incumbent
deters entry by exploiting network effects. By bundling its monopoly network product A with a
complementary product B, firm 1 prevents the entrant 2 from achieving sufficient scale in order
to be profitable and thereby deters entry. Also in this framework firm 1 faces a commitment
problem. Nalebuff (2004), finally is able to resolve the commitment problem. He shows that
bundling is most effective as an entry deterrent when consumers’ preferences for both goods
are positively correlated, but can also be achieved if tastes are uncorrelated.13
In my framework, bundling has also the potential to deter entry. Moreover it is credible
without any prior commitment. Nevertheless, I will not explicitly consider entry deterrence for
two reasons. First, in reality firms’ reciprocal entry has already taken place and considerable
sunk costs have been invested. Thus, the deterrence perspective would be merely hypothetical.
The only question of practical relevance which remains is whether any one firm is able to drive
its competitor out of its home market again. Second, in the presence of high sunk entry costs, it
is notoriously difficult to determine when the entrant is indeed better off by exiting the market:
When it is not possible to deny sales completely to the entrant, he will still find it better to make
some surplus which contributes to recouping entry costs, rather than to write off his initial
investment altogether. Consequently, to make the assessment of entry deterrence feasible, one
must at least incorporate the present static framework into a dynamic context.
Competition Mitigation: If entry has occurred (i.e. firm 1 is monopolist in A and duopolist
in B, while firm 2 provides B only) bundling may still be profitable because of its ability to
soften competition. Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann (1990) and Chen (1997), for instance,
show that bundling has the ability to artificially differentiate otherwise homogeneous products.
To see this, suppose firms engage in Bertrand competition and the provision of products bears
zero marginal costs. Then, if products are sold individually, the Bertrand price war will compete
13The effect vanishes for perfectly negatively correlated values.
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away any profits in market B, leaving firm 1 with its market A revenue only. However, if firm
1 offered its products in a pure A−B bundle, while firm 2 still offers B individually, then both
firms can extract some additional consumers’ surplus from market B. The bundle differentiates
the products. Those consumers which have a high valuation for both goods will buy from firm
1, while some remaining consumers with low valuation buy from firm 2.14
Furthermore Seidmann (1991) and Spector (2007) show that bundling may also facilitate
(tacit) collusion and thereby mitigate competition. While Seidmann’s model rests upon the ar-
tificial differentiation principle (and a precommitment to bundling) again, Spector considers a
repeated game where firms can explicitly coordinate on a collusive outcome using Nash bar-
gaining.
Gaining Competitive Advantages: Finally, there exists an array of articles which provide
further examples of how firms can gain competitive advantages through bundling. Among
these are, e.g. Choi (2004), who shows that bundling may reduce rivals’ innovation incentives,
Choi (2003), who suggests to bundle new products with old to signal quality, or Martin (1999),
who provides an example of how bundling can change the substitution relationships between
products. Further examples are mentioned in Nalebuff (2003). However, almost all of the
strategic reasons to bundling address the broader theory of market leverage, i.e. the question
whether market power in one product market may be used to gain a competitive advantage in
the other market. This question is also of particular importance for the present framework and
the next subsection is therefore devoted to a detailed presentation. Furthermore, obviously all of
the strategic reasons for bundling immediately raise antitrust concerns and consequently there
is also a great body of literature which investigates the basic tension between bundling and
welfare. This part of the bundling literature will be surveyed in Section 5.1.
3.2.2 The Leverage Hypothesis
There has been a long dispute in economic literature about whether a firm with market power in
its primary market could use bundling as a device in order to gain an advantage in (or through) a
secondary market. This leverage hypothesis has for a long time been dismissed on the grounds
of the Chicago critique (cf. e.g. Director and Levi 1956; Bowman 1957; Posner 1976). In a
14In Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann’s model consumers preferences are for simplicity perfectly positively
correlated.
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nutshell, the Chicago argument runs as follows.15 Consider a multi-product firm which provides
product A as a monopolist and product B competitively (i.e. at marginal costs, say c). If market
power could be leveraged by (pure) bundling, then there must be a bundle price pb, which grants
higher profits to the monopolist than if he sold A at price ps and B at a price of c separately.
Obviously, since B is provided competitively, consumers can purchase it for c. Consequently,
only those consumers will buy theA−B bundle whose reservation price forA exceeds pb−c.16
However, if the monopolist would have sold A at a price of ps = pb − c individually, then the
same consumers would have purchased A and he would have made the same profit. Hence, as
Whinston (1990) puts it, “there is only one monopoly profit that can be extracted”.17
The Chicago critique has been so influential that it effectively prevented research on strate-
gic reasons for bundling for more than a decade. Instead, efficiency reasons, such as price
discrimination, were put forward as a motivation to bundling. However, in a pathbreaking ar-
ticle, Whinston (1990) was among the first to recognize that the Chicago critique was not as
general as believed and hinged upon some critical assumptions. Among these, the most im-
portant are that the secondary market is perfectly competitive and that firms have a constant
returns-to-scale technology. Obviously, both assumptions fail to hold for the communications
industry.
Whinston proposed the (by now well known) market structure, where a multi-product firm
holds a monopoly in one product market, but faces imperfect competition in the other. Without
noticeable exceptions, subsequently scholars concerned with the resurrection of the leverage
theory have adopted this market structure. The most influential among these have been surveyed
in the previous subsection.
Quality Leverage
This paper extends the literature on market leverage in two respects.
First, I deviate from Whinston’s standard market structure by assuming a duopoly in both
markets. This assumption is per se not new to the bundling literature (cf. Matutes and Regibeau
15The following example is adapted from Whinston (1990).
16This is, assuming products A and B are independent.
17As a matter of fact, for completeness it shall be noted that under pure bundling the Chicago critique also holds
if goods are complements, or if valuations for A and B are not perfectly correlated (Nalebuff 2003).
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1992; Anderson and Leruth 1993; Economides 1993; Kopalle, Krishna, and Assuncao 1999),18
even in the context of digital convergence (Reisinger 2006; Diallo 2006). However, none of
these works is concerned with market power leverage. Furthermore, in my model, I do not just
consider two duopoly markets, but reciprocal entry. Thereby, the crucial difference is that each
firm has a home market in which it enjoys a strategic advantage.
Among the reasons why the reciprocal duopoly setting has not been considered in the lever-
age literature so far, is that each firm’s market power is lessened considerably when its primary
market is a duopoly. Also in my setting, ex ante it is not clear whether bundling may facilitate
market leverage because the leverage efforts of either firm counteract. Nevertheless, I can show
that one firm can leverage its home market advantage over to the secondary market, even if
market power is rather limited.
Secondly, I propose a new mechanism through which market leverage is achieved. More
specifically, I will show that bundling facilitates the segmentation of consumers into their
willingness-to-pay for quality. Whereas under separate selling, each firm exercises its home
market advantage by establishing itself as the high-quality provider, under a bundling regime,
firms find it profitable to specialize on providing either high- or low quality products in both
markets. Thus, bundling serves as a quality differentiation mechanism, both on the consumer
and the producers’ side. Thereby, the firm which engages in bundle pricing first, can achieve to
leverage its home market quality dominance over to its secondary market and achieve greater
profits than under separate pricing.
Definition (Quality Leverage). Quality Leverage refers to a mechanism which facilitates a
firm’s ability to leverage market power from its home market into a secondary market by altering
the quality of its products.
In this work I will provide ample evidence that quality leverage is very viable and, more
specifically, that product bundling may act as a quality leverage mechanism. This result is
shown to be very robust, as its holds without any prior commitment to bundling and also if
consumers quality preferences are uncorrelated. Further extensions, such as unilateral mixed
bundling, economies of scope or correlated consumer preferences are also feasible and dis-
cussed in Chapter 4.
18These papers have mainly investigated whether pure bundling or mixed bundling will emerge as an equilibrium
strategy and are presented in Section 4.2.
73
CHAPTER 3: QUALITY LEVERAGE THROUGH BUNDLING
3.3 The Base Model
3.3.1 Principal Assumptions and Game Structure
Having located my framework within the literature, I can finally begin with the presentation
of my base model.19 There are two established firms i = 1, 2 in the industry whose home
(or primary) markets are denoted by m = A,B, respectively. More specifically, a symmetric
reciprocal duopoly is assumed, which has been constituted as each firm has entered the other
firm’s home market (reciprocal entry).20 Firms provide exactly one service for each market.
Game Structure: The aim of the present model is to show that a firm’s pricing strategy (i.e.
separate selling or bundling) can have significant ramifications on the quality of all firms’ ser-
vices. In this vein, one firm, say 1, can quality leverage its home market advantage over to its
secondary market. To this extend, the following three-stage game is considered: In the first
stage, firms decide whether to sell their services as a pure bundle or separately. For ease of
exposition, firms choose their pricing strategy sequentially in the first stage: Firm 1 will choose
first and firm 2 can observe firm 1’s decision before selecting its optimal pricing strategy.21 In
the second stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose the quality for all their services. Each
firm has the choice between a high- or low quality service for each market, where quality levels
are exogenously given by qH ≥ 4 qL > 0.22 Finally, in the third stage, firms simultaneously set
continuous positive prices p ∈ R+. The solution concept is that of subgame perfectness (Selten
1975).
Notice that the game structure reflects that quality is rather a long term variable which
cannot be altered so quickly. Although under facilities-based competition firms have maximal
19A preliminary version of this model has been published as Kra¨mer (2007a, 2007b). Furthermore, I would like
to thank the participants at the 6th Conference on Telecommunication Techno-Economics (CTTE), 2007 and at the
34th Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE), 2007 for valuable
comments.
20More specifically I take the firms’ entry decision as given and sunk, such that exit is prohibitively costly. Thus,
I fade out any aspects related to strategic entry deterrence, nor will I further address the question on whether entry
should have occurred in the first place.
21Later, it is shown that the results are identical under simultaneous decision making, as long as the costs of
quality improvement are non negligible.
22The choice of qH ≥ 4 qL will be motivated later in the text and is not crucial for the quality differentiation
effect to hold. In fact, as one will see later, the assumption has been made to ensure existence of subgame equilibria
other than the desired.
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control over the network and associated quality characteristics, once a decision has been made
(e.g. with respect to a certain technology) considerable sunk costs constitute a high level of
quality commitment. Hence, in the model, firms’ quality decisions (in stage two) are sunk and
irrevocable during the Bertrand price competition (in stage three). Furthermore, the main aim
of the present model is to investigate the long term impact of bundling as a pricing strategy
decision upon the firms’ quality decision and subsequent price competition. In this mindset,
the pricing strategy decision must take place before the quality decision, i.e. before the quality
decision has become sunk.
For the further presentation of the model, it will be convenient to introduce a short-hand
notation distinguishing between the four subgames which may emerge after the first stage of
the game. In particular, denote by ss the subgame that obtains when both firms choose separate
pricing, sb the subgame where firm 1 chooses separate and firm 2 bundle pricing, bs the sub-
game where firm 1 chooses bundle pricing and firm 2 separate pricing, and finally, bb, where
both firms choose the bundle pricing strategy. Moreover, I will denote ss as the separate pricing
regime, and all other subgames as bundle pricing regimes.
Home Market Advantage: It is at the heart of this model that each firm has a home market
in which it can exercise some additional market power over her competitor. In principle, a first-
mover-advantage at the quality-decision stage seems to capture this very adequately. Indeed, the
incumbent has been in the market before and should therefore be able to decide upon his service
quality prior to the entrant. In the absence of cross-market effects, it is a standard result of the
vertical differentiation literature that the first-mover will choose to provide the high-quality
service, because it is associated with the higher revenues, whereas the entrant has to settle
for the low-quality, low-revenue service (high-quality advantage principle). In the reciprocal
duopoly setting this means that under the separate pricing regime, each firm will be the high-
quality provider in its home market and the low-quality provider in its secondary market. Under
any bundle pricing regime, on the contrary, cross-market effects create a joint market in which
neither firm can be considered to have an advantage ex ante. Thus, in order not to forestall any
leverage results within the otherwise symmetric framework, only the simultaneous choice of
qualities can preserve a neutral bias under the bundle pricing regimes. However, prescribing a
different decision sequence under the separate pricing regime and the bundle pricing regimes
might dilute some of the more subtle effects underlying the transition between them. To solve
this problem, I assume simultaneous quality choice under all regimes. Nevertheless, under the
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separate pricing regime each firm’s strategic home market advantage can be preserved, when
the incumbent firm is exogenously attributed to provide the high-quality service in each market.
In this way the strategic dilemma can be overcome.
Demand: Depending on the decision in stage one, each firm either offers its two services in a
bundle (b), or separately (s). Furthermore, let qi = (qAi, qBi) denote the quality vector of firm i,
which has been chosen in the second stage of the game. Finally, let pi be the corresponding price
vector. If firm i has chosen separate pricing in the first stage of the game, the price vector has two
elements, pi = (psAi, p
s
Bi), one for each service. Otherwise, if bundling has been chosen in stage
one, the vector degenerates to a single element, pi = pbi , representing the bundle price. Then
each firm’s service offer, Γi = (qi; pi), is fully characterized by the tuple of the quality vector
and the price vector. Notice that under the separate pricing regime, Γi can be decomposed into
the two distinct suboffers ΓAi = (qsAi; p
s
Ai) and ΓBi = (q
s
Bi; p
s
Bi). The services of different firms
are perfectly compatible, such that consumers can also mix-and-match suboffers of different
firms to obtain their optimal service portfolio.23
There is a continuum of consumers normalized to mass 100 who have a positive valuation
for exactly one service from each market m = A,B. More specifically, consumers differ in
their marginal willingness-to-pay for quality, θ, and value a service offer Γi with quality qi at24
Vθ(qi) ≡ θ qi (3.1)
Consequently, consumers with a relatively low θ do not value quality enough in order to find
it reasonable to purchase a rather expensive high-quality service, which consumers with a rela-
tively high θ would still find attractive. In contrast to horizontal product differentiation models,
however, at equal prices all consumers prefer the service of higher quality. In addition, I allow
for the possibility that consumers may have a different willingness-to-pay for each service, i.e.
θ = (θA, θB). Moreover, θm is uniformly, independently and identically distributed in the unit
23However, consumers have positive valuation for exactly one service in each market. Therefore, I assume that
consumers will refrain from purchasing superfluous units of services, also if they are bundled together with another
service. Thus, in the base model mixing-and-matching will be of relevance under the separate pricing regime only.
To the contrary, In Section 4.2, where firms are allowed to employ unilateral mixed bundling, mixing-and-matching
will be of central importance. The related mix-and-match literature will be surveyed in Subsection 4.2.1.
24As will be seen soon, also θ is a vector.
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interval.25 As a limit case, I assume that tastes are uncorrelated across service types, such that
consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit square which is spanned by θA and θB.26
In order to be able to isolate the strategic effect of bundle pricing alone, I assume away
any scope economies or consumption dependencies, i.e. complementarity or substitutability
across services of different markets.27 Following an investigation by Crampes and Hollander
(2007) this does not pose a limitation: “In the Triple Play case, one can discard the argument
of utility super-additivity. Even if the services were complements for the consumer, there is no
reason to purchase from a single supplier.” Moreover, they note that due to the digital nature of
the services, one may assume that the transaction cost argument, by which consumers prefer a
’single bill’, is not essential.
Consequently, each consumer’s total valuation is linearly separable his valuation for each
service. Notwithstanding, since consumers have a positive valuation for exactly one service
from each market only, on each market the competitively supplied services are demand sub-
stitutes. More precisely, given two distinct service offers Γi = (qi; pi) and Γj = (qj; pj), a
consumer, say θ˜, will be indifferent between both offers if and only if
Vθ˜(qi)− 1pi = Vθ˜(qj)− 1pj, (3.2)
where 1 is a vector of proper length where each element is one.28 Moreover, the consumers’
outside option is normalized to zero, i.e. the consumer indifferent between buying service offer
Γi (or any suboffer, respectively) and not buying at all, say θ̂, is determined by:
Vθ̂(qi)− 1pi = 0. (3.3)
The set of indifferent consumers imposes a demand pattern onto the unit square spanned by θA
and θB. Thus, the demand a firm receives for a specific service (sub-)offer is determined by the
area of the unit square in which those consumers are located for whom this offer maximizes
utility. In this way, firm i’s total demand, Di(Γi,Γ−i,Θ) can be represented by a vector, which
depends on firm i’s own service offer, Γi, the service offer of the other firm, Γ−i, and the
25By this, I implicitly assume that the market is not covered in equilibrium because there will always be some
consumers who do not value a given service at its price. This assumption has mainly been made to avoid case
differentiations and is not crucial for the the main implications of this model. Incidentally, it also seems reasonable
that there are always some consumers which refrain from buying a certain product.
26I will argue later in Section 4.3 that uncorrelated tastes are actually a worst-case scenario for the quality sorting
effect to occur.
27Economies of scope are considered in Section 4.4.
28If service offer Γi is sold at a bundle price, then 1 has one element, otherwise two.
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characteristics of the consumers, Θ, which comprises the assumptions about the distribution and
correlation of quality preferences. If firm i has chosen a separate pricing strategy, the demand
vector contains the demand for every distinct suboffer, Di = (DAi, DBi). Conversely, when
firm i employs bundle pricing, Di degenerates to a single value which represents the demand
for the pure bundle.
Costs and Profits: I assume that firms’ costs of quality improvement fall on fixed costs
only (cf. Subsection 2.1.2). Yet, notice that this assumption does not neglect the existence
of marginal costs per se, but rather suggests that marginal costs are not influenced by a firm’s
service quality choice. Clearly, if marginal costs are quality independent, they have no influence
on the service quality and merely result in a linear mark-up on prices. Thus, for expositional
clarity, I can w.l.o.g. normalize marginal costs to zero. In particular, consider the following cost
function for each service:29
C(qmi) ≡ c qemi, (3.4)
where c > 0 and e > 1 are parameters of the fixed cost function, characterizing its scale and
elasticity.30 Obviously, C ′(·) > 0 and C ′′(·) > 0, i.e. the cost function is convex such that
services of higher qualities are more costly to provide and increasingly so at higher cost levels.
Let Ri = Di pi be firm i’s revenue. Then i’s profit, which it seeks to maximize, is given by:
Πi ≡ Ri − C(qAi)− C(qBi). (3.5)
I will relax and deviate from some of the above assumptions in Chapter 4 to show the
robustness of my main findings.
It will be convenient to determine the equilibrium of the game specified above in three main
steps. First, the separate pricing regime (ss subgame) is considered in isolation, because it forms
a special case due to the absence of cross-market effects. Second, the three remaining bundle
pricing subgames (bb, bs, and sb) are solved. Third, each firm’s equilibrium pricing strategy
(stage one of the complete game) is determined on basis of the results of the four subgames.
29Also in reference to the communications industry, Economides and Lehr (1995) have proposed a similar,
although less general, cost function.
30I will discuss these latter parameters in more detail shortly.
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3.3.2 Separate Pricing Regime
As a point of departure, let us first investigate the subgame that occurs if both firms choose the
separate pricing strategy (ss). Under this regime, firms assign a separate price to each of their
two services such that consumers can mix-and-match an individual service package from the
firms’ suboffers, possibly containing services of different firms. Clearly, there is no economic
link between the markets which could influence firms’ or consumers’ decisions. Hence, by the
home market advantage, the incumbent firm of market m, say h, will provide the high-quality
product in m, while the entrant, say l, must content itself with offering the low-quality service
here.31 Consequently, under the separate pricing regime each firm will earn high profits in
its home and low profits in its secondary market. Due to the reciprocal market structure with
symmetric firms, and in the absence of any cross market effects, firms cannot transport their
home market advantage over to their secondary market, and thus both firms will earn identical
overall profits.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium and Revenue under Separate Pricing). Under the separate pricing
regime, each firms offers a high-quality service in its home market and a low-quality service in
its secondary market. Total revenue is approximated by
Rssi ≈ qH (25−
28
3
µ)
Proof. The first part follows directly from my assumptions. Thus, the incumbent in market
m will be the high-quality provider due to its strategic home market advantage. According to
(3.2), the consumer indifferent between assigning to the high and low quality service in market
A (B) is located at
θ˜ssA =
pssA1 − pssA2
qH − qL ,
(
θ˜ssB =
pssB2 − pssB1
qH − qL
)
.
Likewise, by (3.3) the consumer indifferent between buying the low-quality service and not
buying at all in market A (B) satisfies
θ̂ssA2 =
pssA2
qL
,
(
θ̂ssB1 =
pssB1
qL
)
.
In particular, it is easy to see that the location of indifferent consumers is independent of the
distribution of consumers on the other market. Figure 3.1 visualizes the demand pattern under
the separate pricing regime.
31Recall the differentiation principle which affirms that firms will never choose to offer services of the same
quality in equilibrium because this lack of differentiation would otherwise dissipate all profits in the subsequent
Bertrand stage.
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Figure 3.1: Demand Pattern under the Separate Pricing Regime
In this and all following visualizations of demand patterns the following convention is made: The first number
specifies the firm and service quality (subscript H for high-quality or subscript L for low-quality) which
consumers located in this area will buy in market A. Likewise, the second number relates to the firm and service
quality bought from the same consumers in market B. If a set of consumers buys nothing in market A (B), then
this is denoted by the first (second) number being ∅.
The absence of cross-market effects allows to consider each market separately. In each
market the revenue for the incumbent h (high-quality) and entrant l (low-quality) firm is
Rssmh = D
ss
mh p
ss
mh = 100 (1− θ˜ssm) pssmh
Rssml = D
ss
ml p
ss
ml = 100 (θ˜
ss
m − θ̂ssml) pssml.
(3.6)
Solving for optimal prices yields:
pss
∗
mh = 200
qH(qH−qL)
4 qH−qL ,
pss
∗
ml = 100
qL(qH−qL)
4 qH−qL .
(3.7)
By substituting this into the revenue functions, I obtain:32
Rss
∗
mh = 400
q2H(qH−qL)
(4qH−qL)2 ,
Rss
∗
ml = 100
qHqL(qH−qL)
(4qH−qL)2 .
(3.8)
32Since each market is considered separately here, this is a standard result (cf. e.g. Motta 1993).
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Thus, each firm’s total revenue is given by
Rssi (µ) = R
ss
mh +R
ss
ml = qH
100(1− µ)(4 + µ)
(4− µ)2 . (3.9)
To be able to compare this revenue with others obtained later, I will approximate the revenue
function linearly in the feasible range of µ ∈ (0, 1
4
]. First, notice that ∂R
ss
i
∂µ
< 0. Furthermore
Rssi (0) = 25qH and R
ss
i (
1
4
) = 222
3
qH . Thus, under the linear approximation scheme, Rssi ≈
Rssi (0)− 4
(
Rssi (0)−Rssi (14)
)
µ = qH(25− 283 µ).
I have assumed a rather general cost function in order to show that my results are robust
to variations of its parameters. However, to make the analysis yet tractable, I have to consider
discrete quality levels as a sacrifice.33 If firms were to chose quality levels from a continuous
set, Lehmann-Grube (1997) has shown that the high-quality advantage principle holds. Con-
sequently, a minimum feasibility requirement one can make is that under the separate pricing
regime the high-quality firm earns higher profits than the low-quality provider in any one mar-
ket. In this vein, I find a constraint governing the relationship between the parameters of the
cost function, on the one hand, and the feasible quality levels on the other:
Lemma 3.2 (Feasibility Constraint). The high-quality advantage principle holds if
C ≡ C(qH)− C(qL)
qH
< 18.75− 27µ = f(µ),
where µ = qL
qH
∈ (0, 1
4
].
Proof. Formally, I must show that under the separate pricing regime the profit of the high-
quality provider, Πssmh, is greater than the profit of the low-quality provider, Π
ss
ml, for any market
m. Substituting the optimal revenue functions (3.8) into the profit functions yields
Πssmh = R
ss∗
mh − C(qH) = 400 q
2
H(qH−qL)
(4qH−qL)2 − c qeH ,
Πssml = R
ss∗
ml − C(qL) = 100 qHqL(qH−qL)(4qH−qL)2 − c qeL.
(3.10)
To show the lemma I must find a constraint for Πssmh > Π
ss
ml, which, by setting µ =
qL
qH
, rewrites
to
c qe−1H (1− µe) < 300
(1− µ)2
(4− µ)2 . (3.11)
For later comparison, I employ the linear approximation scheme again. To this extend, set
f(µ) = 300 (1−µ)
2
(4−µ)2 and notice that
∂f
∂µ
< 0. Furthermore f(0) = 18.75 and f(1
4
) = 12. Thus,
the feasibility constraint function, f may be well approximated from above by f(µ) ≈ f(0) −
4
(
f(0)− f(1
4
)
)
µ = 18.75− 27µ and the lemma obtains.
33I will show later that my results also hold if firms choose quality levels endogenously.
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Cost Relevance Measure C : Notice that C = C(qH)−C(qL)
qH
, which will be in the center of
my analysis, is the difference in costs between the high-quality service and the low-quality
service, expressed in units of qH . As such, C measures how relevant costs are in a firm’s
decision process. If C is very small, i.e. the costs for high- and low-quality services differ
only very little, firms will offer high-quality services, no matter what the market conditions
are, since high-quality services promise higher profits by the high-quality advantage principle.
Consequently, if costs are negligible, the analysis becomes trivial, because firms must not trade
off between revenue and costs.
Conversely, it is in the interest of this model to analyze those settings where costs are non
negligible.34 However, intuitively it is also clear, that there should be an upper bound to C , at
which costs are so prevalent that the high-quality advantage principle fails to hold and no firm
finds it profitable to continue business. Such a bound is identified by Lemma 3.2.
Finally, it is annotated that C may also be interpreted as a convexity measure of the cost
function. To this extend, rewrite C = c qe−1H (1 − µe). Thereby qe−1H reflects the convexity of
the cost function and c the general magnitude of costs. Obviously, the higher C , the costlier it
is for firms to improve their quality. For low values of C , costs rise only slowly with quality
because either convexity is mild or costs are generally small, or both. Thus, firms will be
able to operate profitably here and high-quality providers generally earn more than their low-
quality competitors. As C increases, cost considerations become increasingly prevalent, until
eventually costs are unfeasibly high, i.e. C ≥ f.
3.3.3 Bundle Pricing Regimes
In contrast to the separate pricing regime, which did not evoke any cross-market effects, bundle
pricing of any one firm creates externality on the other market. In order to compare a service
bundle with competing service offers, consumers cannot consider each market separately any-
more, but must simultaneously assess all offers on the converged markets. I can show that this
externality acts as a quality-leverage device, which enables one firm to provide a high-quality
service on both markets.
Due to the completely symmetric set-up of the model, ex ante either one of the two firms can
potentially achieve quality leverage. Hence, there exist at least two symmetric equilibria, which
34The negligibility threshold is defined later in Proposition 3.8 precisely.
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are identical up to permutations of the firms’ indices. To fix ideas, I denote the firm which is
believed to achieve quality leverage by 1. In other words, for the remainder of this chapter the
following hypothesis shall be under consideration:
Hypothesis (Quality Leverage Hypothesis). Firm 1 achieves greater payoffs under service
bundling than under separate selling because bundling enables firm 1 to leverage its quality
leadership in market A over to its secondary market B.
To this extend, asymmetry is introduced into the model in the following two respects:
1.) Firm 1 will choose its pricing decision first, firm 2 can observe firm 1’s decision and react
optimally. This assumption reflects that firm 1 actively seeks to achieve leverage through
its pricing decision. It is annotated that this assumption is not crucial for the quality
leverage effect to be feasible. In fact, at the end of my analysis I will show that the
equilibrium properties are not altered if firms select their pricing decision simultaneously,
as long as costs of quality improvement are non negligible.
2.) Under all bundle pricing regimes, firm 1 is fixed as the high- and firm 2 as the low-quality
provider in market A. This assumption resolves the multiplicity of Nash equilibria. It is
important to notice, however, that the assumption is without loss of generality. Due to the
quality-differentiation principle, firms must differentiate their service qualities in at least
one market in equilibrium. Otherwise, if all services would have the same quality, firms
would fall prey of the Bertrand price war and obtain zero profits.
Since the quality assignment is being fixed for market A, it is now at the core of this section
to investigate the quality choice of firms in market B when firm 1 has chosen a bundle pricing
strategy. In total, four scenarios are possible:
Scenario LH: Certainly, if bundling had no effect on the firms’ quality decision, firm 1 would
choose qL and firm 2 would choose qH in market B in equilibrium again. Denote this
scenario by LH .
Scenario HL: Conversely, the equilibrium scenario which supports the quality leverage hy-
pothesis the strongest is denoted by HL. Here, firm 1 is able to establish itself as the
high-quality seller in market A and B, while simultaneously forcing the other firm into
providing a low-quality service in both markets.
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Scenario HH: Also scenario HH supports the quality leverage hypothesis, although not as
strongly as HL. Firm 1 achieves to be the high-quality seller in both markets, but cannot
prevent firm 2 from providing a high-quality service in B as well. However, firm 1’s
profits are expected to be lower than under scenarioHL, because firms fail to differentiate
their services in market B, which leads to intensified price competition in turn. Call this
scenario HH .
Scenario LL: Finally, if both firms choose a low-quality service in equilibrium in market B,
scenario LL obtains. Obviously, scenario LL is not very desirable to the firms for two
reasons. First, neither firm can benefit from the high-quality advantage in market B.
Second, firms do not differentiate their services in market B, like in scenario HH , such
that price competition will intensify and lead to diminishing profits. Due to this strategic
similarity between scenario HH and LL, it will often be convenient to subsume the two
under scenario XX.
1
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HH HLqH
qLqH
qL
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Figure 3.2: Stylized Game Tree under Sequential Pricing-Strategy Decisions
With the help of this notation, the whole game can be represented by the stylized game
tree shown in Figure 3.2, which can be interpreted as follows: First, firm 1 decides upon its
pricing strategy, i.e. whether to bundle (b) or to sell its services separately (s). Subsequently
firm 2 can observe this decision and choose its pricing strategy as well. The firms’ pricing
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strategy decision in stage one constitutes either one of the four subgames ss, sb, bs or bb. In
each subgame, firms decide simultaneously about the quality levels of their services. In the
separate pricing regime (ss), there are no cross-market effects and each firm can play out its
home market advantage. Thus, in market B, firm 1 is forced into choosing qL and firm 2
will choose qH . Therefore only scenario LH is feasible here. In contrast, under the bundle
pricing regimes (sb, bs, bb) the effect of each firm’s respective home market advantage cannot
be isolated ex ante and is thus determined endogenously within the game. Since the quality
assignment for services in market A is fixed exogenously, the firms’ quality decision in each
bundle pricing subgame degenerates to a normal form game, which reflects the firm’s quality
decision in market B. Each of these normal form games can be represented by a bimatrix like
Table 3.1. Finally, given the quality decision in each subgame, firms simultaneously choose
Market Firm 2
B qH qL
Fi
rm
1 qH
Π1(HH) Π1(HL)
Π2(HH) Π2(HL)
qL
Π1(LH) Π1(LL)
Π2(LH) Π2(LL)
Table 3.1: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Quality Decisions in Market B
prices, either for the pure bundle or for each service separately. In this way, LHss as well
as each scenario of each bundle pricing subgame implies an underlying Bertrand price game.
Thus, in total 13 Bertrand price subgames have to be investigated. This is a very tedious and
cumbersome task and therefore I have abandoned parts of the proof to the appendix for the sake
of readability. Within the following subsections, I will consider each bundle pricing subgame
separately.
Bundle vs. Bundle Pricing Regime
In this subsection, I consider the subgame where both firms have chosen a bundle pricing strat-
egy in the first stage of the game (bb ). Before I can investigate each of the four scenarios
(HH , HL, LH , LL) independently, I must introduce some common notation. First, as already
mentioned, I set qA1 = qH and qA2 = qL under all bundling regimes w.l.o.g. in order to avoid
multiplicity of equilibria. Of course all results also hold for the symmetric case where firm 2
85
CHAPTER 3: QUALITY LEVERAGE THROUGH BUNDLING
would be the designated high-quality firm in marketB. The consumers indifferent between firm
1’s and 2’s bundle lie on the line
θ˜bbB =
pbb1 − pbb2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH − qL
qB1 − qB2 ,
where pbbi denotes the price of firm i’s bundle. The consumers indifferent between buying bundle
1 or 2 at all are located along
θ̂bbB1 =
pbb1
qB1
− θA qH
qB1
and
θ̂bbB2 =
pbb2
qB2
− θA qL
qB2
,
respectively. The locus of consumers indifferent between all three choices (if existent) is Lbb =
(LbbA , L
bb
B), with
LbbA =
pbb1 qB2 − pbb2 qB1
qH qB2 − qL qB1 and
LbbB =
pbb2 qH − pbb1 qL
qH qB2 − qL qB1 .
Notice that the indifferent consumers are now determined by their tastes for both service types.
These cross-market effects are responsible for the existence of the quality leverage effect.
Next, I will try to give some intuition for the price competition evolving in each of the sce-
narios. I will employ the visualizations of the demand patterns here to undermine my analysis.
The quantitative results are summarized by the subsequent lemmas whose proofs may be found
in the appendix.
Scenario LHbb: I start with the investigation of the LHbb scenario because it represents a
short-term transition stage between the separate- and bundle pricing regime which would obtain
if firms did not alter quality-levels but only prices. Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding demand
pattern. I addition to the already introduced notation labeling the different demand areas, I use
the convention to put parenthesis around the two numbers if the service is offered in a bundle.
Scenario LHbb is characterized by perfect symmetry. Each firm is the high-quality provider in
its home market and the low-quality provider in its foreign market. The corresponding bundles
are therefore a mix of high-and low quality services and very similar in nature. Consequently,
price competition is rather intense, because a small change in price may induce many con-
sumers to switch bundles. However, due to symmetry, in equilibrium both firms must offer the
same price for their bundles and will consequently earn the same profits. The consumers being
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1H 1L
2L 2H( 
( 
)
)
Figure 3.3: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario LHbb
Bundles offers are denoted by parenthesis in this and all following visualizations of demand patterns.
indifferent between both service bundles are thus located along the angle bisecting line. Fur-
thermore, the lack of differentiation in the vertical dimension will keep prices and consequently
revenues rather low.
ScenarioHLbb: Next, assume the quality-sorting effect holds and firm 1 emerges as the high-
and firm 2 the low-quality provider in both markets. Then the demand pattern looks as in Figure
3.4. In this scenario price competition is much weaker than under LHbb because firms’ bundles
are now maximally differentiated. One firm has specialized on serving the low-quality end of
the market, whereas the other firm serves the high-quality loving consumers. This segmentation
of the consumer space allows for more inelasticity in prices. Of course, due to the high-quality
advantage principle, the revenues of both firms are not equal anymore and firm 1 will be much
better off than firm 2. I will soon show, however, that this setting can nevertheless be achieved
by firm 1 in equilibrium when it pursues a bundle pricing strategy.
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1H 1H
2L 2L(
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Figure 3.4: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario HLbb
ScenariosHHbb and LLbb: Finally, I must consider the case where firms do not differenti-
ate their products in market B. Say both firms provide a service of quality qX ∈ {qH , qL} in B.
The corresponding demand pattern is given by Figure 3.5. In this scenario, the consumers in-
different between both scenarios are all characterized by the same taste for quality in market A,
because firms fail to differentiate their services in market B. Price competition is at an interme-
diate level and largely determined the by the degree of differentiation in market A. Of course,
due to the high-quality advantage principle, scenario HH generates higher revenues than sce-
nario LL. However, for price equilibria to exist in these scenarios, at least firms’ services in
market A must be sufficiently differentiated.
Lemma 3.3 shows that the existence of interior price equilibria for these four scenarios
generally requires a minimum amount of service differentiation.
Lemma 3.3 (Price Equilibrium Feasibility Constraints: Pure Bundling). Interior price equi-
libria exist only if quality levels are sufficiently differentiated. Scenario HLbb is feasible for
qH > 1.77 qL, scenario HHbb for qH > 2.31 qL, scenario LHbb for qH > qL and scenario
LLbb for qH > 3.73 qL.
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Figure 3.5: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenarios HHbb and LLbb
Proof. See Appendix.
The reader may now understand why qH ≥ 4 qL is actually an unfavorable assumption,
because it ensures the existence of all four scenarios of the bb subgame. As qL approaches qH
further, the equilibria where both firms provide the same service quality in market B gradually
cease to exist. This is intuitively clear, since services must be sufficiently differentiated in
market A, if firms fail to distinguish their services in market B. Scenarios HLbb and LHbb, on
the contrary, continue to hold under significantly less service differentiation. Also keep in mind
that the conditions in Lemma 3.3 are only necessary, because quality levels are exogenous.
If firms would choose quality levels freely, the classical literature on vertical differentiation
has shown that sufficient differentiation arises endogenously, such that interior price equilibria
generally exist.
Now, let us turn to a more quantitative analysis of the bb -subgame.
Lemma 3.4 (Revenues in the bb-subgame). The revenue of firm i in each scenario of the bb-
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subgame, denoted by Rbbi , can be well approximated by
Rbb1 (HH) = qH (36.88− 28µ) , Rbb2 (HH) = qH (6.71− 1.54µ)
Rbb1 (HL) = qH (54.41− 29.06µ) , Rbb2 (HL) = qH 8.62 µ
Rbbi (LH) = qH (17.16− 3.84µ)
Rbb1 (LL) = qH (25− 1.50µ) , Rbb2 (LL) = qH 14.54 µ
Proof. See Appendix.
In particular notice that firms’ revenue depends on qH and qL = µ qH only and generally
increases with quality. In order to determine the quality equilibrium of the bundle pricing regime
subgames, I must now define a function BRi(q−i), which returns firm i’s best quality response
in market B, given the quality decision of her opponent,−i. The pure quality Nash-equilibrium
of each subgame is then given by a set of qualities (qi, q−i), from which neither firm wishes to
deviate unilaterally, i.e. BRi (BR−i(qi)) = qi, ∀i.
Lemma 3.5 (Best Quality Responses in the bb-subgame). In the bb-subgame, each firms best
quality response function BRbbi is
BRbb1 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bb
1 (qL) = 29.41− 27.56µ
qL, otherwise
BRbb1 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bb
1 (qH) = 19.72− 24.16µ
qL, otherwise
BRbb2 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bb
2 (qL) = 17.16− 18.37µ
qL, otherwise
BRbb2 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bb
2 (qH) = 6.71− 10.16µ
qL, otherwise
For all µ ∈ (0, 1
4
] it holds that the threshold functions, r, can be uniquely ranked as rbb2 (qH) <
rbb2 (qL) < r
bb
1 (qH) < r
bb
1 (qL).
Proof. The best response function determines whether it is best to reply with a high- or low
quality service, given the quality level of the opponents’ service. Consider firm 1, for example.
If firm 2 offers a service of quality qX ∈ {qH , qL} in market B, firm 1 will respond with a
high-quality service iff Π1(HX) ≥ Π1(LX). Rearranging this inequality yields
c (qeH − qeL) ≤ R1(HX)−R1(LX)
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Moreover, we know from Lemma 3.4 that the revenue functions follow the basic form of Ri =
qH gi(µ), such that a division by qH together with substituting qL = µ qH yields
c qe−1H (1− µe) ≤ r1,
where the left hand side is C = C(qH)−C(qL)
qH
and the right hand side corresponds to the threshold
function r1 =
R1(HX)−R1(LX)
qH
. Of course, the same holds analogously for firm 2. The lemma
then follows trivially from Lemma 3.4. To see how well the linear approximations of Lemma
3.4 resemble the original function, Figure A.1 in the appendix shows a comparison of both.
Lemma 3.4 has two important implications.
First, notice that the threshold functions may be uniquely ranked in terms of C , however in-
dependent of µ and e. Consequently, the Nash-equilibrium of the bb-subgame depends only on
the general size of the cost relevance measure, C , and not on the precise relationship between
qH and qL. Consequently, although I have simplified the analysis by fixing the quality levels ex-
ogenously, I obtain qualitatively identical results as if quality levels were chosen endogenously.
This gives rise to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.6 (Exogeneity Independence). The pure quality strategy equilibria of the bb-
subgame are independent of whether quality levels are exogenously given or endogenously
chosen from a continuous set.
Second, note that the feasibility constraint function identified by Lemma 3.2, f , satisfies
r2(qH) < f < r1(qH) < r1(qL), ∀µ ∈ (0, 1
4
]
which means that the range of feasible C -values is cut-off at a level below the threshold func-
tions, r1, of firm 1. The next corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 3.7 (High-Quality Commitment). For all feasible values of C , firm 1 chooses qH in
market B as a dominant strategy in the bb-subgame.
Corollary 3.7 refers to the high-quality commitment effect of bundle pricing. Providing a
high-quality service in market B is a credible strategy for the high-quality provider in market
A, irrespective of the precise fixed cost function. This shows very impressively how powerful
the bundle pricing strategy may act as a quality leverage device.
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In an effort to determine the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the bb-subgame, I will consider
all feasible settings of C in turn. If costs are negligible, i.e C < rbb2 (qH), the HH
bb scenario
is the unique equilibrium. Here costs have only small impact on the quality decision and thus
both firms strive toward offering a high-quality service, i.e. BRi(qH) = qH ,∀i.
WhenC increases, such that rbb2 (qH) < C ≤ min{rbb2 (qL), f},35 cost considerations become
more prominent, such that scenario HL is the robust unique equilibrium outcome of the bundle
pricing bb-subgame for all remaining settings: More precisely, if rbb2 (qH) < C ≤ rbb2 (qL), firm
2 will reply with BR2(qH) = qL and BR2(qL) = qH in this parameter range. However, since
firm 1 will offer a high-quality service as a dominant strategy, HLbb is the unique equilibrium
scenario here. Likewise, should rbb2 (qL) < C < f hold, firm 2 will provide a low-quality ser-
vice in market B as a dominant strategy, irrespective of firm 1’s quality choice. That is, in this
parameter range firm 1’s high-quality commitment effect is coupled with a low-quality commit-
ment effect of firm 2. Consequently, scenario HLbb remains the unique quality equilibrium of
the bb-subgame here, even in dominant strategies.
Proposition 3.8 (Quality Equilibria of the bb-subgame).
Non Negligible Costs: If costs of quality improvement are non negligible, i.e. C > rbb2 (qH),
Scenario HLbbobtains as the unique pure strategy quality equilibrium of the bb-
subgame.
Negligible Costs: If costs of quality improvement are negligible, i.e. C ≤ rbb2 (qH), Scenario
HHbbobtains as the unique pure strategy quality equilibrium of the bb-subgame.
Bundle vs. Separate Pricing Subgame
In order to show that the strong results obtained under a bundle vs. bundle pricing regime
extend to hybrid pricing regimes, I consider the bundle vs. separate pricing subgame next. Here
firm one has chosen a bundle pricing strategy, whereas firm 2 seeks to counteract the leverage
efforts of firm 1 by selling its services separately. Since the course of proofs is analogous to the
bb-subgame, I will keep the analysis as concise as possible.36 All variables of this subgame will
be denoted by a superscript bs to indicate the bundle vs. separate pricing regime.
35Precisely, min{rbb2 (qL), f} = rbb2 (qL) iff µ < 0.18 and f otherwise.
36Of course, details are available in the appendix.
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In this subgame consumers have the choice of five different service portfolios: They may
buy firm 1’s bundle, firm 2’s services separately (either one or both) or refrain from purchasing
any service. I must therefore distinguish the following indifferent consumers:37
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s bundle and firm 2’s A-service satisfy
θ˜bs
+
B =
pbs1 − pbsA2
qB1
− θA qH − qL
qB1
.
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s bundle and firm 2’s B-service only are located
at
θ˜bs
++
B =
pbs1 − pbsB2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH
qB1 − qB2 .
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s bundle and each of firm 2’s services separately
lie along
θ˜bs
+++
B =
pbs1 − pbsA2 − pbsB2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH − qL
qB1 − qB2 .
Finally, the locus of consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s bundle and either firm 2’s
A-service or both services of firm 2, i.e. where θ˜bs+B = θ˜
bs+++
B is given by L
bs = (LbsA , L
bs
B ),
where
LbsA =
qB2 (p
bs
1 − pbsA2) − qB1 pbsB2
(qH − qL) qB2 , L
bs
B =
pbsB2
qB2
.
Figure 3.6 shows the demand patterns for each of the scenarios of the bs-subgame. Before I turn
to the quantitative analysis of the above scenarios, I will try to give some qualitative intuition
concerning the nature of the price competition again.
This time the LHbs scenario is not perfectly symmetric because the firms employ different
pricing strategies. Although both firms offer a high-quality service in their home market and
a low-quality service in their secondary market, the use of different pricing strategies creates
some artificial differentiation between the firms’ service portfolios. Hence, we may already
conclude from Figure 3.6(a) that price competition is less intense than under LHbb. However,
by offering its services separately, firm 2 induces some self-inflicted competition among its own
services. We may thus conjecture that firm 2’s revenues are lower under LHbs as compared with
LHbb. Consequently, counteracting firm 1’s bundling strategy by a separate selling strategy may
not be firm 2’s best choice when it simultaneously tries to prevail its high-quality leadership in
market B.
37Not all of these indifferent consumers may be of importance in all of the subsequent scenarios. Recall that
quality assignments in market A are held fixed as qA1 = qH and qA2 = qL.
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Figure 3.6: Bundle Pricing Subgame: (a) Scenario LHbs, (b) Scenario HLbs (c) Scenarios HHbs and
LLbs
Next, consider scenario HLbs. Figure 3.6(b) shows that although firm 1’s bundle competes
against more distinct service portfolios, the nature of competition is very similar to that from
HLbb: Firm 1 serves the high-quality consumer segment, whereas firm 2 offers low-quality
services. By offering its services separately, firm 2 induces some self-inflicted competition
again, however, on the other side it also seems to capture some more consumers by doing so
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(especially those with extreme differences in θ across markets). In summary, we can expect
revenues akin to those in HLbb.
Similar holds for the scenarios XXbs, where firms offer the same service quality in market
B. Again, firm 1 is able to attract the most valuable consumers with high θ values in both
markets and will therefore achieve higher revenues. By its separate pricing strategy, firm 2 is
able to steal some demand in the low θB segment, but also suffers from self-inflicted competition
again.
The corresponding quantitative analysis may be found in the appendix and is summarized
by the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.9 (Revenues in the bs-subgame). The revenue of firm i in each scenario of the bs-
subgame can be well approximated by
Rbs1 (HH) = qH (36.9− 30.56µ) , Rbs2 (HH) = qH (6.71− 3.28µ)
Rbs1 (HL) = qH (54.41− 31.36µ) , Rbs2 (HL) = qH 6.65 µ
Rbs1 (LH) = qH (35.09− 27µ) , Rbs2 (LH) = qH (5.88− 1.69µ)
Rbs1 (LL) = qH (25− 0.95µ) , Rbs2 (LL) = qH 13.47 µ
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 3.10 (Best Quality Responses in the bs-subgame). In the bs-subgame, each firm’s best
quality response function is
BRbs1 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bs
1 (qL) = 29.41− 30.41µ
qL, otherwise
BRbs1 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bs
1 (qH) = 1.81− 3.56µ
qL, otherwise
BRbs2 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bs
2 (qL) = 5.88− 15.16µ
qL, otherwise
BRbs2 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
bs
2 (qH) = 6.71− 9.93µ
qL, otherwise
For all µ ∈ (0, 1
4
] it holds that the threshold functions, r, can be uniquely ranked as rbs1 (qH) <
rbs2 (qL) < r
bs
2 (qH) < f < r
bs
1 (qL).
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Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3.5
Lemma 3.10 reveals two major differences of the sb-subgame compared to the bb-subgame.
First, due to the asymmetry and resulting weak price competition in scenario LHbs, firm 1
is able to achieve much higher revenues here. Consequently, LHbs is much more appealing to
firm 1 such that BRbs1 (qH) = qL at small C values already. Likewise, compared to LH
bb, firm
2 is worse off in scenario LHbs, which in turn raises the attractiveness of scenario LLbs for firm
2. Therefore BRbs2 (qL) = qL holds for much lower values of C than before. The remaining best
response functions have changed only little in comparison to the bb-subgame.
Second, the diminishing revenue differences across neighboring scenarios also disposes firm
1’s high quality commitment effect. In fact, BRbs1 (qH) = qL already holds for very relatively
low values of C , such that scenario LHbs obtains as the equilibrium of the bs-subgame in the
range rbs1 (qH) < C ≤ rbs2 (qL).
If cost considerations become more prominent, i.e. C > rbs2 (qL), scenario HL
bs is the
unique equilibrium of the sb-subgame again. To see this consider rbs2 (qH) > C > r
bs
2 (qL) first.
Here scenario LHbs cannot be sustained in equilibrium anymore, because firm 2 wishes to devi-
ate into LLbs. LLbs is not an equilibrium either, however, as BRbs1 (qL) = qH , leads to scenario
HLbs. When costs rise further to f > C > rbs2 (qH), firm 2’s low-quality commitment effect is
viable again and HLbs can be sustained in equilibrium as firm 1 will choose BRbs1 (qL) = qH
while firm 2 responds with BRbs2 (qH) = qL.
Finally, notice that there exists no pure strategy quality equilibrium in the range rbs2 (qL) <
C ≤ rbs2 (qL). The borderline between negligible and non negligible cost levels as specified by
Proposition 3.8, namely rbb2 (qH), also falls in this range. This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 3.11 (Equilibria of the bs-subgame).
Non Negligible Costs: If costs of quality improvement are non negligible (in the sense of
Proposition 3.8) ScenarioHLbsobtains as the unique pure strategy quality equilibrium
of the bs-subgame.
Negligible Costs: The unique pure strategy quality equilibrium is constituted by Scenario
LHbs, if rbs1 (qH) < C ≤ rbs2 (qL). Otherwise, if C ≤ rbs1 (qH), ScenarioHHbsobtains.
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Separate vs. Bundle Pricing Regime
The separate vs. bundle pricing regime (sb-subgame) obtains when firm 1 chooses a separate
pricing strategy and firm 2 a bundle pricing strategy.
Lemma 3.12 (Revenues in the sb-subgame). Revenues in the bs-subgame can be well approxi-
mated by
Rsb1 (HH) = qH (25− 11.32µ) , Rsb2 (HH) = qH (8µ)
Rsb1 (HL) = qH (50.72− 27.43µ) , Rsb2 (HL) = qH 6.09 µ
Rsb1 (LH) = qH (5.88− 1.69µ) , Rsb2 (LH) = qH (35.09− 27µ)
Rsb1 (LL) = qH (25− 13.58µ) , Rbs2 (LL) = qH 7.26 µ
Proof. First notice that scenario LHsb is identical to scenario LHbs, just with the role of each
firm interchanged. Thus, equilibrium revenues in LHbs can be derived from Lemma 3.9 and by
interchanging firms’ indices. The rest of the proof may be found in the appendix.
Furthermore, best responses are given by:
Lemma 3.13 (Best Quality Responses in the sb-subgame). In the sb-subgame, each firm’s best
quality response function is
BRsb1 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
sb
1 (qL) = 25.72− 13.85µ
qL, otherwise
BRsb1 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
sb
1 (qH) = 19.12− 9.63µ
qL, otherwise
BRsb2 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
sb
2 (qL) = 35.09− 34.26µ
qL, otherwise
BRsb2 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
sb
2 (qH) = 1.91µ
qL, otherwise
For all µ ∈ (0, 1
4
] it holds that the threshold functions, r, can be uniquely ranked as rsb2 (qH) <
f < rsb1 (qH) < r
sb
1 (qL) < r
sb
2 (qL).
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3.5
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In particular notice, that firm 1 will choose qH as a dominant strategy for all feasible values
of C . The next proposition then follows immediately.
Proposition 3.14 (Equilibria of the sb-subgame).
Non Negligible Costs: If costs of quality improvement are non negligible (in the sense of
Proposition 3.8) ScenarioHLsbobtains as the unique pure strategy quality equilibrium
of the sb-subgame.
Negligible Costs: The unique pure strategy quality equilibrium is constituted by Scenario
HHsb, if C ≤ rsb2 (qH). Otherwise, ScenarioHLbsobtains.
3.3.4 Equilibrium Pricing Strategies
The previous two subsections have established the pure strategy price equilibria (stage three)
and quality equilibria (stage two) for all feasible values of the cost relevance measure C . These
results are summarized by Table 3.2 Therein, six different regions of C from zero to f are
differentiated. Each of these regions represents a different set of quality equilibrium scenarios,
comprised from each of the four subgames. In particular, note that regions V and V I represent
the interval of C where costs are considered non negligible in the sense of Proposition 3.8.
Conversely, regions I through IV represent the interval where firms consider costs negligible,
i.e. C ≤ rbb2 (qH).
Costs Pricing Subgame
C bb bs sb ss
ne
gl
ig
ib
le
I: C ≤ rsb2 (qH) HHbb HHbs HHsb LHss
II: rsb2 (qH) < C ≤ rbs1 (qH) HHbb HHbs HLsb LHss
III: rbs1 (qH) < C ≤ rbs2 (qL) HHbb LHbs HLsb LHss
IV: rbs2 (qL) < C ≤ rbb2 (qH) HHbb N/A HLsb LHss
V: rbb2 (qH) < C ≤ rbs2 (qH) HLbb N/A HLsb LHss
VI: rbs2 (qH) < C < f HL
bb HLbs HLsb LHss
Table 3.2: Overview of Quality Equilibrium Scenarios
Table 3.2 displays which equilibrium scenario will obtain in each of the four possible pricing
strategy subgames for each of the six feasible regions of C . In order to determine each firm’s
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equilibrium pricing strategy, it is convenient to examine the case of non negligible cost and
negligible costs separately.
Non Negligible Costs
Consider the case of non negligible costs of quality improvement first, i.e C > rbb2 (qH). Table
3.2 shows quite impressively that scenario HL will obtain under all bundle pricing regimes. In
other words, whenever any of the two firms chooses a bundle pricing strategy, firm 1 will emerge
as the high-quality provider in market A and B, while firm 2 provides low-quality services in
both markets. Only the separate pricing regime results in a symmetric quality distribution as
each firm provides a high-quality service in its home and a low-quality service in its secondary
market. However, due to the high-quality advantage, firm 1 is much better off in any of the HL
scenarios than under separate pricing. This is expressed by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.15 (Dominance of Bundle Pricing under Non Negligible Costs). Firm 1 will choose
bundle pricing as a dominant strategy if costs of quality improvement are non negligible.
Proof. Obviously firm 1 faces the same costs in all HL scenarios, such that higher rev-
enues translate directly into higher profits. Thus, by Lemmas 3.4, 3.9 and 3.12 Πbb1 (HL) >
Πbs1 (HL) > Π
sb
1 (HL). Finally, by Lemmas 3.12 and 3.4 see that Π
sb
1 (HL) > Π
ss
1 (LH) iff
qH(50.72 − 27.43µ) − 2cqeH > qH(25 − 9.33µ) − cqeH(1 − µe). The inequality is satisfied iff
C < 25.72− 18.1µ, which holds for all feasible C . Thus, firm 1 is best off by a bundle pricing
strategy, irrespective of firm 2’s pricing decision.
Given Lemma 3.15 the next proposition is straight forward.
Lemma 3.16 (Pricing Equilibrium under Non Negligible Costs). If costs are non negligible,
both firms choose bundle pricing in the unique pricing equilibrium.
Proof. Since bundle pricing is a dominant strategy by firm 1, firm 2 compares Πbb2 (HL) >
Πbs2 (HL), which trivially holds by Lemmas 3.4 and 3.9.
Lemma 3.15 bears yet another important implication. Since firm 1 chooses bundle pricing
in equilibrium irrespective of firm 2’s pricing decision, the sequence of decision making is
irrelevant.
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Corollary 3.17 (Irrelevance of Decision Sequence under Non Negligible Costs). Under non
negligible costs, the sequence of the firms’ bundle pricing decision in stage one of the game is
irrelevant for the equilibrium of the game.
Put differently, under negligible costs, scenario HLbb constitutes the unique equilibrium of
the game also if firms choose their pricing strategy simultaneously. Moreover, in region V I this
remains true, even if firm 2 would select its pricing strategy first.
Negligible Costs
If costs are negligible, the leverage result is not as obvious, because firm 2 will generally con-
tinue to provide a high-quality service in market B. Moreover, bundle pricing is not a dominant
strategy for firm 1 anymore. This is mainly because scenario HLsb remains viable at almost all
cost levels. As a consequence, under negligible costs, the sequence of firms’ pricing decisions
matters.
Lemma 3.18 (Pricing Equilibrium under Negligible Costs). If costs are negligible, both firms
choose bundle pricing in the unique pricing equilibrium.
Proof. Consider each of the four regions of C in turn.
In region I , costs are irrelevant and thus under the bundle pricing regimes, both firms will
offer a high-quality service in market B. Obviously, if firm 1 chose a bundle pricing strategy
here, firm 2 compares Πbb2 (HH) > Π
bs
2 (HH) and would choose bundle pricing as well. Con-
versely, if firm 1 chose separate pricing, firm 2 compares Πsb2 (HH) < Π
ss
2 (LH) and would
choose separate pricing. Consequently, firm 1 compares Πbb1 (HL) > Π
ss
1 (LH), which holds for
all feasible values C < f . Therefore, both firms choose bundle pricing and HHbb obtains in
equilibrium.
In region II , the previous analysis is changed only if firm 1 chooses separate pricing first.
Then firm 2 compares Πsb1 (HL) < Π
ss
2 (LH), which holds for all feasible C and would still
choose separate pricing. Hence, for firm 2 nothing has changed and HHbb obtains again.
Next, suppose firm 1 choose bundle pricing in region III . Then, firm 2 would choose bundle
pricing as well, because Πbb2 (HH) > Π
bs
2 (LH). If firm 1 chose separate pricing first, then firm
2 would choose separate pricing as well (compare region ii). Thus, HHbb is also the unique
equilibrium in region iii.
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Finally, in region IV , firms cannot coordinate on a pure-strategy quality equilibrium in
the bs-subgame. Even if they did, firm 2 would still choose a bundle pricing strategy, since
Πbb2 (HH) > max{Πbs2 (HH),Πbs2 (LH),Πbs2 (HL),Πbs2 (LL)}. Thus, the analysis is qualitatively
identical to the one pursued for region iii and the lemma obtains.
Finally, it is annotated that subgame sb is not to be very tempting for firm 1, since
Rsb1 (XY ) ≤ Rbb1 (XY ),∀µ ∈ (0, 14 ], where X, Y ∈ {H,L}. In particular, this means that
the bb-subgame is ex post credible because firm 1 would never wish to deviate into the sb- sub-
game, once the quality decision has been fixed.38 This is important, because in my model, I
show that the pricing strategy (which includes little commitment) has influence upon the firms’
quality decision (which requires sunk investments and thus high commitment). Hence, if firm 1
can force firm 2 into the bb-subgame, and influence it to provide a low-quality service through
the quality differentiation mechanism of bundling, then ex post credibility ensures that firm 1
has no incentive to deviate from its pricing strategy, once the beneficial quality configuration
has been obtained.39 Consequently, contrary to Whinston (1990), in my model firm 1 does not
need any exogenous commitment to bundling in order to achieve market leverage. Bundle pric-
ing remains an equilibrium strategy, even after it has altered the nature of competition in the
market.
3.3.5 Quality Leverage through Bundling
Having fully characterized all equilibria of the game at all feasible cost levels, I can finally turn
to the interpretation of the results.
First see that bundle pricing emerges an an equilibrium pricing strategy for firm 1 at all
cost levels. Interestingly, also firm 2 chooses bundle pricing as its unique equilibrium pricing
strategy. In this sense, one can say that firms find it beneficial to adopt a symmetric pricing
strategy.40 That is, the model provides evidence that offering Triple Play bundles is indeed a
pure Nash-equilibrium strategy for the integrated network operators, because it poses a best
response to the bundling strategy of the opposing firm.
38It is easy to see that similar holds for a deviation from the bs-subgame to the separate pricing regime (ss).
39Since firm 2 is the second-mover it will always choose the optimal pricing strategy in response to firm 1, of
course, and thus the problem of ex post credibility does not arise here.
40Also recall from the proof of Lemma 3.18 that firm 2 will always follow the pricing strategy of firm 1 under
negligible costs.
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This insight, however, does not yet explain why one firm offers a pure bundle of its ser-
vices in the first place. To this extend, recall that if both firms offer their services separately,
consumers can self-select their optimal services from markets A and B, possibly comprising an
individual package which contains services of both firms. Thus, a consumer’s decision in mar-
ket A has no ramifications on his decision in market B and firms experience no cross-market
effects in demand. As a consequence, each firm can play out its limited market power and es-
tablish itself as the high-quality service provider in its home market. In this way, either firm
provides high-quality in the foreign market and low-quality in the secondary market (scenario
LH).
When any firm offers its services in a pure bundle, consumers are unequivocally forced
to optimize their service portfolio decision for both markets simultaneously. This creates ex-
ternality in the market which leads the firms to alter the quality of their service offerings. In
particular, the above analysis has revealed that the precise quality constellation depends on how
prominently costs affect firms’ decision making.
If costs of of quality improvement are non negligible scenario HLbb constitutes the unique
equilibrium of the game. The HLbb scenario is so appealing to the firms because it allows them
to affectively shield themselves from the aggressive Bertrand price competition by segmenting
the market into low- and high-quality buyers. By the high-quality advantage, in scenario HLbb
firm 1 is much better and firm 2 worse off than under the separate pricing regime. Conversely, if
under the all bundle pricing regime firms would have continued to provide a high-quality service
in their home market and a low-quality service in their secondary market (LHbb scenario),
price competition would have intensified compared to the separate pricing strategy because
bundles became relatively close substitutes. Thus, both firms would rather price their products
separately than choosing LHbb under a bundle pricing strategy.
If costs considerations become negligible, scenarioHHbb obtains. In fact, costs are so small
that firm 1 cannot prevent firm 2 from participating of the high-quality advantage itself, which
is in turn so large that it even recoups the losses incurred from intensified price competition.
This eventually leads to higher profits than under separate pricing.
The main result of this chapter is summarized by the next proposition.
Proposition 3.19 (Bundling and Quality Leverage). Both firms will choose a bundle pricing
strategy and differentiate their bundles in equilibrium. Let w.l.o.g firm 1 provide a high-quality
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service and firm 2 provide a low-quality service in market A. Then bundle pricing affects the
firms’ quality decision such that
• firm 1 and firm 2 will provide a high-quality service in market B, if costs are negligible
(scenario HHbb)
• only firm 1 will provide a high-quality service in market B (while firm 2 provides a low-
quality service in market B) if costs are non negligible (scenario HLbb).
In all cases, firm 1 achieves greater payoffs than under a separate pricing regime because
the quality leverage effect of bundling enables firm 1 to leverage its quality leadership, which is
associated with higher profits, from its primary market A to its secondary market B.
Example
To exemplify Proposition 3.19, consider the following values for qH , qL, e and c.
Cost Function: Suppose C(qmi) = 12q
2
mi, i.e. c =
1
2
and e = 2. This particular cost function
has been chosen, because it has been frequently employed in the quality differentiation
literature (cf. e.g. Motta 1993; Aoki and Prusa 1996).
Quality Levels: Quality levels are set at qH = 25 and qL = 5. These values are not chosen
at random, but result from Lemma 4.9 in Chapter 4.3, where quality levels have been
endogeneized, given the above specification of the cost function. More specifically, if
firms would choose their quality levels freely from the continuous set [0,∞) under a
bundle pricing regime, they would elicit q∗H = 25.33 and q
∗
L = 4.82 as the optimal
qualities.
Notice that all necessary assumptions are satisfied for these parameter values. First, quality
levels are sufficiently differentiated as µ = 1
5
< 1
4
. Second, costs are non negligible, but yet
feasible, since rbb2 (qH) = 4.68 < C = 12 < f = 13.35.
Let firm 1 be the high-quality provider in market A, then firms receive a payoff of
Πssi (LH) = R
ss
i −
1
2
(252 + 52) = 253.35
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(a) Bundle vs. Bundle Pricing Regime
bb-subgame Firm 2
(market B) qH qL
Fi
rm
1 qH
Πbb1 (HH) = 157.00 Π
bb
1 (HL) = 590.00
Πbb2 (HH) = −164.95 Πbb2 (HL) = 18.10
qL
Πbb1 (LH) = 84.80 Π
bb
1 (LL) = 292.50
Πbb2 (LH) = 84.80 Π
bb
2 (LL) = 47.70
(b) Bundle vs. Separate Pricing Regime
bs-subgame Firm 2
(market B) qH qL
Fi
rm
1 qH
Πbs1 (HH) = 144.70 Π
bs
1 (HL) = 578.45
Πbs2 (HH) = −173.65 Πbs2 (HL) = 8.25
qL
Πbs1 (LH) = 417.25 Π
bs
1 (LL) = 295.25
Πbs2 (LH) = −186.45 Πbs2 (LL) = 42.35
(c) Separate vs. Bundle Pricing Regime
sb-subgame Firm 2
(market B) qH qL
Fi
rm
1 qH
Πsb1 (HH) = −56.60 Πsb1 (HL) = 505.85
Πsb2 (HH) = −285.00 Πsb2 (HL) = 5.45
qL
Πsb1 (LH) = −186.45 Πsb1 (LL) = 232.1
Πsb2 (LH) = 417.25 Π
sb
2 (LL) = 11.30
Table 3.3: Example Payoffs for the Bundle Pricing Subgames
in the separate pricing subgame, where qualities are determined through the firms relative home
market advantage. In the remaining three bundle pricing subgames, firms face the follow-
ing quality decision in market B: Obviously, scenario HL is the unique quality equilibrium
in all bundle pricing subgames. Since Πbb1 (HL) > Π
bs
1 (HL) > Π
sb
1 (HL) > Π
ss
1 (LH) and
Πss2 (LH) > Π
bb
2 (HL) > Π
bs
2 (HL) > Π
sb
2 (HL) both firms will choose bundle pricing in equi-
librium, independent of the sequence of decision making. Therefore, scenario HLbb will obtain
in equilibrium. Therein, firm 1 receives a payoff of 590, while firm 2 only makes a profit of
18.10. Under the separate pricing regime both firms would have received 253.35 instead. Thus,
in this case, the quality leverage effect of bundle pricing enables firm 1 to more than double its
profit compared to the separate pricing regime.
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Model Extensions: Unilateral Mixed
Bundling, Correlated Preferences and
Economies of Scope
In this chapter I extend and deviate from the base model with respect to several central assump-
tions. Thereby, I can show that the main results are unaffected by these variations. To facilitate
the distinction between the base model and its extensions, I denote the most critical assumptions
of the former as follows:
(A1) Firms provide exactly one service per market
(A2) Firms cannot employ unilateral mixed bundling
(A3) Consumers’ preferences are uncorrelated across markets
(A4) Firms are symmetric
(A5) Firms must choose from discrete exogenous quality levels
(A6) Firms’ technology exhibits no scope economies
In following, I will relax any one of these assumptions.
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4.1 Monopoly and Optimal Quality Differentiation
First, I show that firms will never find it profitable to offer more than one service per market.
This proves that assumption (A1) is not binding. To make the analysis as simple and precise
as possible, imagine that reciprocal entry has not yet taken place such that each firm is an
unconstrained monopolist in its home market. Certainly, if under the given conditions already
a monopolistic firm does not find it profitable to introduce a second service quality into the
market, this would be strong evidence that the same holds under oligopoly. In particular, let
θ again denote the consumers’ willingness-to-pay for quality which is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval and let U(θ, qm, pm) = θ qmi − pmi be each consumers’ utility function
for the monopolist’s service variant i. If the monopolist offered a single product, the marginal
consumer indifferent between buying and not buying this service would be θ̂m = p
m
qm
. Hence,
given the same cost function as before, i.e. C(qm) for each service, the firm’s profit function is
Πm1 = (1−
pm1
qm1
)pm1 − C(qm1 )
Solving for the optimal price yields pm1
∗ = q
m
1
2
. Put differently, in the absence of competition, a
monopolistic firm would choose a quality deflated price of p
m
1
qm1
= 1
2
, and thereby serve only half
of the consumers. Consequently, the single service monopolist makes a profit of
Πm1
∗ =
qm1
4
− C(qm1 )
Introducing a second quality, say qm2 < q
m
1 , changes the monopolist’s profit function to
Πm2 = (1− θ˜m)pm1 + (θ˜m − θ̂m)pm2 − C(qm1 )− C(qm2 ),
where θ˜m = p
m
1 −pm2
qm1 −qm2 denotes the consumer indifferent between purchasing service 1 or 2 from
the monopolist. Again, optimal prices are given by pm1
∗ = q
m
1
2
and pm2
∗ = q
m
2
2
, such that the
profit function becomes
Πm2
∗ =
qm1
4
− C(qm1 )− C(qm2 ),
because the low-quality service does not receive any demand at these prices. Consequently, the
introduction of another service variant just causes costs without any revenue gains, such that
qm2
∗ = 0.
Proposition 4.1. The unconstrained monopolist never finds it profitable to introduce a second
service quality.
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4.2 Unilateral Mixed Bundling
Next, I allow for unilateral mixed bundling as a more flexible pricing strategy and thereby
relax (A2). Of course, it should be in the discretion of each firm whether it pursues a pure
bundling or a unilateral mixed bundling strategy. As mentioned before, the latter is especially
common in the communications market and refers to the firms practice of tying the sale of
the secondary service to the purchase of the home service, while simultaneously allowing the
separate purchase of the home service. Obviously, unilateral mixed bundling subsumes pure
bundling because firms can always choose to set the price for the individual purchase of their
home service arbitrarily high, thereby establishing a de-facto pure bundling regime. Likewise,
mixed bundling (i.e. offering the bundle and both service types separately) subsumes unilateral
mixed bundling.
4.2.1 Mixed Bundling vs. Pure Bundling
Mix-and-Match
When firms offer their home services individually, consumers have the ability to mix-and-match
services from different providers. Obviously, this is possible only because service types are
taken to be fully compatible (cf. Section 2.1.5). There exists a small body of literature which has
investigated whether product compatibility is indeed advantageous to firms. Foremost, Matutes
and Regibeau (1988)–whose model has subsequently been extended by Economides (1989)–
consider a duopoly market in which each firm offers both of two complementary products.
More precisely, the firms play a two stage game in which they first decide whether to produce
compatible products and then compete in prices. If firms agree on a compatibility standard,
consumers can mix-and-match products from different suppliers. Conversely, if firms choose
to provide incompatible products the situation is akin to pure bundling, since consumers must
buy the whole set of products from one firm. Interestingly, the authors find that firms are in fact
inclined to offer compatible products, because compatibility reduces the level of competition
in the duopoly market and thereby allows for higher prices. Also Einhorn (1992) finds similar
results while extending Matutes and Regibeau’s framework (where consumers have uncorre-
lated horizontal preferences for each good) to a model with vertical differentiation (where firms
offer products of different qualities). In particular, Einhorn shows that compatibility mitigates
competition because it increases the aggregate degree of product differentiation in the market.
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Equilibrium Pricing Strategies
As compatibility of services is in the firms’ best interest, consumers will generally be able to
mix-and-match their optimal service portfolio from different suppliers. The previously men-
tioned mix-and-match literature does not account for mixed bundling, however, i.e. consumers
cannot be given a bundle discount if they purchase both products from one supplier. This issue
is addressed in another body of literature investigating mixed bundling in duopoly. Unfortu-
nately, the authors disagree on whether mixed bundling actually raises firms profits or at least
emerges as an equilibrium pricing strategy in comparison to separate pricing or pure bundling.
Economides (1993), for example, finds in a linear demand model that mixed bundling forces
firms into a prisoners’ dilemma. Thus, although mixed bundling is chosen as a dominant strat-
egy in equilibrium, it leads to lower profits than separate pricing. On the contrary, using a logit
demand model, Anderson and Leruth (1993) show that separate pricing (weakly) dominates
pure or mixed bundle pricing: Here firms are reluctant to mixed bundling because it induces
self inflicted competition, while pure bundling, on the other hand, forgoes the ability to price
discriminate between both products. Also Matutes and Regibeau (1992) extend their mix-and-
match model by a third stage (located between the compatibility decision and the price compe-
tition stage) in which firms can choose their pricing strategy (i.e. either pure bundle -, mixed
bundle -, or separate pricing). The authors find that the separate selling strategy dominates the
pure bundling strategy as firms generally wish to make their products compatible. Moreover,
they show that the optimal pricing strategy of firms producing compatible products depends on
the consumers’ reservation price for their ideal product portfolio: If it is low, both firms choose
mixed bundling and earn less than if they would have chosen separate pricing. This resembles
the prisoners’ dilemma situation also found by Economides (1993). At intermediate reservation
prices, one firm chooses mixed bundling and the other separate pricing, and at high reservation
prices both firms choose separate pricing. Kopalle, Krishna, and Assuncao (1999) extend the
framework of Anderson and Leruth (1993) by introducing an additional “no purchase” option.
They allow for all three pricing strategies, but show that pure bundling will never be an equi-
librium strategy by either firm. Their key finding, however, is that the equilibrium bundling
strategy depends on the scope for market expansion. When the probability of purchase is low
(i.e. there is scope for market expansion) firms are likely to employ mixed bundling, but as the
scope for market expansion decreases firms favor to price products independently. Finally, also
McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) briefly comment on the optimal pricing strategy in a
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multiproduct duopoly setting and find that independent pricing cannot be more profitable than
(mixed) bundling if reservation prices for the two products are independently distributed.
In summary, it seems that the optimal (equilibrium) pricing strategy hinges upon the precise
model assumptions – in particular the demand structure. In the literature, at least, no robust set-
ting in favor of any bundling strategy could be identified. In my model, bundle pricing is always
preferred over separate pricing. Moreover, I can show that pure and (unilateral) mixed bundle
pricing strategies can simultaneously coexist in equilibrium. This is a remarkable finding, as
recently, Vaubourg (2006) has criticized that the previous literature on equilibrium bundling
strategies cannot explain this phenomenon, despite its practical relevance. Although my model
is distinct from Vaubourg’s, we both share the assumption that products are independent in
demand, whereas the earlier models have assumed a complementary relationship.
4.2.2 The Unilateral Mixed Bundle Pricing Regime
In following, I extend the base model by allowing for a unilateral mixed bundle pricing strategy
instead of a pure bundle pricing strategy in the first stage of the game. From Chapter 3 we
know that firms tend to use the same pricing strategies, such that the bb-regime emerges as
unique equilibrium subgame under pure bundling. I will therefore limit the investigation to
the unilateral mixed bundle pricing vs. unilateral mixed bundle pricing regime, denoted by
superscript uu. Moreover, firms individual (home service) prices are puuA1 and p
uu
B2, respectively;
all other variables are as before. Before proceeding, however, I must specify the location of
some indifferent consumers again:
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s pure bundle and firm 2’s home service only
are located at
θ˜uu
+
B =
puu1 − puuB2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH
qB1 − qB2 .
Likewise, the consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s home service and firm 2’s pure
bundle satisfy
θ˜uu
++
B =
puu2 − puuA1
qB2
+ θA
qH − qL
qB2
,
and consumers indifferent between firm 1’s and firm 2’s bundle lie at
θ˜uu
+++
B =
puu1 − puu2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH − qL
qB1 − qB2 .
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Furthermore, the consumers indifferent between buying bundle 1 or 2 at all are located along
θ̂uuB1 =
pbb1
qB1
− θA qH
qB1
and
θ̂uuB2 =
pbb2
qB2
− θA qL
qB2
,
respectively. Let the locus of consumers indifferent between buying either bundle or not buying
anything at all, i.e. θ˜uu+++B = θ̂
uu
B1 = θ̂
uu
B2, if existent, be L
uu = (LuuA , L
uu
B ), with
LuuA =
puu1 qB2 − puu2 qB1
qH qB2 − qL qB1 and
LuuB =
puu2 qH − puu1 qL
qH qB2 − qL qB1 .
Finally, denote the locus of consumers indifferent between buying firm 1’s bundle, firm 2’s
bundle or firm 1’s home service separately, i.e. θ˜uu++B = θ˜
uu+++
B , by P
uu = (P uuA , P
uu
B ), with
P uuA =
puuA1 − puu2
qH − qL +
puu1 − puuA1
qH − qL
qB2
qB1
and
P uuB =
puu1 − puuA1
qB1
.
Again, I will first provide the reader with some intuition concerning the nature of compe-
tition in each of the four scenarios. The tedious quantitative analysis is mostly executed in the
appendix and summarized by Lemmas 4.2 through 4.4.
Scenario LHuu: Once more, let us begin with the investigation of scenario LH . If firms
can employ unilateral mixed bundling instead of pure bundling (cf. Figure 3.3) the demand
pattern changes to the one depicted in Figure 4.1. One can already conclude from the demand
pattern that competition is much less intense in LHuu as compared to LHbb. As each firm
sells its high-quality home service separately, the consumers with the highest willingness-to-
pay (i.e. the most profitable consumers) are able to compile an all-high-quality service portfolio
themselves. In this vein, both firms evenly profit from the individual offering of their home
services by contributing exactly one service to this most-valued service portfolio. Hence firms’
home services are viewed as complementary by these consumers and thus price competition is
very weak in the individual service segment. On the contrary, firms’ pure bundles remain to
be demand substitutes, evoking rather harsh price competition in the bundle segment. How-
ever, since only those consumers with medium willingness-to-pay in both markets are directly
indifferent between the firms’ bundles, the effect of small price changes onto firms’ profits is
not as pronounced as in LHbb. Overall, one can say that scenario LHuu seems to combine the
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(1H 1 )L
(2L 2H
1H 2H
)Ø2H
1 ØH
Figure 4.1: Unilateral Mixed Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario LHuu
best of the two regimes: On the one hand, individual home service offerings allow to single
out the most valued customers by allowing them to compile their optimal service portfolio, the
revenue of which is evenly shared. On the other hand, competing bundle offerings compromise
on the amount of self-inflicted price competition in lieu of substitutive price competition. Taken
together, we can thus expect symmetric revenues which are well above the level of LHbb and
might even exceed those achieved under the separate pricing regime.
Scenario HLuu: The expected demand pattern under scenario HLuu is drawn in Figure
4.2(a). Since firm 1 is the high-quality service provider in both markets in this scenario, its
bundle offering is especially appealing to the most valued customers, and therefore very prof-
itable. In contrast to scenario LHuu, the individually compiled service portfolio now attracts
only some medium valuable customers, and thus cannot serve as a source of high revenues. In
fact, the additional revenue generated by this portfolio is not able to compensate firm 2 for the
self-inflicted competition caused between its individual home service and its bundle offering.
Hence, firm 2 refrains from selling its home service separately (i.e. it sells it at a price equal or
above the bundle price), leading to the demand pattern depicted in Figure 4.2(b). Of course, with
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1H2L
1H 1H( )
2L 2L( )
1 ØH
Ø2L
(a)
1 ØH
1H 1H( )
2L 2L( )
(b)
Figure 4.2: Unilateral Mixed Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario HLuu
the discontinuation of 2’s home service, two distinct demand areas drop out, leaving consumers
with three potential service offerings; the two bundles and firm 1’s home service. It turns out
that selling its home service separately remains profitable for firm 1, because the revenue gain
from stealing some of 2’s demand (weakly) exceeds the losses incurred through self-inflicted
competition with its own bundle. This latter revenue gain is not very strong, however, and we
can thus expect revenues at about the same magnitude as in HLbb, but with a slight increase
(decrease) in firm 1’s (2’s) revenues.
Scenarios HHuu and LLuu: Finally, consider the demand pattern shown by Figure 4.3,
which obtains if both firms select the identical quality level for their B-service. At first glance,
it is evident that only very little has changed compared to scenarioXXbb. Mainly, this is because
there is no reason for the customers to compile an individual service portfolio from each firm’s
individual home service offerings in this scenario: Due to the lack of service differentiation in
market B, all possible service portfolios consisting of two services are covered by the firms’
bundles already. Consequently, since bundles are by definition cheaper than the sum of their
components, no consumer can benefit from assembling services of different firms. Moreover,
each firm’s separate home service offering appeals only to customers with extreme differences
in their willingness-to-pay for quality across service types. The quantitative analysis will show
that the value generated by these customers cannot countervail the negative effects created by
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(1H 1 )X2L 2X( )Ø2X
1 ØH
Figure 4.3: Unilateral Mixed Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenarios HHuu and LLuu
self-inflicted competition between each firm’s individual and bundled services. Consequently,
in this scenario, both firms choose not to offer their home services separately, resulting in the
very same situation as in XXbb.
For the quantitative analysis, I begin by deriving the the price equilibrium feasibility con-
straints for the unilateral mixed bundle pricing regime. Since there are generally more distinct
demand regions in this regime, quality levels must therefore also be generally more differenti-
ated in order to ensure existence of an interior price equilibrium. However, since scenario LLbb
(which has been the limiting case in the base model) and scenario LLuu (which remains to be
the limiting case in this extension) turn out to be identical in both settings, the assumption of
qH ≥ 4qL is still justified and ensures the feasibility of all four scenarios.
Lemma 4.2 (Price Equilibrium Feasibility Constraints: Unilateral Mixed Bundling). Under
unilateral mixed bundling interior price equilibria exist only if quality levels are sufficiently
differentiated. Scenario HL is feasible for qH > 2.12 qL, scenario HH for qH > 2.31 qL,
scenario LH for qH > 2.46 qL and scenario LL for qH > 3.73 qL.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Furthermore, the following lemma confirms the findings of the above intuitive interpretation.
Lemma 4.3 (Revenues in the uu-subgame). The revenue of firm i in each scenario of the uu-
subgame can be well approximated by
Ruu1 (HH) = qH (36.88− 28µ) , Ruu2 (HH) = qH (6.71− 1.54µ)
Ruu1 (HL) = qH (54.62− 29.45µ) , Ruu2 (HL) = qH 8.58 µ
Ruui (LH) = qH (25− 8.92µ)
Ruu1 (LL) = qH (25− 1.50µ) , Rbb2 (LL) = qH 14.54 µ
Proof. See Appendix.
With the exception of LHuu, revenues have changed only very little with respect to the
bb-subgame. However, the softening of price competition in scenario LHuu has significant
impact on the firms’ best response functions. In particular, firm 1 is now less inclined to choose
qH (especially at high cost levels, in response to a high-quality B-service offering of firm 2)
because LHuu is much more attractive than LHbb used to be. Likewise, for the same reason,
firm 2 is less willing to give into providing a low-quality service in response to a high service
quality offering by firm 1.
Lemma 4.4 (Best Quality Responses in the uu-subgame). In the uu-subgame, each firm’s best
quality response function is
BRuu1 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
uu
1 (qL) = 29.62− 27.95µ
qL, otherwise
BRuu1 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
uu
1 (qH) = 11.88− 19.08µ
qL, otherwise
BRuu2 (qL) =
qH , if C ≤ r
uu
2 (qL) = 25− 23.45µ
qL, otherwise
BRuu2 (qH) =
qH , if C ≤ r
uu
2 (qH) = 6.05− 10.12µ
qL, otherwise
For all µ ∈ (0, 1
4
] it holds that the threshold functions, r, can be uniquely ranked as ruu2 (qH) <
ruu1 (qH) < f < r
uu
2 (qL) < r
uu
1 (qL).
Proof. Analogous to Lemma 3.5
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Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 show that unilateral mixed bundling as ambiguous effects with respect
to strengthening firm 2’s position in counteracting firm 1’s leverage efforts. On the one side,
it helps (both firms) to relax the ruinous price competition characterizing scenario LH , but on
the other side, it worsens (or has no impact on) the situation in the remaining scenarios. This
ambivalence also shows in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.5 (Equilibria of the uu-subgame). The equilibrium outcomes of the unilateral
mixed bundle pricing subgame are virtually identical to those of the pure bundle pricing sub-
game, with an exception if costs are very high (C > ruu1 (qH)). At this level, next to scenario
HLuu, scenario LHuu can also be sustained in equilibrium and firms must coordinate on one
of the two equilibria.
Proof. For very low values of C , the the high-quality advantage lets both firms strive towards
offering a high-quality of service in market B again, yielding HHuu. When costs increase to
ruu2 (qH) < C ≤ ruu1 (qH), firm 2 finds it more profitable to give in into being the low-quality
provider in both markets (scenario HLuu) rather than trying to compete with firm 1 in HHuu.
Finally, if costs are such that C > ruu1 (qH) a coordination problem arises, because both firms
would rather refrain from offering the high-quality service in market B, should the opponent
choose to do so. Thus, both HLuu and LHuu constitute an equilibrium.
From Lemmas 3.16 and 3.18 and noticing that the revenues of both firms are virtually iden-
tical under unilateral mixed bundle pricing and pure bundle pricing, with the exception of sce-
nario LHuu–where both firms are better off than under LHbb–I can directly conclude that both
firms will employ the bundle pricing strategy in equilibrium again, at all cost levels.
Corollary 4.6 (Equilibrium of the Unilateral Mixed Bundle Pricing Game). Under a unilateral
mixed bundle pricing regime, the high quality seller in market A is likely to leverage its quality
dominance over to market B and thereby earn greater profits than under a separate pricing
regime. Even if quality leverage is not achieved, both firms’ profits are higher than under
separate selling.
4.3 Correlation of Consumer Preferences
In the base model I have considered the limit case where consumers’ preferences were uncor-
related. In fact, with respect to the quality differentiation mechanism, uncorrelated preferences
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represent a worst-case scenario, because there is demand in every ’niche’ of the market. Graph-
ically, this is represented by a uniform distribution of consumers in the unit square. As con-
sumers’ tastes become more (positively) correlated, consumer mass is concentrated around the
angle bisecting line (grey shaded area in Figure 4.4). Intuitively, as consumers’ preferences
1H 1L
2L 2H( 
( 
)
)
(a) Scenario LH
1H 1H
2L 2L(
( )
)
(b) Scenario HL
Figure 4.4: Bundle Pricing Regimes under Correlated Consumers’ Preferences
become positively correlated, price competition in the LH scenario must inevitably intensify
under the bundle pricing regime, as a small change in either firm’s price will now induce an
even greater number of consumers to switch providers. Eventually, when consumers’ tastes
are perfectly positively correlated, the symmetric LH scenario (Figure 4.4(a)) cannot constitute
an equilibrium anymore, because either provider can attract all consumers by an infinitesimal
small drop in price. On the contrary, in the HL scenario (Figure 4.4(b)) demand is much more
inelastic as the consumers being indifferent between both bundles lie ’orthogonally’ to the angle
bisecting line around which consumer mass is concentrated. Thus, as consumers’ preferences
become positively correlated, scenario HL becomes increasingly attractive to the firms and the
results obtained earlier should rather be strengthened.
In this section I deviate from the base model with respect to (A3) - (A6) as follows:
(A3’) Consumers’ preferences are perfectly positively correlated across service types.
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(A4’) Each firm has a cost advantage (or disadvantage) in its home market, i.e.
C ′′(qmi) =

1
2
q2mi, if m is firm i’s home market
σ
2
q2mi, if m is firm i’s secondary market,
with σ > 0.1
(A5’) Firms choose quality levels, q, endogenously from the continuous interval [0,∞).
Formally, by (A3′) I impose that there is a one-to-one mapping between consumers’ preferences
for quality across service types, such that θ = θA = θB. Note that θm can be interpreted as the
marginal rate of substitution between income and quality. Consumers with a higher income
have a lower marginal utility of income and thus a higher θm (cf. Tirole 1988, p.96). Of course,
all consumers can be uniquely ordered according to their income and since the same consumers
are present on both markets, there is good reason to believe that this ordering is identical (or at
least highly positively correlated) across markets.
Furthermore, I introduce some cost asymmetry in each market and allow firms to choose the
quality level of each of their services freely. This allows me to analyze the effect of bundling
on equilibrium quality levels in the presence of cost (dis-)advantages.2
4.3.1 Separate Pricing Regime
Recall from Section 3.3.2 that there are no cross-market effects under the separate pricing
regime. Therefore, we can consider each market separately again. I denote the present sep-
arate pricing regime by superscript s. Otherwise the notation is the same as before. Hence, let
firm h be the high-quality provider and firm l be the low-quality provider in marketm, such that
qsh > q
s
l . Optimal prices are given by
3
ps
∗
h = 200
qsh(q
s
h−qsl )
4 qsh−qsl
,
ps
∗
l = 100
qsl (q
s
h−qsl )
4 qsh−qsl
.
(4.1)
and, consequently, revenues amount to
Rs
∗
h = 400
qs
2
h (q
s
h−qsl )
(4 qsh−qsl )2
,
Rs
∗
l = 100
qshq
s
l (q
s
h−qsl )
(4 qsh−qsl )2
.
1For expositional clarity I economize on parameters by setting c = 12 and e = 2.
2I have imposed that a firm’s cost advantage in one market is equal to its cost disadvantage in the other market.
The analysis trivially extends to the case where firms are not symmetric across both markets.
3Cf. Motta (1993).
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With the introduction of cost asymmetry, firms’ profit functions become:
Πsh = R
s∗
h − 12qs
2
l
Πsl = R
s∗
l − σ2 qs
2
l .
Substituting qsl = µ q
s
h, µ ∈ (0, 1) into the first order conditions and after some rearranging one
obtains that µ is uniquely determined by
8σµ3 − 12σµ2 + (16σ + 7)µ− 4 = 0. (4.2)
By implicit differentiation, one can easily check for ∂µ
∂σ
< 0, which implies that µ ∈ (0, 4
7
) for
σ > 0 and also reveals the previously mentioned quality differentiation principle. In particular,
for symmetric firms (i.e. σ = 1) µ ≈ 0.19. This provides further evidence that the assumption
of µ ∈ (0, 1
4
), which has been made in the base model, is most naturally met if quality levels are
chosen from a continuous set.
Solving for µ and substituting this back into the first order conditions yields the following
optimal qualities:4
qs
∗
h = 400
2µ2−3µ+4
64−48µ+12µ2−µ3
qs
∗
l =
100
σ
4−7µ
64−48µ+12µ2−µ3 .
(4.3)
It is easy to see that the high-quality advantage principle is confirmed at these quality levels, as
the high-quality provider, firm h, achieves a higher payoff than firm l. However, in order to show
that this candidate equilibrium is indeed Nash, it remains to be verified whether qs∗l is actually
a best response to qs∗h by the designated low quality firm, or whether it has an incentive to high
quality leapfrog by providing a higher quality than the designated high quality firm.5 In the this
case, the game would have no equilibrium. Low quality leapfrogging, on the contrary, is only
relevant if the low quality firm earns higher payoffs than the high quality firm (Lehmann-Grube
1997), and can therefore be neglected here.
For symmetric firms, Motta (1993) has shown that high-quality leapfrogging is never advan-
tageous. I allow for asymmetric firms, including those cases where the designated low-quality
firm is more efficient than the designated high-quality firm, i.e. where σ < 1. It turns out that
high-quality leapfrogging can be ruled out as long as the low-quality firm’s cost advantage is
4The reader may easily verify that both second order conditions fulfill ∂
2Πsmi
∂2qsmi
< 0 given qsh > q
s
l .
5This has not been necessary before because quality leapfrogging is not possible when there are only two
discrete quality levels.
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not too predominant, such that σ > σ ≈ 0.63.6 Hence for all σ > σ the above candidate equi-
librium is subgame perfect Nash, otherwise there exists no equilibrium.
Furthermore, the following lemma sheds some light on the impact of cost asymmetry on com-
petition and equilibrium quality levels.
Lemma 4.7 (Cost Asymmetry under Separate Pricing). Under separate pricing, an increase
(decrease) in the firms’ cost asymmetry will c.p. lead to a decrease (increase) in each firm’s
equilibrium quality. Overall, services will be more (less) differentiated than before, thereby
softening (tightening) competition and resulting in an increase (decrease) of the quality deflated
prices p
s
i
qsi
.
Proof. First, recall that ∂µ
∂σ
< 0 and µ ∈ (0, 4
7
) for σ > 0. This immediately proves the second
part of the lemma. Differentiating qsh with respect to σ yields
∂qsh
∂σ
=
800 ∂µ
∂σ
µ(80−36µ+3µ2−µ3)
(64−48µ+12µ2+µ3)2 ,
which must be smaller than zero because of ∂µ
∂σ
< 0. Consequently, ∂q
s
l
∂σ
=
∂(µqsh)
∂σ
= ∂µ
∂σ
qsh+
∂qsh
∂σ
<
∂qsh
∂σ
< 0.
Finally, notice that although firms are asymmetric in each market, across both markets firms
are symmetric again, such that each firm will earn the same overall profit under separate pric-
ing.7
4.3.2 Bundle Pricing Regime
Next, consider the bundle pricing regime where firms compete against each other by offering
pure bundles. Consequently, the consumer indifferent between firm 1’s and firm 2’s bundle is
located at:8
θ˜b =
pb1 − pb2
(qbA1 + q
b
B1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
qb1
− (qbA2 + qbB2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
qb2
.
In following, I use the shorthand notation qbi = q
b
Ai + q
b
Bi to denote the aggregate quality of
firm i’s bundle. Obviously, since preferences are perfectly correlated, consumers care only
6Formally, I must check whether there exists a quality level q > qs
∗
h , such that
Rs
∗
h (q
s∗
h , q)−
σ
2
q2 > Rs
∗
l (q
s∗
h , q
s∗
l )−
σ
2
qs
∗2
l .
A brief numerical analysis reveals that there exists no such q as long as σ > σ ≈ 0.6296
7Of course, if one firm has a cost advantage in the provision of both service types, it will also earn higher
overall profits than its less efficient competitor.
8Superscript b denotes the bundling regime.
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about the aggregate quality level and not how it is distributed among the service types. Thus, in
order to make positive revenue, firms must differentiate their aggregate quality levels and I can
assume w.l.o.g. that qb∗1 > q
b∗
2 in equilibrium. It is easy to see that with the help of this short
hand notation, the derivation of equilibrium prices is analogous to the separate pricing regime.
Consequently, firms’ optimal prices and profits can be written as
pb
∗
1 = 200
qb1(q
b
1−qb2)
4 qb1−qb2
,
pb
∗
2 = 100
qb2(q
b
1−qb2)
4 qb1−qb2
.
(4.4)
Πb1 = 400
qb
2
1 (q
b
1−qb2)
(4 qb1−qb2)2
− 1
2
qbA1
2 − σ
2
qbB1
2
,
Πb2 = 100
qb1q
b
2(q
b
1−qb2)
(4 qb1−qb2)2
− σ
2
qbA2
2 − 1
2
qbB2
2
.
From two of the four first order conditions, I can directly deduce the following inter market
relationships:
qb
∗
B1 =
1
σ
qb
∗
A1
qb
∗
B2 = σ q
b∗
A2.
(4.5)
The corresponding intra market relationship (for market A) is derived by setting qb∗A2 = ν q
b∗
A1,
with ν ∈ [0, 1] and solving simultaneously for all four first order conditions:9
8(σν)3 − 12(σν)2 + 23σν − 4 = 0, (4.6)
In fact, see that the solution to this equation must be of the form ν = K
σ
, where K is a constant
independent of σ. Moreover, notice that (4.6) coincides with (4.2) for σ = 1, such that K =
µ(1) ≈ 0.19.
Resolving ν and substituting it along with (4.5) into one of the first order conditions yields
the following equilibrium quality levels for service type A:10
qb
∗
A1 = 400
2(νσ)2−3(νσ)+4
64−48(νσ)+12(νσ)2−(νσ)3
qb
∗
A2 =
100
σ
4−7(νσ)
64−48(νσ)+12(νσ)2−(νσ)3 .
(4.7)
Proposition 4.8 (Quality Leverage Under Correlated Preferences). Under the bundle pricing
regime with perfectly positively correlated preferences, firms specialize on providing either
9The reader may be assured that (4.6) has only one real root in the relevant parameter range.
10Second order conditions for a maximum are fulfilled. Furthermore, high-quality leapfrogging by firm 2 is not
feasible. That is, there exists no qb2 = q
b
A2 + q
b
B2 > q
b∗
1 , such that
Πb
∗
2 (q
b∗
1 , q
b∗
2 ) = 100
qb
∗
1 q
b∗
2 (q
b∗
1 −qb
∗
2 )
(4qb
∗
1 −qb∗2 )2
− σ2 qb
∗
A2
2 − 12qb
∗
B2
2
<
Πb
∗
2 (q
b∗
1 , q
b
2) = 400
qb2
2
(qb2−qb
∗
1 )
(4qb2−qb∗1 )2
− σ2 qbA2
2 − 12qbB2
2
.
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high-or low-quality service types in both markets (HL scenario) in the unique equilibrium.
Thereby one firm can achieve market leverage, even in the presence of cost disadvantages in its
secondary market.
Proof. We know that qbA1 > q
b
A2 as long as ν =
µ(1)
σ
< 1 ⇔ σ > µ(1) ≈ 0.19. From (4.5) it
follows that qbB1 > q
b
B2 ⇔ 1σqbA1 > σqbA2 ⇔ σ < 1µ(1) ≈ 5.26. Thus, the lemma obtains if the
cost asymmetry is not too predominant.
Finally, I can investigate the impact of bundle pricing on equilibrium quality levels.
Lemma 4.9 (Equilibrium Quality Levels and Bundle Pricing Under Correlated Preferences).
Under bundle pricing, an increase in the firms’ cost disadvantage in providing their secondary
service will increase (decrease) the quality differentiation on the high-quality seller’s home
(secondary) market. The overall level of competition, reflected by the quality deflated price p
b
i
qbi
,
will remain constant, however.11
Proof. Obviously, since ν = µ(1)
σ
it holds that ∂ν
∂σ
= − ν
σ
< 0. Thus, an increase of σ will lead
to more service differentiation in market A. In particular, differentiating qbA1 with respect to σ
yields ∂q
b
A1
∂σ
=
2νσ(5+νσ)(ν+σ ∂ν
∂σ
)
(σν−4)4 = 0, and consequently
∂qbA2
∂σ
=
∂(νqbA1)
∂σ
= ∂ν
∂σ
qbA1+
∂qbA1
∂σ
= − qbA2
σ
<
0. This means that under the bundle pricing regime, firm 1 does not change its equilibrium
quality level in market A, such that the increase in differentiation stems from a decrease in firm
2’s equilibrium quality level only. This contrasts the results obtained under the separate pricing
regime (cf. Lemma 4.7), where both firms adjust their quality levels downwards in response
to an increase of cost asymmetry. Thus, I can compute qb∗A1 = 25.33 as the unique equilibrium
value, independent of σ.
Conversely, in market B, I find that ∂q
b
B2
∂σ
=
∂(σqbA1)
∂σ
= 0 and ∂q
b
B1
∂σ
=
∂( 1
σ
qbA1)
∂σ
= − qbB1
σ
< 0.
Hence, quality levels in market B become less differentiated as only firm 1 alters its service
quality downwards, thereby approaching firm 2’s quality level. Moreover, qb∗B2 = 4.82 in equi-
librium, independent of σ. This proves the first part of the lemma.
For the second part of the lemma, differentiate the quality deflated prices with respect to σ
11Of course, if one firm enjoys a cost advantage in both markets, or if its cost advantage in one market overcom-
pensates its cost disadvantage in the other, then the level of competition will be softened as the overall asymmetry
increases.
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and substitute the above results, yielding
∂
pb1
qbA1+q
b
B1
∂σ
=
3
σ
qbA1 q
b
B1 − qbA2 qbB2
(4(qbA1 + q
b
B1)− (qbA2 + qbB2))2
= 0
and
∂
pb2
qbA2+q
b
B2
∂σ
=
6
σ
qbA1 q
b
B1 − qbA2 qbB2
(4(qbA1 + q
b
B1)− (qbA2 + qbB2))2
= 0,
because of (4.5) and qbA2 = ν q
b
A1.
To conclude, the following corollary, which follows directly from the fact that (4.2) and
(4.6) coincide for σ = 1, shows that bundling has no impact on the equilibrium quality levels if
firms are symmetric, as assumed in the base model.12
Corollary 4.10. If firms are symmetric such that they have identical costs of quality improve-
ment for both service types, bundling has no effect on the equilibrium service quality levels.
4.4 Economies of Scope
As I have argued before (cf. Section 2.1.2), the provision of digital goods is characterized by
large scale and scope economies. While the cost function employed in the base model has
accounted for economies of scale, economies of scope have deliberately been neglected. In
this section, I relax the assumption (A6) by assuming that the total cost of quality are only
constituted by the service of higher quality, i.e.
C(qA, qB) = max{C(qA), C(qB)}.
Indeed, such an extreme form of scope economies seems reasonable in the present context, since
costly infrastructure upgrades are usually necessitated by the most demanding service only.
Of course, a change of the cost structure has no effect on the final price competition stage
where the firms’ quality decisions are sunk already. However, the decision structure at the
quality decision stage is altered. In particular, it is easy to see that firm 1, which is assumed to
provide the high quality service in market A already, will always provide a high-quality service
in market B also, because it can do so at no additional costs. Hence,
BR1(qH) : Π1(HH) > Π1(LH) ⇔ R1(HH) > R1(LH) and
BR1(qL) : Π1(HL) > Π1(LL) ⇔ R1(HL) > R1(LL)
12Further investigations concerning the impact of the pricing strategy on equilibrium quality levels will be un-
dertaken in Section 5.3.
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holds for all µ in all bundling subgames. Consequently, firm 1 chooses qH in market B as a
dominant strategy under all bundle pricing regimes. Notice that this rules out the possibility
that scenario LH or LL may emerge in equilibrium.
Likewise, under all bundle pricing regimes, BR2(qH) and BR2(qL) are not altered through
economies of scope, as firm 2 faces the principal decision of whether it wants to provide a
high-quality service at all. The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 4.11 (Equilibria Under Economies of Scope). If costs of quality improvement are
non negligible, i.e. C > r2(qH), scenario HL is the unique equilibrium in all bundle pricing
regimes (of pure or unilateral mixed bundling) with economies scope. Otherwise scenario HH
obtains in equilibrium.
Therefore, the existence of economies of scope even encourages the quality leverage effect
of bundling and strengthens my previous results.
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Chapter 5
Quality Leverage and Welfare
5.1 Bundling and Welfare: A Brief Survey
The economic literature on bundling is vast (cf. Section 3.2) and therefore eludes a complete
presentation of the normative implications it has put forth. Moreover, as I will exemplify in this
section, the welfare consequences of bundling are found to be highly ambiguous and can hardly
be generalized. Consequently, I will limit my attention to some exemplary findings of those
themes which seem to be most relevant and well supported in literature.1
It greatly facilitates the presentation of the welfare effects of bundling to distinguish be-
tween monopoly and oligopoly settings. However, this is not to say that any of the following
effects are viable under either market structure only. Under monopoly, at least, there is a con-
sensus that bundling will almost certainly raise producers’ surplus. In the absence of strategic
effects, the monopolistic producer can choose freely whether or not to bundle, and will obvi-
ously only do so if it is deemed profitable. The effect of bundling on consumers’ surplus, on the
contrary, is not as clear. First, recall that under monopoly bundling has been mainly motivated
through efficiency reasons (e.g. in production or pricing). Thus, ex-ante bundling must not
necessarily be detrimental to consumers’ welfare if firms would pass some of these efficiency
gains on to the consumers. However, Adams and Yellen (1976) find that bundling rather dimin-
ishes consumers’ surplus when employed as a price discrimination device, because it allows the
monopolist to better sort customers according to their reservation values and thereby enables
the extraction of additional consumers’ surplus. Furthermore, Adams and Yellen suggest that
1A more detailed survey on the impact of bundling of communications services may be found in Papandrea,
Stoeckl, and Daly (2003). Inevitably, their overview and mine partially overlap.
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bundling generally leads to both distributive and allocative inefficiencies: The former stemming
from the fact that bundling often forces consumers into buying more than they would have de-
sired in the presence of individual offerings, whereas the latter denote that consumers can Pareto
improve by selling their superfluous units on an aftersales market. In the present context, only
distributive inefficiency will be of relevance, however, since a communications services bundle
generally cannot be dismantled in a way that allows consumers to sell any one of its components
separately. The same holds for information goods and in this vein also Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(2000) find that large scale bundling of zero-marginal-cost goods increases producers’ surplus
in lieu of consumers’ surplus, as it allows to better predict consumers’ reservation prices at no
additional costs. Among others, Salinger (1995), on the other hand, argues that “the effect of
bundling on consumers’ surplus depends on the precise distribution of reservation values”. In
particular, he identifies two independent welfare effects of bundling. First, the pure bundling
effect refers to the distributive inefficiencies described above. Since these efficiencies are cre-
ated through excessive purchases, the pure bundling effect will always have a negative impact
on consumers’ surplus. Second, there is a price effect, which is provoked by the difference
between the bundle price and the sum of the component prices under separate pricing. As the
bundle price is contingent upon the correlation of consumers’ reservation prices, it may either
exceed or undercut the sum of component prices and thereby have either negative or positive
effects on consumers’ welfare. Thus, whether consumers are better or worse off under bundling
depends on whether the price effect can offset the pure bundling effect. As will soon be seen,
the welfare implications of my model will also be driven by these two (opposing) effects.
Under oligopoly the welfare effects of bundling are even more ambiguous because strategic
effects can additionaly forfeit the welfare enhancements on the producers’ side. To this extend,
recall the models of Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Economides (1993) or Reisinger (2006), for
example, which have all identified settings in which bundling has forced firms into a prisoners’
dilemma, leaving them worse off than under separate pricing. At the same time, although
it is not specifically addressed in Matutes and Regibeau (1992) and Economides (1993), one
can presume that consumers’ surplus could potentially rise in these models as the prisoners’
dilemma situation leads to lower prices (i.e. a positive price effect). Reisinger (2006), however,
finds that the price effect is not strong enough to compensate for the pure bundling effect and
therefore attests bundling a negative overall effect on welfare.
Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991, p. 110) annotate that whenever bundling mitigates com-
petition (as in Carbajo, de Meza, and Seidmann 1990, or Chen 1997) or facilitates collusion
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(as in Seidmann 1991 and Spector 2007), consumers’ surplus will generally be reduced since
the price effect is likely to be negative. In these cases, the effect on total welfare depends on
whether producers’ surplus is increased or decreased. At least Chen (1997) affirms that in his
model “profits of all firms in the industry are higher but welfare is unambiguously reduced”.
Also when bundling deters entry, Whinston (1990) comments that “the normative implica-
tions are not clear”, but concludes that consumers should generally be worse off as they face less
variety and most likely higher prices after successful monopolization. Similarly, Peitz (2006)
also finds that bundling can blockade entry and thereby reduce overall welfare. Likewise other
means of market leverage are also found to decrease overall welfare (cf. e.g. Choi 2004; Mar-
tin 1999). Yet, Brennan (2005), while analyzing the welfare implications of Nalebuff (2004)’s
model, which highlights bundling as an entry deterrent, finds that not only producers’, but also
consumers’ surplus (and thus total welfare) are increased in this framework.
To conclude, the effects of (market leverage through) bundling on welfare are highly am-
biguous. Nevertheless, the majority of the models support a tendency towards negative influ-
ences on consumers’ and total welfare. In this context, the results of my model are very inter-
esting as they provide a wide range of settings in which bundling will unambiguously enhance
both consumers’ and producers’ surplus. In particular, if firms are symmetric, or consumers’
preferences are uncorrelated, bundling is confirmed to have positive welfare effects. Only if the
entrant has a cost disadvantage and consumers’ preferences are perfectly positively correlated,
bundling is found to be welfare decreasing on the consumers’ and producers’ side.
5.2 Uncorrelated Preferences
At first, I will investigate the welfare effects of bundling when consumers’ preferences for
quality are uncorrelated across service types. As usual, welfare (W ) is given by the sum of
consumers’ (CS) and producers’ surplus (PS). In the previous chapters I have shown that the
HL scenario emerges as the (unique) equilibrium under the bundle pricing regime for almost
all parameter settings. Thus, in following, I will focus on the welfare comparison between the
separate pricing regime and scenario HL.
5.2.1 Pure Bundling
In this subsection I compare the separate pricing regime with the HLbb scenario.
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Consider producers’ welfare first and recall that by Proposition 3.1 firms earn equal profits
under the separate pricing regime, because both provide a high- and a low-quality service in
each market. Under bundle pricing, however, firms specialize on serving either the low- or
high-quality end of the market (scenario HLbb), leading to an increase of firm 1’s profit at the
expense of firm 2’s, compared to the profits under separate pricing. Thus, ex-ante it is not clear
whether producers’ surplus is raised or lowered in the transition. Obviously, since the same
service qualities are offered in the economy in both scenarios, just by different providers, cost
differences cannot account for a prospective change in producers’ surplus. Therefore, the results
obtained here are not peculiar to the specifics of the cost function.
Lemma 5.1 (Producers’ Surplus under Pure Bundling). Producers’ surplus is higher under the
bundle pricing regime (HLbb scenario) than under the separate pricing regime.
Proof. Since overall costs are identical under HLbb and the separate pricing regime, I must
merely show that
∆PSssbb (HL) ≡ Rbb1 (HL) +Rbb2 (HL)− 2(Rssh +Rssl ) > 0
In particular, by Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3.4, I can directly conclude that ∆PSssbb (HL) ≈
qH(4.41− 1.77µ) > 0 for µ ∈ (0, 14 ].
Consequently, although firm 2 is worse off underHLbb, the quality sorting effect of bundling
mitigates competition such that overall producers’ surplus is increased. However, when taking
a course of action, regulators are usually more concerned with consumers’ surplus or at least
total welfare. More precisely, whether consumers’ surplus is increased or decreased hinges
upon the direction and size of the price and the bundling effect. In the present setting, the
price effect is positive, because the prices for the low- and high-quality bundle are smaller
under HLbb than their corresponding counterparts under individual pricing (Figure 5.1). Thus,
at least the customers buying these service packages under both regimes are better off under
bundling. Although this finding reflects the intuitive notion of a bundle discount, the economic
interpretation must moreover explain why firms’ profits can rise (Lemma 5.1) while prices drop.
Both can be attributed to the bundling effect.
On the one hand, selling bundles leaves consumers with less options: Under separate pricing
each consumer can compile his optimal service package, possibly consisting of low- and high-
quality services from different firms. In total, consumers can choose between nine different
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%
Figure 5.1: Positive Price Effect: Prices of the low- (solid line) and high-quality bundle (dashed line) in
per cent of the price for the corresponding service package under separate pricing.
service combinations, including the no-buy option. Under the bundle pricing regime, however,
consumers have only three options left – to buy the service package of either firm, or not to
buy anything at all. As a consequence, many consumers are forced into buying a high-quality
service bundle they would not have purchased before. In this way, the bundling effect negatively
influences consumers’ welfare, but increases producers’ surplus.
On the other hand, the consumers’ lack of choice is also a lack of differentiation on the
providers’ side. Whereas under the separate pricing regime a small change in price would have
induced consumers to switch their provider for only one service type, a similar price change
might provoke consumers to switch their provider altogether under the bundle pricing regime.
Hence, bundling evokes an all-or-nothing effect which leads to increased price competition and
thereby lower prices.2
Lemma 5.1 has confirmed that the bundling effect outweighs the price effect for the
providers. Conversely, Lemma 5.2 reveals that the same price effect offsets the welfare losses
incurred by the bundling effect on the consumers’ side.
Lemma 5.2 (Consumers’ Surplus under Pure Bundling). Consumers’ surplus is higher under
the bundle pricing regime (HLbb scenario) than under the separate pricing regime.
2That is, prices are lower than for the corresponding service package under separate pricing. Recall that among
the scenarios of the bundle pricing regimes, prices are among the highest in the HLbb scenario.
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Proof. I must show that
∆CSssbb (HL) ≡ CSbb(HL)− CSss > 0,
where CSssbb (HL) and CS
ss is the consumers’ surplus under HLbb and separate pricing, respec-
tively.
First, recall the demand pattern under separate pricing from Figure 3.1. Knowing that both
markets are completely symmetric, consumers’ welfare can be computed as
CSss = CSss∅,1L + CS
ss
∅2H + CS
ss
2L∅ + CS
ss
1H∅+
CSss2L1L + CS
ss
2L2H
+ CSss1H1L + CS
ss
1H2H
,
with
CSss∅1L = CS
ss
2L∅ = 100
θ˜ss∫̂
θss
θ̂ss∫
0
(θssA qL − pssl ) dθssB dθssA
CSss1H∅ = CS
ss
∅2H = 100
1∫˜
θss
θ̂ss∫
0
(θA qH − pssh ) dθB dθA
CSss1H1L = CS
ss
2L2H
= 100
1∫˜
θss
θ˜ss∫̂
θss
(θA qH − pssh + θB qL − pssl ) dθB dθA
CSss2L1L = 100
θ˜ss∫̂
θss
θ˜ss∫̂
θss
(θA qL − pssl + θB qL − pssl ) dθB dθA
CSss1H2H = 100
1∫˜
θss
1∫˜
θss
(θA qH − pssh + θB qH − pssh ) dθB dθA
such that
CSss = qH
100(16 + 16µ− 5µ2)
(4− µ)3 .
Furthermore, consumers’ surplus in the HLbb scenario is given by (cf. Figure 3.4):
CSbb(HL) = CSbb(1H1H)(HL) + CS
bb
(2L2L)
(HL)
CSbb(1H1H)(HL) = 100 [
pbb1 −pbb2
qH−qL∫
0
1∫˜
θbbB
(
θA qH + θB qH − pbb1
)
dθB dθA +
1∫
pbb1 −pbb2
qH−qL
1∫
0
(
θA qH + θB qH − pbb1
)
dθB dθA]
CSbb(2L2L)(HL) = 100 [
pbb2
qL∫
0
θ˜bbB∫̂
θbbB2
(
θA qL + θB qL − pbb2
)
dθB dθA +
pbb1 −pbb2
qH−qL∫
pbb2
qL
θ˜bbB∫
0
(
θA qL + θB qL − pbb2
)
dθB dθA]
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It turns out that ∆CSssbb (HL) = qH ω
bb(µ), where ∂ω
bb
∂µ
< 0 and ωbb(0) = 2.4552 and
ωbb(1
4
) = 1.2431, which proves the lemma. Figure 5.2 visualizes numerically exact solutions
of ∆CSssbb (HL) (dashed line), ∆PS
ss
bb (HL) (dotted line) and ∆W
ss
bb (HL) = ∆PS
ss
bb (HL) +
∆CSssbb (HL) (solid line) in units of qH for different values of µ.
Figure 5.2: Absolute Difference of Consumers’ (dashed line), Producers’ (dotted line) and Total Welfare
(solid line) Between the Bundle and the Separate Pricing Regime in Units of qH .
The next proposition then follows trivially.
Proposition 5.3 (Total Welfare under Pure Bundling). Total welfare is higher under the bundle
pricing regime (HLbb scenario) than under the separate pricing regime.
5.2.2 Unilateral Mixed Bundling
For completeness, I pursue the same welfare analysis for the unilateral mixed bundle pricing
regime (scenario HLuu) instead of HLbb. In general, one can say that there is only little differ-
ence to the previous results.
Lemma 5.4 (Producers’ Surplus under Unilateral Mixed Bundling). Producers’ surplus is
higher under the unilateral mixed bundle pricing regime (HLuu scenario) than under the sepa-
rate pricing regime.
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Proof. Again, since overall costs are identical under HLuu and the separate pricing regime, I
must only show that
∆PSssuu(HL) ≡ Ruu1 (HL) +Ruu2 (HL)− 2(Rssh +Rssl ) > 0
In particular, by Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 4.3, I can directly conclude that ∆PSssuu(HL) ≈
qH(4.62− 2.20µ) > 0 for µ ∈ (0, 14 ].
Overall one can observe that ∆PSssuu(HL) > ∆PS
ss
bb (HL). This is because the price effect
is weaker (i.e. prices are higher) for the high-quality bundle. On the contrary, since firm 2 faces
more competition, the price effect for the low-quality bundle is stronger, but cannot off-set the
increase in surplus of firm 1. Hence, unilateral mixed bundling allows producers to extract some
additional rent over pure bundling.
Lemma 5.5 (Consumers’ Surplus under Unilateral Mixed Bundling). Consumers’ surplus is
higher under the unilateral mixed bundle pricing regime (HLuu scenario) than under the sepa-
rate pricing regime.
Proof. I must show that
∆CSssuu(HL) ≡ CSuu(HL)− CSss > 0,
where CSssuu(HL) and CS
ss is the consumers’ surplus under HLuu and separate pricing, re-
spectively.
Consumers’ surplus in the HLuu scenario is given by (cf. Figure 4.2(b)):
CSuu(HL) = CSuu1H∅(HL) + CS
uu
(1H1H)
(HL) + CSuu(2L2L)(HL)
CSuu1H∅(HL) = 100 [
PuuA∫
puu
A1
−puu2
qH−qL
θ˜uu
++
B∫
0
(θA qH − puuA1) dθB dθA +
1∫
PuuA
puu1 −puuA1
qH∫
0
(θA qH − puuA1) dθB dθA]
CSuu(1H1H)(HL) = 100 [
PuuA∫
0
1∫
θ˜uu
+++
B
(θA qH + θB qH − puu1 ) dθB dθA +
1∫
PuuA
1∫
puu1 −puuA1
qH
(θA qH + θB qH − puu1 ) dθB dθA]
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CSuu(2L2L)(HL) = 100 [
puu2
qL∫
0
θ˜uu
+++
B∫̂
θuuB2
(θA qL + θB qL − puu2 ) dθB dθA +
puuA1−p
uu
2
qH−qL∫
puu2
qL
θ˜uu
+++
B∫
0
(θA qL + θB qL − puu2 ) dθB dθA+
PuuA∫
puu
A1
−puu2
qH−qL
θ˜uu
+++
B∫
θ˜uu
++
B
(θA qL + θB qL − puu2 ) dθB dθA]
Here ∆CSssuu(HL) = qH ω
uu(µ), where ∂ω
uu
∂µ
< 0 and ωuu(0) = 1.6970 and ωuu(1
4
) = 1.2132,
which proves the lemma.
Conversely, due to the decrease in the high-quality price effect, consumers are now worse
off under HLuu compared to HLbb. Obviously, the prices for the high-quality services gener-
ally have a greater impact on welfare and therefore overall consumers’ surplus falls, although
the low-quality service bundle is cheaper than under pure bundling. In sum, the total welfare
improvement of unilateral mixed bundling over separate selling is a little less pronounced than
under pure bundling as some welfare gain is shifted from consumers to producers.
Proposition 5.6 (Total Welfare under Unilateral Mixed Bundling). Total welfare is higher under
the unilateral mixed bundle pricing regime (HLuu scenario) than under the separate pricing
regime.
5.3 Perfectly Positively Correlated Preferences
Next, consider the case where consumers’ preferences for quality are perfectly positively cor-
related. Furthermore, as a starting point, assume σ = 1, i.e. neither firm has a cost advantage in
the provision of any service type. In this perfectly symmetric setting, we know from Lemma 4.9
and Corollary 4.10 that bundling has no effect on equilibrium qualities. Moreover, consumers
have to pay exactly the same for the bundle than for the sum of individual services under sepa-
rate pricing, such that the same consumers will buy the same services at the same quality, and
consequently, bundling will have no effect on welfare.
Proposition 5.7 (Welfare Neutrality of Bundling Under Symmetric Costs). In the absence of
cost advantages (σ = 1), bundle pricing has no effect on either consumers’ or producers’
welfare, when consumers’ preferences are perfectly positively correlated.
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For σ 6= 1, however, the effect on welfare is not as obvious. First, recall from Lemma
4.9 that under the bundle pricing regime the incumbents will not alter their equilibrium quality
as a response to a change in σ, while under separate pricing, both firms adjust their qualities
downwards (upwards) if σ increases (decreases). Knowing that quality levels coincide at σ = 1,
I can directly conclude from the proofs of Lemma 4.7 and 4.9 that the following inequalities
hold for σ > 1:3
qb
∗
A1 > q
s∗
A1 and q
b∗
B1  qs∗B2 (high-quality levels)
qb
∗
A2 < q
s∗
A2 and q
b∗
B2  qs∗B1 (low-quality levels)
(5.1)
The intuition behind inequalities (5.1) is as follows: Under separate pricing an increase in σ
will cause the entrant to lower the quality of its service type, such that marginal revenue equals
marginal cost again. As a consequence, the incumbent’s marginal revenue rises (Ronnen 1991)
and due to the convexity of the cost function the incumbent will lower the quality of his service
as well. Under bundle pricing, however, Lemma 4.9 revealed that the incumbents will not adjust
their quality levels as a response to an increase in σ. Moreover, as firm 1 offers the high-quality
service in market B now, despite having a cost disadvantage, the equilibrium quality qb∗B1 is
considerably smaller than qs∗B2. In fact, recall from (4.5) that q
b∗
B1 =
1
σ
25.33. Similarly, because
qb
∗
B2 is fixed at the level that would have prevailed for σ = 1 under separate pricing, it is much
larger than qs∗B1 which is directly affected by σ. Hence, under bundle pricing we can expect a
sharp decline in quality of the high-quality service in market B as σ increases. Conversely, the
low-quality service in market B will stay at a relatively high quality-level compared to separate
pricing. On the contrary, in market A the relative quality differences are less pronounced,
due to firm 1’s incumbency. In summary, one can conclude that under bundle pricing aggregate
qualities decline in the high-quality segment (qbA1+q
b
B1 < q
s
A1+q
s
B2) for σ > 1, while aggregate
qualities in the low quality segment rise (qbA2 + q
b
B2 > q
s
A2 + q
s
B1). Call this the quality effect.
Furthermore, under separate pricing the overall disparity between equilibrium qualities in-
creases (i.e. ∂µ
∂σ
< 0), as the entrant is much more sensitive to changes in σ and therefore adjusts
its quality level relatively more than the incumbent. This leads to higher quality deflated prices
and, eventually, to an upwards shift of marginal consumers in each market. Under the bundle
pricing regime, on the contrary, only the entrants adjust their qualities downwards. Therefore,
competition softens on market A, but intensifies on market B. However, by Lemma 4.9 I could
show that the overall level of competition remains constant as σ changes. Consequently, the
3All inequalities are reversed for σ < 1.
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same consumers buy at the same quality deflated prices under bundling, whereas consumers
under separate pricing have to pay a relatively higher price. Denote this as the price effect.
As will soon be seen, the quality effect and the price effect generally point in opposite
directions. First, I show that the direction of the price effect is decisive for the assessment of
producers’ surplus.
Lemma 5.8 (Producers’ Surplus Under Correlated Preferences). Compared to separate pricing,
producers’ surplus is lower (higher) under bundling if σ > 1 (σ < 1).
Proof. From Lemma 4.9 we know that the level of competition and the quality deflated prices
remain constant under bundling and thus neither firm profits from an increase in σ. However,
both firms suffer a loss because they have to bear increased marginal costs in their secondary
market, such that overall producers’ surplus is decreased under bundling. At the same time,
under separate pricing an increase in σ reduces the profit of the low quality firm, but increases
revenue of the high quality firm, because price competition is lessened. One can easily verify
that the high quality firm’s gain overcompensates the low-quality firm’s loss, such that overall
producers’ surplus is increased. The lemma obtains since producers’ surplus is identical under
both pricing regimes when σ = 1.
In the light of the two opposing effects, consumers’ surplus could potentially go either way.
On the one hand, the quality effect leaves consumers worse off under bundling, as firm 1’s
efficiency deficit in market B drives quality down in the important high-quality segment. On
the other hand, by the price effect consumers enjoy relatively lower prices than under separate
pricing when σ > 1.
Lemma 5.9 (Consumers’ Surplus Under Correlated Preferences). Compared to separate pric-
ing, consumers’ surplus is lower (higher) under bundling if σ > 1 (σ < 1).
Proof. Under separate pricing, consumers’ surplus of the high (CS
s
) and low quality buyers
(CSs) are given by
CS
s
= 100
1∫
θ˜s
[θ (qsA1 + q
s
B2)− (psA1 + psB2)] dθ
CSs = 100
θ˜s∫
θ̂s
[θ (qsA2 + q
s
B1)− (psA2 + psB1)] dθ
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Similarly, under bundle pricing, consumers’ surplus of the high (CS
b
) and low quality buyers
(CSb) are
CS
b
= 100
1∫
θ˜b
[
θ (qbA1 + q
b
B1)− (pb1)
]
dθ
CSb = 100
θ˜b∫
θ̂b
[
θ (qbA2 + q
b
B2)− (pb2)
]
dθ
First notice that for σ > 1, consumers with low θ are better off under bundle pricing as both the
CS s
b
Figure 5.3: Perfectly Positively Correlated Preferences: Comparison of Consumers’ Surplus under Sep-
arate and Bundle Pricing for σ > 1
quality and the price effect are positive for them. More formally, from equations (4.1),(4.2) and
(4.3), as well as (4.4),(4.5), (4.6), (4.7) and inequalities (5.1), we know that qbA2+q
b
B2 > q
s
A2+q
s
B1
and pb2 > p
s
A2 + p
s
B1 for σ > 1.
4 That is, in this parameter range of σ, aggregate qualities
and prices are generally higher in the low-quality segment under bundle pricing. Moreover,
we know that the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing or not is shifted
upwards under separate pricing. Taken together, I can immediately conclude that consumers’
surplus must be higher under bundle pricing for σ > 1 (cf. Figure 5.3). Conversely, in the high-
quality segment, it holds that qbA1 + q
b
B1 < q
s
A1 + q
s
B2 and p
b
1 < p
s
A1 + p
s
B2 for σ > 1. Thus, due
to the higher aggregate service quality available under separate pricing, consumers can derive
higher surplus here compared to the bundle pricing regime. In particular, Figure 5.3 exemplifies
that consumers whose willingness-to-pay for quality is above θ = p
s
A1+p
s
B2−pb1
qsA1+q
s
B2−(qbA1+qbB1)
are better
4Of course, all inequalities are exactly opposite for σ < 1.
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Figure 5.4: Consumers’ Surplus Under Bundle Pricing in Per Cent of Consumers’ Surplus Under Sep-
arate Pricing When Consumers’ Preferences are Perfectly Positively Correlated
off under separate pricing, while the consumers below θ are better off under the bundle pricing
regime when σ > 1. Consequently, for consumers with high θ the negative quality effect offsets
the positive price effect. To prove the lemma, it must be clarified whether the positive effect of
bundling on low θ consumers is larger or smaller than the negative effect exerted upon the high θ
consumers. To this extend, consumers’ surplus under bundle pricing is expressed in per cent of
consumers’ surplus under the separate pricing regime in Figure 5.4. The figure reveals that the
effect of bundling on the high quality segment outweighs the effect on the low quality segment
and is therefore decisive for the overall net effect on consumers’ welfare. Thus, consumers’
surplus is lower (higher) under bundle pricing compared to separate pricing iff σ > 1.
Finally, since the net effect of bundle pricing on both consumers’ and producers’ surplus
points into the same direction, the following proposition follows trivially.
Proposition 5.10 (Welfare Under Correlated Preferences). When preferences are perfectly pos-
itively correlated, total welfare is lower under bundle pricing compared to separate pricing if
entrants have a cost disadvantage (σ > 1). Conversely, for σ < 1 total welfare is increased
through bundle pricing.
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Chapter 6
Regulatory Implications, Empirical
Evidence and Economic Prospects
In this chapter I will enrich the results of my analytical analysis with a brief reference to price
regulation and empirical findings in the communications industry. Finally, I will comment on
possible future scenarios in the light of the mutual forbearance theory.
6.1 Policy Implications for Price Regulation
One must be very cautious when deducing policy implications from the abstract mindset un-
derlying game-theoretic models. However, the main insights of the present model are believed
to be fairly robust and especially noteworthy in the context of price regulation. The German
Telecommunications Law (TKG),1 for example, defines the regulatory motives for price regu-
lation in §27(1):
“The aim of price regulation is to prevent abusive exploitation, impediment, or dis-
crimination of end users or competitors through pricing measures of undertakings
with substantial market power.”
Thereby, contrary to general competition law (Article 82 EC Treaty), price regulation ex-
plicitly seeks to protect not only the consumers, but also the competitors of firms with market
1I refer to the TKG from June 22, 2004, last amended on February 18, 2007, which implements the latest EU
Directives, including 2002/21 (cf. Section 1.2.3). The following translations of the TKG are my own and therefore
not legally binding.
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power.2 With respect to consumers’ welfare, Chapter 5 has revealed that bundle pricing is gen-
erally not harmful. However, the leverage results obtained in Chapters 3 and 4 strongly confirm
that bundle pricing can be employed to diminish rivals’ profits and are therefore highly relevant
to price regulation, as pointed out by §28(1) TKG:
“[...] An abusive conduct exists, if the [dominant] undertaking demands prices
which [...] impair the competitive prospects of other undertakings on the commu-
nications market considerably, [...] unless factual justification for this conduct can
be established.”
Moreover, §28(2) TKG explicitly recognizes bundling as a means of abusive conduct:
“An abuse according to para. 1 is presumed, if [...] an undertaking employs fac-
tually unjustified bundling of its products. To clarify whether this is the case,
the Federal Network Agency has to check whether efficient competitors of the un-
dertaking with significant market power are able to offer a comparable bundle at a
similar price.”
Unfortunately, the rules prescribed by §28 TKG are vague at best. For the law to be ap-
plicable, one must agree on a common understanding of the notion of the terms “factually
unjustified” and “efficient competitor”. Until today there exists no relevant previous rulings on
the basis of §28, from which one could draw conclusions concerning the applicability of this
legal norm (Monopolkommission 2005).
Holznagel, Hombergs, and Rosengarten (2004) comment on the criterion “factual unjusti-
fied” that it is notoriously imprecise, but can generally be approved if bundling is only possible
because of a dominant market position. Mayen (2005) notes that one should consider previous
jurisdiction in anti-trust cases. Furthermore, he argues that the allegation of an abusive conduct
can only be maintained if bundling is shown to be “competitively relevant”. According to a rul-
ing of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), this is only the case if the bundle contains
goods whose nature does not require to sell them together or whose joint sale is not custom-
ary within the industry.3 Both cases do not hold in the present context: First, facilities-based
2More specifically, for the course of the TKG the approach to market definition is laid down in §10 TKG in
combination with the framework directive Article 15(3) EC Treaty. Furthermore, “market power” is defined in §11
TKG.
3BGH, March 30, 2004. KZR 1/03.
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communications firms certainly have neither a technical nor a factual justification for tying the
provision of their secondary service to the purchase of their home service. DT, for example,
could well offer an IPTV service without simultaneously demanding a voice telephony sub-
scription. Likewise, cable companies would be able to offer Internet access or voice telephony
without requiring a basic TV subscription.4 Second, from an economic perspective Triple Play
is customary within the communications industry. Both firms currently offer such bundles, and
also the current analytical framework confirms that bundle pricing is in fact an equilibrium
strategy for both firms.
However, despite bundling does not appear to be “competitively relevant” in this context, it
has been shown that considerable market leverage can nevertheless be achieved. Therefore, the
implications of the present model advise the regulator not to allow bundle pricing per se just
because it is seen as a customary practice.
In an effort to clarify the notion of “efficient competitors” in the communications indus-
try, the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) itself has published its policy view on the matter
(Bundesnetzagentur 2005). Therein, BNetzA denotes that its main task is the establishment of
a regulatory framework which ensures (i) that efficient competitors must be provided access to
all parts (here: services) comprising the bundle and (ii) that access is provided at prices which
allow the provision of a competitive rival bundle. Furthermore, BNetzA points out that access
to all essential parts of the bundle must not be warranted for any competitor, but merely for
efficient ones. Of course, this immediately raises the question how the agency is to determine
efficiency (Mo¨schel and Haug 2003). To this extend, BNetzA announces that it will not judge
the efficiency of specific undertakings, but rather evaluate the efficiency of business models at an
abstract level. Thereby the term ’business model’ is employed in reference to either (integrated)
network operators, service operators or resellers (cf. Section 1.1.5). The agency further regards
the current set of business models in the market as given, and thus declines to mandate firms
to pursue a different business model in order to ensure the emulation of the dominant bundle.
Rather, BNetzA argues that §28(2) TKG requires that efficient competitors are – in principle –
able to offer a competitive bundle without having to bear inadequate additional economic risks.
With respect to the context of this paper, it is doubtful whether the view of BNetzA is
able to achieve the regulatory aims of price regulation; even if the efficiency of firms and their
business models could be reliably assessed: Within the present analytical framework both firms
4Some cable companies in the US, like Comcast, do not tie their broadband offers to their TV subscription, for
instance.
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are perfectly symmetric - in terms of their business model as well as with regard to efficiency.
Furthermore, both firms are (in principle) able to offer the same bundles at identical prices, and,
finally, both firms possess market power in their respective home markets. Consequently, from
the agency’s viewpoint, no regulatory intervention is necessary (nor legally allowed) because
there exists an efficient competitor (here firm 2) which is able to emulate the bundle of the firm
with substantial market power (here firm 1). In addition, firm 2 has substantial market power
itself (albeit in a different market).
However, although ex ante each firm has equal economic prospects, the present game-
theoretic reasoning has shown that bundling may nevertheless lead to considerable asymmetry
in payoff and is therefore of relevance to price regulation. More precisely, bundling acts as
a quality leverage device, which enables one firm to provide the more profitable high-quality
services in both markets, whereas the competitor is left with providing a low-quality, i.e. less
profitable, service quality in both markets. The impact of this quality leverage effect on firms’
payoffs has been shown to be substantial. The example of Section 3.3.5 e.g. has revealed that
one firm was able to more than double its profits under bundle pricing compared to separate pric-
ing. At the same time, the profits of the competitor diminished to about three per cent of what it
earned under separate pricing regime. It is important to recognize that firms’ ex post asymmetry
is not a result of differences in efficiency. Here service differentiation is rather a mutually best
response (i.e. a Nash equilibrium) in the light of fierce price competition. Therefore, the quality
leverage effect can be considered long-lasting from an economic perspective. Hence, BNetzA
is advised to carefully reconsider its criteria concerning “efficient competitors” and “factually
unjustified bundling” in general, and rather adopt an effects-based approach by judging on a
case-by-case basis. Even more so, since the agency has already recognized that the threat of
competition impediment is especially high in the communications industry (Bundesnetzagentur
2005, p.19).
In conclusion, the present model provides ample evidence that the currently highly debated
more economic approach to jurisdiction should not only be applied to general competition law
(Articles 81ff EC Treaty), but also to the sector-specific regulatory frameworks. With respect
to the TKG, for example, the present economic analysis has revealed that the law’s implicit
and old-fashioned presumption of intra-modal competition,5 which rests on the assumption that
5Recall that “intra-modal competition” refers to the competition between firms employing the same network
technology (e.g. cable or DSL), whereas “inter-modal competition” describes the competition between firms em-
ploying different broadband delivery technologies (e.g. cable and DSL)
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exactly one firm holds a dominant position in the relevant market, may not be contemporary
anymore in the age of digital convergence. Indeed, the present paper points out that the rules of
the game may be quite different under inter-modal competition where two firms hold some sig-
nificant market power in different segments of the converged market. Although neither firm can
be regarded to have an ex ante advantage in the joint market, competition can promote asym-
metries in payoff and thereby hinder the economic prospects of one of the firms significantly.
This situation is currently not properly accounted for in the law.
6.2 Empirical Evidence and Market Maturity
In strong support of the results of the present model, Maldoom et al. (2005, p.48) write:
”The European broadband consumer market has been characterised by two major
trends: price reductions and increased differentiation in product offerings. Both are
consistent with the maturing of broadband into a mass-market product.[...] Compe-
tition between DSL and cable operators for subscribers appears to be an important
driver of price decreases and product differentiation.”
I argue that the same holds true for the Triple Play market in general, given market maturity.
More specifically, the analytical results of the present model suggest, that product differentia-
tion is a result of fierce price competition, which in turn stems from a lack of differentiation
as firms switch from the separate pricing to the bundle pricing regime. Consequently, in an
immature industry, where reciprocal entry has just taken place, each firm will provide a high-
quality service in its home market, but only a low-quality service in its secondary market. As
the market matures, firms begin to offer service bundles, possibly also to shield themselves
from single service competitors. Moreover, in the short run, firms will not adjust their quality
levels, resulting in scenario LH which is characterized by fierce price competition. In a mature
industry, on the other side, firms realize that declining profits can only be countervailed through
increased service differentiation. Quite possibly, at an interim state, both firms will fight for the
quality leadership (scenario HH), yielding even lower profits. But eventually – and this is the
hypothesis of the present paper – scenario HL will prevail, where firms coordinate on being
either the low- or the high-quality provider for the entire Triple Play market.
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Unfortunately, rigorous econometric analyses of this hypothesis are not available. In partic-
ular, previous related studies of the price developments in the communications market usually
neglect changes in the rapidly changing quality of the services. An notable exception is Karamti
(2007), who successfully employs the hedonic method to explain firms’ pricing behavior in the
French mobile telephony market between 1996 and 2002. The hedonic method is an empirical
means of determining a price function which incorporates the (quality) characteristics of the
goods sold in differentiated product markets. It was developed by Waugh (1928) and Court
(1939) and later refined by Griliches (1961). The hedonic method is particularly promising in
the context of the present paper, because it is able to derive the quality deflated price of the
services and thus directly measures the level of price competition (cf. Section 4.3). In this
vein, later scholars, beginning with Rosen (1974), related the observed hedonic prices with the
equilibrium predictions of formal game theoretic models. More specifically, following Pakes
(2003), these models - as well as mine - rely on three primitives:
• Utility functions, which are directly defined on the characteristics of the product (here
quality) and not on the product per se. Different consumers are assumed to have different
preferences for each characteristic and aggregate demand will depend on the distribution
of these preferences.
• Firms’ cost functions, which typically include characteristics of the good, as well as the
scale of production and ’efficiency’ as its arguments.
• An equilibrium assumption (here: Bertrand competition), which determines prices given
demand and costs.
Here firms’ bundles have two characteristics, constituted by the quality of either service. Let qi
be the vector of the relevant characteristics of bundle i, and pi its price. Furthermore, consumers
have heterogeneous preferences for each of the characteristics. Thus, let Θ denote the vector
characterizing the distribution of preferences for each service type. Under a pure bundling
regime, the demand for product i is then given by (cf. Section 3.3)
Di(·) = Di(qi, pi; q−i, p−i; Θ),
where subscript −i denotes the competitors’ variables. Since firms’ marginal costs of quality
are zero, prices depend only on the demand elasticity, i.e.
pi =
Di(·)
|∂Di(·)/∂p| .
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The hedonic function, finally, is the expectation of price, conditional on the product character-
stic, qi:
h(qi) ≡ E[pi|qi] = E
(
Di(·)
|∂Di(·)/∂p|
∣∣∣∣ qi)
A thorough econometric analysis of mature and immature Triple Play markets employing
the hedonic method eludes the scope of this paper and should be carried out elsewhere. More-
over, collection of quality related data is a tedious and non-trivial task, since service providers
are usually very reluctant to making quality related data available. To provide at least some
empirical evidence, I have collected some publicly observable data of the German Triple Play
market from August 2006 until September 2007. Unequivocally, during this time period the
German Triple Play market was in its infancy (cf. Section 1.3). Deutsche Telekom AG (DT),
the German PSTN incumbent and former monopolist, started to offer a Triple Play package
in October 2006. In the beginning, DT tied the Triple Play bundle to a subscription of its
new VDSL access.6 DT’s package “Complete Basic” initially included 55 free TV channels, a
voice telephony flatrate and unlimited Internet access with up to 25 Mbps bandwidth, selling
at 80.84e per month. Prior to DT, also several cable operators had Triple Play packages at
offer already. The biggest incumbent in the German CATV market, Kabel Deutschland Group
(KDG)7, sold its “Professional” bundle comprising over 50 free digital TV channels, a voice
telephony flatrate and unlimited 6 Mbps Internet access at 66.80e. Figure 6.1 shows the devel-
opment of the bundle prices of DT and KDG over the last year. Inevitably, monthly prices have
fallen during that period. In particular, in May 2007 DT renamed its “Complete Basic” pack-
age to “Entertain Comfort VDSL” and simultaneously lowered the price by 16% to currently
69.95e in response to very reluctant Triple Play uptake. Likewise, KDG renamed its “Profes-
sional” bundle to “Deluxe” while downsizing price, but has also previously steadily reduced the
effective monthly price for its Triple Play bundle by offering free initial months. The Deluxe
package currently sells at 56.80e, i.e. almost 18% cheaper than the original “Professional”
package. Although this price decline in itsself is notable, it does not report the full extend of
the price competition. During the same time, firms have also constantly increased the quality
characteristics of their services. DT, for example, added more than 15 channels to its TV ser-
6DT’s reasons should be obvious in the context of this paper. However, at the time, DT argued that the high
access speeds of VDSL were necessary to provide a video and TV service (Heise 2006). Surprisingly, today a
comparable Triple Play offer is available over a ADSL2+ connection with 16 Mbps.
7Cf. Section 1.3 for an overview of the German CATV and PSTN market.
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Figure 6.1: Triple Play Price Trend in Germany from August 2006 - September 2007: Comparison of
absolute monthly prices† for selected Triple Play bundles of network incumbents DT and KDG.
† Prices include all monthly fees based on a two year subscription, but exclude one-time payments for set-up and
hardware. Source: Firms’ website.
vice; KDG even about 50. Furthermore, KDG’s bundle now comes with a bandwidth of up to
25 Mbps, instead of the initial 6 Mbps. If one was to incorporate these quality changes to obtain
the quality-deflated price, e.g. through the hedonic method, the decline in bundle prices would
obviously be even more pronounced. In a naive approach, I have calculated the bandwidth-
deflated prices for the above bundles to exemplify this point (Figure 6.2). Thereby changes in
the remaining characteristics are neglected. Since the bandwidth guarantees for DT’s bundle
have not changed over time, here the bandwidth-deflated price still confirms a mere 16% price
drop. KDG’s bundle, however, went from a bandwidth-deflated price of 66.80e
6Mbps = 11.13e/Mbps
to 56.80e
25Mbps = 2.27e/Mbps, a decline of 490%. In the light of these figures, it is not surprising that
Forrester Research has prophesied that DT’s Triple Play offers are “financial suicide”, given the
enormous sunk costs (roughly 3 billion euros) associated with the necessary build of the infras-
tructure (Handelsblatt 2006). Likewise, cable companies are suffering from the financial burden
of their HFC network upgrade, bestowing KDG a net loss of 26.8 million euros in the year 2006
(Heise 2007). However, with respect to more advanced Triple Play markets, such as the French
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Figure 6.2: Bandwidth Deflated Triple Play Price Trend in Germany from August 2006 - September
2007
or Japanese markets, (quality-deflated) prices are still relatively high in Germany. In France, for
example, absolute prices have manifested at a level of 45e for some years now.8 Nevertheless,
also here quality has constantly increased during that time (Freyberg 2007, p.19ff): Today, mar-
ket leader Free’s Triple Play package includes not only an unlimited 28 Mbps Internet access,
but also over 200 TV channels and free voice telephony to all national and 70 international
destinations. Recently the quality improvements to this bundle have become less fundamental
though and Free’s possibilities to improve value-generating product characteristics seem almost
exhausted. Maybe these are the first signs that the quality-deflated price has reached a lower
bound.
The present model assumes a mature industry being characterized by (i) constant quality-
deflated prices (ii) and market satiation (i.e. fixed consumer mass). While the example of Free
provides evidence that prices already start to level out in some countries, several studies (e.g.
Booz Allen Hamilton 2007) suggest that the demand for Triple Play services is still growing.
Of course, this latter effect counteracts the negative impact of diminishing profit margins and
might fuel the battle for quality leadership (scenario LH or HH) for some time to come. In
8Based on a monthly bundle fee of 30e and a basic subscription fee of 15e.
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the end, it will be interesting to see if appropriate econometric studies can confirm the present
analytical prophecy (scenario HL).
6.3 Mutual Forbearance: The Prisoners’ Dilemma Revisited
My model considers a static framework where product differentiation is the firms’ only possi-
bility to relieve price competition. In a dynamic context, the IO literature proposes yet another
means out of this dilemma. More precisely, Edwards (1955) formulates a hypothesis of mutual
forbearance between multi-market firms; a form a tacit collusion which is thought to be facili-
tated through repeated interaction of the same firms in multiple product markets (multiple-point
competition; cf. Karnani and Wernerfelt 1985). Edwards notes:9
“A prospect of advantage from vigorous competition in one market may be weighed
against the danger of retaliatory forays by the competitor in other markets. Each
[...] competitor may adopt a live-and-let-live policy designed to stabilize the whole
structure of the competitive relationship. Each may informally recognize the other’s
primacy of interest in markets important to the other, in the expectation that its own
important interest will be similarly respected.”
Thereby Edwards explicitly addresses the notion of reciprocal home market entry. He pre-
sumes that firms will refrain from price wars, because each firm fears a retaliatory counter-attack
(cf. Watson 1982), should it act aggressively in the other’s market territory. While being con-
cerned with social interaction in general, also sociologist Simmel (1950, p.286ff) expressed a
similar view. He argued that those rivals meeting in multiple domains will gain by allowing the
other to be superordinate in some domains in exchange for similar treatment in other domains.
In this vein, in a dynamic framework firms could manage to maintain high prices in scenario
LH , while retaining quality leadership in their respective home market.
Porter (1980) offers two reasons of why the threat of a retaliatory attack might be extraordi-
narily credible under multiple-point competition. First, since the firms meet in multiple markets,
the competitor can simultaneously retaliate in all markets, allowing for considerably severer
punishments. Second, the competitor can choose to retaliate in those markets where its own po-
tential losses are relatively small, leaving the defecting firm much worse off. A third argument
9As quoted by Scherer (1980, p.340).
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in favor of the mutual forbearance hypothesis has been put forth by Boeker et al. (1997) and
Jayachandran, Gimeno, and Varadarajan (1999), who argue that the high interconnectedness of
the multi-market competitors will augment their knowledge about each other. The longer and
the more often the rival firms meet, the more they learn about each other’s past competitive
behavior and may thus anticipate future actions more accurately. Such knowledge of the other’s
’weak spots’ may then help to sustain a credible commitment to tacit collusion.
It is also in the context of these arguments, that Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985) have moti-
vated the mutual foothold equilibrium (cf. Section 2.2.1), a strategy which deliberately creates
multiple points of competition to facilitate collusion. In this way, multi-market contact creates
strategic exit barriers, because it leads firms to continue competing in those markets where they
might perform poorly (Baum and Korn 1999). This view provides further evidence that scenario
LH – where firms perform well in their home, but poorly in their secondary market – may well
be maintained outside a static framework.
Although the above arguments are compelling at first glance, for a long time the mutual
forbearance hypothesis has rested on weak formal grounds. Bernheim and Whinston (1990),
for example, point out that Porter’s argument contains a logical flaw: “Once a firm knows that
it will be punished in every market, if it decides to cheat, it will do so in every market.” Albeit
multiple-point competition raises the severeness of the punishment, it is likely to equally raise
the benefit of defection. In their seminal paper, Bernheim and Whinston consider an infinitely
repeated game with two firms. In each period firms may choose their prices cooperatively or
non-cooperatively, the latter being subsequently punished by infinite competitive pricing be-
havior of the other firm (trigger-strategy; cf. Friedman 1971). At first, Bernheim and Whinston
establish an irrelevance result, which states that multi-market contact does not aid in sustaining
collusive outcomes when identical firms with identical constant-return-to-scale technologies
meet in identical markets. However, the authors also prove that if any of these three conditions
is violated, in particular if firms’ technology exhibits scale economies, repeated multiple-point
competition pools the firms’ incentive constraints governing the implicit agreements between
them and thereby enables mutual forbearance. Furthermore, in a similar spirit Matsushima
(2001) shows that the mutual forbearance hypothesis is theoretically also sustainable if firms
can only imperfectly monitor their opponents.
In closing, there is ample formal analytical support that mutual forbearance is feasible in
the present context. In addition, some empirical studies provide further evidence that multi-
market contact facilitates tacit collusion in telecommunications (Parker and Ro¨ller 1997) and
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media (Waldfogel and Wulf 2005) markets. Finally, it should be annotated that the currently
fierce price competition in the Triple Play market does not yet contradict the possibility of mu-
tual forbearance. To the contrary, Gimeno and Woo (1996, p.326) argue from a more dynamic
perspective that the initial “development of multi-market contacts spark episodes of intense ri-
valry”. But as firms realize the implications of multi-market contact on competition, they are
guided towards more collusive equilibria. Thus, in the future a combination of mutual forbear-
ance and increased service differentiation seems to offer the facilities-based communications
firms a plausible way out of their current dilemma.
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During the last two decades, bundling has become a hot topic for Industrial Organization
economists, mainly as a result of legal actions against Microsoft (Crampes and Hollander 2007).
In this spirit, the literature has thus far focused on asymmetric settings where one firm holds
a monopoly for some type of service, while the competitors have only limited or no market
power. In this paper, I consider a symmetric reciprocal duopoly setting, where both firms have
some additional market power in their respective home market. This market structure has been
constituted in the communications industry as a direct consequence of the digital convergence
phenomenon, which led previously distinct integrated network operators to offer essentially
the same kinds of services. Today, voice telephony, Internet and TV services are all available
from either the telephone- or cable network incumbents, both of which frequently bundle these
services to one so-called Triple Play package.
Moreover, previous literature has typically considered communications services as a homo-
geneous good. To the contrary, I argue that these services differ in various quality measures,
such as bandwidth, content, or failure rates. For the firms, the provision of high-quality services
is more costly than the provision of low-quality services. Conversely, consumers have a greater
reservation price for higher service qualities. Therefore firms face a trade off between revenues
and cost when selecting the optimal service quality.
While carefully recognizing the technological, legal and economic framework, I have in-
vestigated whether bundle pricing is indeed a profitable pricing strategy in this industry, if it
can facilitate market power leverage and whether it emerges as an equilibrium strategy. To
this extend, a three-stage game was considered, in which firms decide whether to offer their
services in a bundle or separately in stage one, determine the quality of their services in stage
two, and compete in prices in stage three. I can show that bundle pricing serves as a powerful
leverage device. This is achieved through a vertical differentiation effect, which accrues as the
firms wish to shield themselves from increased price competition in the market for bundles.
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Absent bundling, each firm can exploit its limited market power and obtain quality leadership
(associated with higher profits) in its home market. Under bundle pricing, however, one firm
emerges as the high-quality, high-profit provider in all markets, whereas the competing firm
has to settle for low qualities and profits. This quality leverage effect is said to be ’powerful’
because it holds under some fairly general terms and for a number of worst-case assumptions.
First, recall that market power is rather limited in the present framework because neither firm
holds a monopoly position. Nevertheless, leverage is achieved under all feasible settings. Next,
I have restricted the analysis to those settings for which interior price equilibria exist for all four
possible scenarios of the bundle pricing regimes. Alternative settings tend to strengthen my
results. Furthermore, I have assumed consumers’ quality preferences to be uncorrelated across
service types. This has been shown to be least appreciated by the quality leverage effect because
demand is evenly spread out up to every corner of the market. Finally, the quality leverage ef-
fect is robust to variations in the cost structure, as long as the costs of quality improvement are
convex and fall on fixed costs mainly. It neither relies on service complementarity nor on any
other efficiency gains due to economies of scope or transaction costs. The effect even prevails
under a unilateral mixed bundling regime.
Furthermore, the welfare effects of bundle pricing have been studied under various settings.
Quite surprisingly, I found that both consumers’ and producers’ welfare generally rise, because
each group assesses the impact of the price effect and the bundling effect differently: On the one
hand, consumers enjoy lower average prices, while on the other hand, firms benefit from reduced
service variety. However, the quality leverage effect of bundling crucially affects the distribution
of firms’ profits and should therefore be considered in the context of price regulation.
Hence, the present model may serve as a fruitful basis for future work on entry deterrence; a
topic which has only been discussed briefly here. I have commented earlier that in my model -
unlike many others - bundling has the potential to deter entry without requiring any prior com-
mitment. Moreover, deterrence is achieved although consumers’ preferences are uncorrelated,
similar to Nalebuff (2004), and despite of the reciprocal duopoly structure in which each firm
has limited market power.
Furthermore, future work should extend the present static model to a dynamic framework,
allowing for a more direct assessment of entry deterrence as well as the mutual forbearance
hypothesis. At the same time it may also be necessary to allow for ex-ante asymmetries, since
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) have shown that the mutual forbearance is ’irrelevant’ when
firms and markets are symmetric. Also switching costs or network effects have the ability to
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turn small initial asymmetries into large advantages over time, and may thus facilitate entry
deterrence.
In conclusion, it is annotated that the current framework is believed to be applicable for
any digital goods industry characterized by high fixed costs and near zero marginal costs. The
software industry, for example, exhibits many of the same economic peculiarities discussed in
the light of the communications industry, such as high sunk costs, economies of scale and scope,
network effects and compatibility or switching costs.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.3
I consider each of the scenarios subsequently:
Scenario LHbb : Figure 3.3 shows firms’ demands in this scenario.10 In particular, firms’
revenue is given by
Rbb1 (LH) = 100
 1∫
LbbA
θ˜bbB dθA −
pbb1 (LH)
qH∫
LbbA
θ̂bbB1 dθA
 pbb1 (LH)
Rbb2 (LH) = 100
(
1−
LbbA∫
0
θ̂bbB2 dθA −
1∫
LbbA
θ˜bb dθA
)
pbb1 (LH),
Solving these equations for optimal prices and setting qL = µ qH , one finds the unique price
equilibrium to be:
pbb1 (LH) = p
bb
2 (LH) = qH
√
(2− µ) + 3µ3 − 1− µ
1− 3µ (A.1)
Notice that positive prices exist for all µ ∈ (0, 1). However, prices decrease when services
become less differentiated, such that for µ = 1, i.e. qH = qL, prices eventually drop to zero.
10Specifically, I assume p
bb
1 (LH)
qH
<
pbb2 (LH)
qL
, because under the alternative assumption there exists no interior
price equilibrium. Detailed proofs of this and following side notes are available from the author upon request.
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ScenarioHLbb: Here the demand pattern looks as in Figure 3.4.11 Firms’ revenues are now
Rbb1 (HL) = 100
1− p
bb
1 (HL)−pbb2 (HL)
qH−qL∫
0
θ˜bbB dθA
 pbb1 (HL)
Rbb2 (HL) = 100
 p
bb
1 (HL)−pbb2 (HL)
qH−qL∫
0
θ˜bbB dθA −
pbb2 (HL)
qL∫
0
θ̂bbB2 dθA
 pbb2 (HL) ,
and optimal prices are uniquely determined as:
pbb1 (HL) = qH
2−4u+2u2−α2u2−9α2+18α2u
8uα
pbb2 (HL) = qH α µ ,
(A.2)
where α(µ) =
√
6
√
(11u2−54u+27)(17u2−18u+9−8√4u4−6u3+3u2)
3(11u2−54u+27) and µ =
qL
qH
again.
See that pb1(HL) > p
b
2(HL). However, in order for p
b
2(HL) > 0 it must hold that α > 0,
which is fulfilled iff µ < 27−12
√
3
11
≈ 0.565035483.
Scenarios HHbb and LLbb: Say both firms choose qX ∈ {qH , qL} in market B, then their
revenue functions are (cf. Figure 3.5):12
Rbb1 (XX) = 100
1− LbbA −
pbb1 (XX)
qH∫
LbbA
θ̂bbB1 dθA
 pbb1 (XX)
Rbb2 (XX) = 100
(
LbbA −
LA∫
0
θ̂bbB2 dθA
)
pbb2 (XX),
where optimal prices are given by:
pbb1 (XX) = qH [
18β2Xµ−9β2Xµ2+β2X
2µ(4βX−5µ+3µ2+2)
−µX 14βXµ−12βXµ2−2βX−2+4µ−2µ22µ(4βX−5µ+3µ2+2) ]
pbb2 (XX) = qH βX ,
(A.3)
where
µX =
1 if qX = qHµ if qX = qL
11The Figure assumes p
bb
1 (HL)−pbb2 (HL)
∆q ≤ 1, which is the only setting for which an interior price equilibrium
exists.
12The Figure assumes again that p
bb
1 (XX)
qH
<
pbb2 (XX)
qL
, which is the only setting for which I obtain an interior
price equilibrium.
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and βX is the positive real root of (81µ3 − 162µ2 + 33µ)β4X + (16 + 4µ + 324µ2 −
216µ3)β3X+(108µ
3−228µ+56)β2X+(48µ3−208µ2+240µ−80)βX−20µ3+56µ2−52µ+16 =
0 if qX = qH or
(81µ3−162µ2+33µ)β4X+ (16+4µ+324µ2−216µ3)β3X− (108µ3−144µ4+88µ2+12µ)β2X+
(72µ2 − 24µ4 − 32µ− 16µ3)βX− 24µ5 + 68µ4 − 64µ3 + 20µ2 = 0 if qX = qL.
In the LLbb scenario I must assume that µ < 1
2−√3 ≈ 13.73205 in order for
pbb1
qH
<
pbb2
qL
to hold: A result, which I have forestalled in my assumptions. In the HHbb scenario this
equilibrium condition is less restricting and amounts to µ < 10
9
+ 17
9ξ
− ξ
9
≈ 1
2.30739
, where
ξ =
3
√
269 + 27
√
106.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.4
To make the analysis tractable, I approximate the revenue functions linearly. This is possible be-
cause generally all revenue functions have the form of Ri = qHgi(µ), where
∂gi(µ)
∂µ
is monotone
in µ. In the small range of µ ∈ (0, 1
4
] numerical comparisons show that these linear approxima-
tions are very close to the original functions (see e.g. Figure A.1 for such a comparison). More
specifically, I will use the approximation
gi(µ) ≈ gi(0)− 4
(
gi(0)− gi(1
4
)
)
µ,
where gi(0) = lim
µ→0
gi(µ).
Given this approximation scheme and the precise revenue functions as stated in the proof of
Lemma 3.3, I obtain the following values for the bb -subgame:
Rbb1 (HH) = qH (36.879− 4 (36.879− 29.879)µ) = qH (36.879− 28µ)
Rbb2 (HH) = qH (6.705− 4 (6.705− 6.320)µ) = qH (6.705− 1.54µ)
Rbb1 (HL) = qH (54.410− 4 (54.410− 47.145)µ) = qH (54.410− 29.06µ)
Rbb2 (HL) = qH (0− 4 (0− 2.155)µ) = qH 8.62 µ
Rbbi (LH) = qH (17.158− 4 (17.158− 16.199)µ) = qH (17.158− 3.836µ)
Rbb1 (LL) = qH (25− 4 (25− 24.624)µ) = qH (25− 1.504µ)
Rbb2 (LL) = qH (0− 4 (0− 3.634)µ) = qH 14.536 µ
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A.3 Amendment to Proof of Lemma 3.5
Figure A.1 shows the goodness of fit of the linear approximations for the feasibility function
f(µ) and the threshold functions rbbi by comparing them with the exact functions in the interval
µ ∈ (0, 1
4
].
m
Figure A.1: Comparison of Exact Functions (solid lines) and Linear Approximations (dashed lines)
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.9
I consider each of the scenarios subsequently again:
Scenario LHbs : Recall the demand pattern of Figure 3.6(a). Set qB1 = qL and qB2 = qH .
Demand is then given by:
Dbs(1H1L)(LH) = 100[
pbs1 −pbsA2−p
bs
B2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
(θ˜bs
+++
B − θ˜bs+B ) dθA+
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL∫
pbs1 −pbsA2−p
bs
B2
qH−qL
(1− θ˜bs+++B ) dθA +
1∫
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL
1 dθA]
Dbs∅2H (LH) = 100
pbsA2
qL∫
0
(1− pbsB2
qH
) dθA
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Dbs2L∅(LH) = 100[
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
pbsB2
qH
dθA +
pbs1 −pbsA2−p
bs
B2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
θ˜bs
+
B dθA]
Dbs2L2H (LH) = 100[
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
(1− pbsB2
qH
) dθA +
pbs1 −pbsA2−p
bs
B2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
(1− θ˜bs+++B ) dθA]
Firms’ revenue is
Rbs1 (LH) = D
bs
(1H1L)
(LH) pbs1 (LH)
Rbs2 (LH) =
(
Dbs2L∅(LH) +D
bs
2L2H
(LH)
)
pbsA2(LH) +(
Dbs∅2H (LH) +D
bs
2L2H
(LH)
)
pbsB2(LH).
Solving for optimal prices yields:
pbs1 (LH) = qH
φ2(3−µ−2)+4(1−µ)(φ+1)
8−2µ
pbsA2(LH) = qH µ
5φ2−6φ+2(1−µ)
8−2µ
pbsB2(LH) = qH φ,
(A.4)
where φ is the smallest positive real root of (9µ+4)φ3−(3µ2−2+8µ)µ2−(6µ2−26µ+20)φ+
4µ2 − 8µ + 4 = 0. The revenue functions are monotone in µ and thus I can apply the linear
approximation scheme used in the proof of Lemma 3.4 to obtain Rbs1 (LH) ≈ qH(35.090−27µ)
and Rbs2 (LH) ≈ qH(5.883− 1.692µ).
ScenarioHLbs : From the demand pattern depicted in Figure 3.6(b) and by setting qB1 = qL
and qB2 = qH , I obtain:
Dbs(1H1H)(HL) = 100[
pbsA2
qL∫
0
(1− θ˜bs++B ) dθA +
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
(1− θ˜bs+++B ) dθA+
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
(1− θ˜bs+B ) dθA +
1∫
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL
1 dθA]
Dbs∅2L(HL) = 100
pbsA2
qL∫
0
(θ˜bs
++
B − p
bs
B2
qL
) dθA
Dbs2L∅(HL) = 100[
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
pbsB2
qL
dθA +
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
θ˜bs
+
B dθA]
Dbs2L2L(HL) = 100
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
(θ˜bs
+++
B − p
bs
B2
qL
) dθA
159
APPENDIX
Firms’ revenue is calculated as
Rbs1 (HL) = D
bs
(1H1H)
(HL) pbs1 (HL)
Rbs2 (HL) =
(
Dbs2L∅(HL) +D
bs
2L2L
(HL)
)
pbsA2(HL) +(
Dbs∅2L(HL) +D
bs
2L2L
(HL)
)
pbsB2(HL).
Solving for optimal prices yields
pbs1 (HL) = qH
ϕ2(9+25µ−2µ2)+2(1+µ2)−4µ
4ϕ(µ+3)
pbsA2(HL) = p
bs
B2(LH) = qH ϕµ,
(A.5)
where ϕ is the smallest positive real root of (36µ3 − 192µ2 − 339µ− 81)ϕ4 − (40µ3 − 12µ2 +
32µ−60)ϕ2+4µ3−12µ2+12µ−4 = 0. The numerical linear approximation yieldsRbs1 (HL) ≈
54.409− 31.364µ and Rbs2 (HL) ≈ 6.652µ.
ScenariosHHbs andLLbs: Consider Figure 3.6(c) and let qB1 = qB2 = qX , qX ∈ {qH , qL}.
Then
Dbs(1H1X)(XX) = 100[
pbs1 −pbsB2
qH−qL∫
pbs1 −pbsA2−p
bs
B2
qH−qL
(1− θ˜bs+B ) dθA +
1∫
pbs1 −pbsB2
qH−qL
1 dθA]
Dbs∅2X (XX) = 100
pbsA2
qL∫
0
(1− pbsB2
qX
) dθA
Dbs2L∅(XX) = 100[
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
pbsB2
qX
dθA +
pbs1 −pbsA2
qH−qL∫
LbsA
θ˜bs
+
B dθA]
Dbs2L2X (XX) = 100
LbsA∫
pbs
A2
qL
(1− pbsB2
qX
) dθA
with revenues of
Rbs1 (XX) = D
bs
(1H1X)
(XX) pbs1 (XX)
Rbs2 (XX) =
(
Dbs2L∅(XX) +D
bs
2L2X
(XX)
)
pbsA2(XX) +(
Dbs∅2X (XX) +D
bs
2L2X
(XX)
)
pbsB2(XX).
Solving for optimal prices yields
pbs1 (XX) = qH
ρ2(3µ−2)+4µX(1−µ)(ρ+1)
µX(8−2µ)
pbsA2(XX) = qH µ
5ρ2−µX(6ρ+2(1−µ))
8−2µ
pbsB2(XX) = qH ρ,
(A.6)
where ρ is the smallest positive real root of (9µ + 4)ρ3 + µX(14 − 23µ)ρ2 + ψXρ + µ2X(4 −
µ2 − 8µ + 4) = 0, with ψH = 26µ − 6µ2 − 20 and ψL = 6µ3 + 2µ2 − 8µ. Here revenues
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can be well approximated by Rbs1 (HH) ≈ 36.9 − 30.556µ , Rbs2 (HH) ≈ 6.705 − 3.276µ ,
Rbs1 (LL) ≈ 25− 0.952µ and Rbs2 (LL) ≈ 13.468µ.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.12
Since scenario LHsb is analogous to scenario LHbs, I must only consider scenarios HLsb and
XXsb here. In this subgame consumers have the choice of five different service portfolios
again: They may buy firm 2’s bundle, firm 1’s services separately (either one or both) or refrain
from purchasing any service:
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 2’s bundle and firm 1’s A-service satisfy
θ˜sb
+
B =
psb2 − psbA1
qB2
+ θA
qH − qL
qB2
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 2’s bundle and firm 1’s B-service only are located
at
θ˜sb
++
B =
psbB1 − psb2
qB1 − qB2 + θA
qL
qB1 − qB2
Consumers indifferent between buying firm 2’s bundle and each of firm 1’s services separately
lie along
θ˜sb
+++
B =
psbA1 + p
sb
B1 − psb2
qB1 − qB2 − θA
qH − qL
qB1 − qB2
The locus of consumers indifferent between buying firm 2’s bundle and either firm 1’sA-service
or both services of firm 1, i.e. where θ˜sb+B = θ˜
sb+++
B is given by L
sb = (LsbA , L
sb
B ), where
LsbA =
qB1 (p
sb
A1 − psb2 ) + qB2psbB1
(qH − qL) qB1 , L
sb
B =
pbsB1
qB1
.
Scenario HLsb : Consider Figure A.2, which depicts the demand pattern in scenario HLsb.
Set qB1 = qH and qB2 = qL. Demand is then given by:
Dsb∅1H (HL) = 100
psbA1
qH∫
0
(1− θ˜sb++B ) dθA
Dsb1H1H (HL) = 100[
LsbA∫
psb
A1
qH
(1− θ˜sb+++B ) dθA +
1∫
LsbA
(1− LsbB ) dθA]
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Dsb1H∅(HL) = 100[
LsbA∫
psb
A1
−psb2
qH−qL
θ˜sb
+
B dθA +
1∫
LsbA
LsbB dθA]
Dsb(2L2L)(HL) = 100− Dsb∅1H (HL)−Dsb1H1H (HL)−
Dsb1H∅(HL)−
psb2
qL∫
0
θ̂sbB2 dθA
(2 2 )L L
1 1H H
Ø1H
1 ØH
Figure A.2: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario HLsb
Firms’ revenue is
Rsb1 (HL) =
(
Dsb1H∅(HL) +D
sb
1H1H
(HL)
)
psbA1(HL) +(
Dsb∅1H (HL) +D
sb
1H1H
(HL)
)
psbB1(HL)
Rsb2 (HL) = D
sb
(2L2L)
(HL) psb2 (HL).
The expressions representing the optimal prices are very lengthy and therefore omitted here,
but most certainly available upon request. The revenue functions are monotone in µ, however,
and thus I can apply the linear approximation scheme used in the proof of Lemma 3.4 again to
obtain Rsb1 (HL) ≈ qH(50.722− 27.428µ) and Rsb2 (HL) ≈ qH(6.092µ).
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Scenarios HHsb and LLsb: Finally, see Figure A.3 for the demand pattern in scenario
XXsb, where qB1 = qB2 = qX . Hence I find:
Dsb∅1X (XX) = 100
psb2 −psbB1
qL∫
0
(1− LsbB ) dθA
Dsb1H∅(XX) = 100[
LsbA∫
psb
A1
qH
θ˜sb
+
B dθA +
1∫
LsbA
LsbB dθA]
Dsb1H1X (XX) = 100
1∫
LsbA
(1− LsbB ) dθA
Dsb(2L2L)(HL) = 100[
psbA1
qH∫
psb2 −psbB1
qL
(1− θ̂sbB2) dθA +
LsbA∫
psb
A1
qH
(1− θ˜sb+B ) dθA]
(2 2 )L X 1 1H XØ1X
1 ØH
Figure A.3: Bundle Pricing Subgame: Scenario XXsb
Firms’ revenue is
Rsb1 (XX) =
(
Dsb1H∅(XX) +D
sb
1H1X
(XX)
)
psbA1(XX) +(
Dsb∅1X (XX) +D
sb
1H1X
(XX)
)
psbB1(XX)
Rsb2 (XX) = D
sb
(2L2X)
(XX) psb2 (XX).
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Again, the optimal prices are very lengthy and therefore omitted. Likewise, the revenue func-
tions are monotone in µ, and I apply the linear approximation scheme such that Rsb1 (HH) ≈
qH(25 − 11.32µ) , Rsb2 (HH) ≈ qH(8µ) , Rsb1 (LL) ≈ qH(25 − 13.58µ) and Rsb2 (LL) ≈
qH(7.26µ).
A.6 Proof of Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3
Scenario LHuu: Consider Figure 4.1 and see that demand for each service portfolio can be
written as:
Duu(1H1L)(LH) = 100[
puuA1
qH∫
LuuA
(θ˜uu
+++
B − θ̂uuB1) dθA +
puuA1+p
uu
B2−p
uu
2
qH−qL∫
puu
A1
qH
(θ˜uu
+++
B − p
uu
1 −puuA1
qL
) dθA +
1∫
puu
A1
+puu
B2
−puu2
qH−qL
(
puuA1+p
uu
B2−puu1
qH−qL −
puu1 −puuA1
qL
) dθA]
Duu(2L2H)(LH) = 100[
LuuA∫
puu2 −puuB2
qL
(1− θ̂uuB2) dθA +
puuA1+p
uu
B2−p
uu
2
qH−qL∫
LuuA
(1− θ˜uu+++B ) dθA]
Duu1H∅(LH) = 100
1∫
puu
A1
qH
puu1 −puuA1
qL
dθA
Duu∅2H (LH) = 100
puu2 −puuB2
qL∫
0
(1− puuB2
qH
) dθA
Duu1H2H (LH) = 100
1∫
puu
A1
+puu
B2
−puu2
qH−qL
(1− puuA1+puuB2−puu1
qH−qL ) dθA
Consequently, firms’ revenues amount to
Ruu1 (LH) = D
uu
(1H1L)
(LH) puu1 +
(
Duu1H∅(LH) +D
uu
1H2H
(LH)
)
puuA1
Ruu2 (LH) = D
uu
(2L2H)
(LH) puu2 +
(
Duu∅2H (LH) +D
uu
1H2H
(LH)
)
puuB2
Setting qL = µ qH and solving for optimal prices yields:
puu1 (LH) =p
uu
2 (LH) = qH  (A.7)
puuA1(LH) =p
uu
B2(LH) = qH
2(3(1− µ) + 2µ2) + (2(µ2 − 1)− µ3 + µ)
(3(µ3 + 1)− µ2 − µ)− 2(µ3 − µ2 − µ+ 2)+
qH
µ4 − µ3 − µ2 + µ
(3(µ3 + 1)− µ2 − µ)− 2(µ3 − µ2 − µ+ 2) , (A.8)
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where  is the unique real root of (21µ3 − 22µ2 + 21µ) 4 − (18µ4 + 30µ3−6µ2 + 18 , µ +
36)3+(−9µ5 + 10µ4 + 50µ3 − 28µ2 + 7µ+ 66) 2+(28µ5−40+52µ2−28µ3−12µ4)+
3µ7−2µ6−7µ5+12µ4+5µ3−18µ2−µ+8 = 0 for which the Hessian is negative semidefinite.
To ensure the existence of the equilibrium, the denominator of the right hand side of (A.8) must
be nonzero. This is warranted for all µ < 0.4068533092.
Scenario HLuu: In scenario HL firms specialize on either the high- or low-quality segment
again. Thus, consumers have the option of buying a high- or low-quality bundle, i.e. (1H1H)
or (2L2L), a high-quality service in market A or a low-quality service in market B individually,
i.e. 1H∅ or ∅2L, or to assemble an individual service portfolio, i.e. 1H2L. If all of these services
were offered, the demand structure would look as in Figure 4.2(a).
However, it turns out that it is in fact not optimal for firm 2, i.e. the designated low-quality
firm, to offer its low-quality home product individually because thereby it would cannibalize
the price of its bundle too much. Of course, if firm 2 refrains from offering its home service
individually (or sets the price puuB2 arbitrarily high), consumers have two options less because
they can neither buy ∅2L nor assemble a package of 1H2L. Thereby, the demand structure can
be simplified to the one depicted by Figure 4.2(b).
Hence, firms’ demand can be written as:
Duu(1H1H)(HL) = 100[
PuuA∫
0
(1− θ˜uu+++B ) dθA +
1∫
PuuA
(1− puu1 −puuA1
qH
) dθA]
Duu1H∅(HL) = 100[
PuuA∫
puu
A1
−puu2
qH−qL
θ˜uu
++
B dθA +
1∫
PuuA
puu1 −puuA1
qH
dθA]
Duu(2L2L)(HL) = 100[
puu2
qL∫
0
(θ˜uu
+++
B − θ̂uuB2) dθA +
puuA1−p
uu
2
qH−qL∫
puu2
qL
θ˜uu
+++
B dθA +
PuuA∫
puu
A1
−puu2
qH−qL
(θ˜uu
+++
B − θ˜uu++B ) dθA]
From the corresponding revenue functions
Ruu1 (HL) =D
uu
(1H1H)
(HL) puu1 +D
uu
1H∅(HL) p
uu
A1
Ruu2 (HL) =D
uu
(2L2L)
(HL) puu2
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one can compute the optimal prices as:
puuA1
∗(HL) =ϕu µ (A.9)
puu1
∗(HL) =qH
ϕ2u(27µ
3 − 147µ2 − 219µ− 81)− ϕu(48µ3 − 144µ2 + 96µ)
ϕu(27µ3 − 102µ2 + 81µ)− 12µ3 − 76µ2 + 196µ− 108 +
qH
76µ3 − 106µ2 + 184µ− 54
ϕu(27µ3 − 102µ2 + 81µ)− 12µ3 − 76µ2 + 196µ− 108 (A.10)
puu2
∗(HL) =qH
ϕ2u(27µ
3 − 198µ2 + 243µ)− ϕu(72µ3 − 600µ2 + 1176µ− 648)
4(ϕu(27µ3 − 102µ2 + 81µ)− 12µ3 − 76µ2 + 196µ− 108) +
qH
180µ4 − 847µ3 + 1640µ2 − 1378µ+ 432
4(ϕu(27µ3 − 102µ2 + 81µ)− 12µ3 − 76µ2 + 196µ− 108) (A.11)
where ϕu(µ) is the unique positive real root of (2673µ5 − 13491µ4 + 19683µ3 −
6561µ2)ϕu
4+2736µ5 − 39360µ4 + 120864µ3 − 119232µ2 + 34992µϕu3+
(21528µ6 − 106164µ2 − 46656 − 117020µ3 − 87572µ5 + 154656µ + 183820µ4 −
2592µ7)ϕu
2+ (2304µ7−7360µ6−23328µ5+226560µ4−563648µ3+626112µ2−322848µ+
62208)ϕu+3088µ
7−30848µ6+145284µ5−355564µ4+477884µ3−355236µ2 +136128µ−
20736 = 0 at which the Hessian is negative semidefinite. Obviously, it must hold that
ϕu(µ) > 0, which translates into µ < 0.471442316.
Scenarios HHuu and LLuu: First, see that when firms choose to offer the same service
quality qX ∈ {qH , qL} in market B, consumers have no desire to assemble their own service
portfolio: Buying the respective home services individually would give a consumer a high-
quality service in market A and a service of quality qX in market B. The very same service
portfolio is offered through firm 1’s bundle, however, at a presumably lower price. Thus, only
four demand regions are feasible (cf. Figure 4.3). Demands are calculated as follows:
Duu(1H1X)(XX) = 100[
puuA1
qH∫
LuuA
(1− θ̂uuB1) dθA +
1∫
puu
A1
qH
(1− puu1 −puuA1
qX
) dθA]
Duu(2L2X)(XX) = 100
LuuA∫
puu2 −puuB2
qL
(1− θ̂uuB2) dθA
Duu1H∅(XX) = 100
1∫
puu
A1
qH
puu1 −puuA1
qX
dθA
Duu∅2X (XX) = 100
puu2 −puuB2
qL∫
0
(1− puuB2
qX
)dθA
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Revenues amount to:
Ruu1 (XX) =D
uu
(1H1X)
(XX) puu1 +D
uu
1H∅(XX) p
uu
A1
Ruu2 (XX) =D
uu
(2L2X)
(XX) puu2 +D
uu
∅2X (XX) p
uu
B2
Computing the optimal prices yields
puuA1
∗(XX) =puu1
∗(XX) (A.12)
puuB2
∗(XX) =puu2
∗(XX). (A.13)
Consequently, no consumer will want to purchase any of the services sold separately, because
he could also buy the firm’s bundle at no extra cost. Thus, de facto firms refrain from offering
their home services individually and I obtain the same results and prices as under pure bundle
pricing (Section 3.3.3).
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With the advent of digital convergence, incumbent telephone and cable companies 
have begun to offer their services, such as voice telephony, Internet and TV in so-called 
triple play packages. While carefully recognizing the technological, legal and economic 
framework of the fixed-line telecommunications industry, this book investigates whether 
bundling is indeed a profitable pricing strategy for the firms and if it can possibly facili-
tate the leverage of market power into neighboring markets. In contrast to previous work 
on bundling, a symmetric duopoly market structure is considered, with two firms having 
market power in their respective home markets, but without any clear ex-ante advantage 
for either firm on the converged market.
This book also serves as a basic introduction into the technological, economic and re-
gulatory concepts of communications as well as into the theory of bundling.
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